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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
These sprays, dusts, and aerosols are now applied almost universally to farms, 
gardens, forests, and homes  nonselective chemicals that have the power to kill 
every insect, the good and the bad, to still the song of birds and the leaping of 
fish in streams, to coat the leaves with a deadly film, and to linger on in soil  all 
this though the intended target may be only a few weeds or insects. Can anyone 
believe it is possible to lay down such a barrage of poisons on the surface of the 
earth without making it unfit for all life?2  
  
If Rachel Carson were alive today I believe she would give America a mixed grade.3 
 
If you heard a strange rumbling sound in late 2004, it may have been Rachel Carson rolling over in 
her grave in response to the National Audubon Societys alarming State of the Birds Report.4  The 
Report concludes that despite all of the environmental laws, regulations, polices, and programs established 
since Rachel Carson first sounded the environmental alarm, a large percentage of avian species found in 
the continental United States are in a significant state of decline.5  While pesticides are only one of the 
many causes implicated in the bird declines,6 that fact cannot be ignored that despite Carsons dire 
warnings, and more than thirty years of intensive regulation, pesticides continue to pose significant risks 
to birds, other wildlife and ecosystems in general.  
One of the great ironies of environmental law is that the ecological consequences of pesticide use, 
such as the devastating impacts DDT had on predatory  bird populations, which fueled the environmental 
                                                 
2  RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 7-8 (40th Anniv. Ed., First Mariner Books 2002). 
3  E.O. WILSON, Afterword, in RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 362 (40th Anniv. Ed., First Mariner Books 2002). 
4  In the fall of 2004, the National Audubon Society (AUDUBON) published its State of the Birds USA 2004 report in 
Audubon magazine (hereinafter Audubon Report).  A copy of the report may be viewed on the Internet at 
www.audubon.org/bird/stateofthebirds/.  In the Report, Audubon evaluated the status of 654 bird species native to the 
continental United States.  The species evaluated inhabit the nations four major types of natural habitat  grass, shrubs, 
tree and water.  The Report revealed a very disturbing trend, demonstrating that large percentages of bird species utilizing 
all of these habitats are in significant decline. The declines range from 13 percent to 70 percent, depending on the habitat 
type used by the species.  Id.  In addition to the Audubon Report, another significant report on the decline of bird species 
conducted by researchers at Stanford University was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 
2004.  Cagan H. Sekercioglu, Gretchen C. Daily and Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Consequences of Bird Declines, PNAS 
2004 101: 18042-18047.  This report predicts that by the year 2100, ten percent of all bird species are likely to disappear 
and that another fifteen percent could be on the brink of extinction.  Id.  Moreover, The Center for Biological Diversity 
recently released a report that found that EPA has approved registrations for pesticides that put more than 375 Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) listed species at risk. Brian Litmans & Jeff Miller, Silent Spring Revisited:  Pesticide Use and 
Endangered Species (A Center for Biological Diversity Report, 2004), available at 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/ (Last visited, August 4, 2005). 
5  Audubon Report. 
6  The Report identifies habitat loss as the leading cause of bird declines, with other factors, such as pesticide poisoning 
contributing to the declines.  Id. 
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movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely have been ignored for the past 30 years.  Only very 
recently has there been renewed interest in the ecological (as opposed to human health) risks posed by 
pesticides.7  Moreover, the explosion of pesticidal genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture 
has raised concerns regarding the novel risks to biodiversity posed by these new pesticides.  Surprisingly, 
however, the primary federal statute governing pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),8 has not changed significantly with regard to ecological matters since 1972 and 
remains primarily a consumer protection statute not well suited for ecological protection.  Moreover, the 
manner in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has implemented FIFRA has not kept pace 
with developments in our understanding of the uncertainty, complexity, and changing nature of ecological 
systems. 
For years, environmental legal scholars have sought a middle ground between absolutist risk-based 
approaches to environmental regulation and cost/benefit analysis approaches. In the past several years, 
scholars have begun exploring the emerging field of eco-pragmatism  a framework for environmental 
decision-making developed by Professor Daniel Farber -- as a way to achieve a workable middle ground.  
At the same time, scholars have begun to look at environmental law through the lens of ecological science. 
 Common themes of complexity, uncertainty and change permeate both eco-pragmatism and ecological 
science.  Science has only scratched the surface of understanding complex ecological systems.  What little 
is understood about ecological science, teaches us that ecological systems are extremely complex, and 
ever changing.  Eco-pragmatism seeks to address concerns with complexity, uncertainty and the change.  
By incorporating an understanding of ecological science into eco-pragmatism, these challenging issues can 
be addressed more effectively.  Accordingly, an integrated approach drawing on the discipline of ecology
the study of the interactions of living organisms and their environments--and eco-pragmatism can provide 
a comprehensive framework for environmental regulation to protect ecological resources.  To date, no 
significant attempts have been made to analyze FIFRA,9 and only a few attempts have been made to 
analyze any other traditional pollution control law, comprehensively under eco-pragmatism or using 
                                                 
7  See, e.g., Wash. Toxics Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Order issued January 22, 2004.   
8  7 U.S.C. § 136 -136y (2004). 
9  In fact, very few scholarly efforts have been made to analyze FIFRA in any comprehensive way at all.  For one of the 
more comprehensive scholarly works, see Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons From Federal Pesticide Regulation on the 
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. L. REF. 369 (1993) (using an analysis of FIFRA to 
frame an argument for an alternative framework for environmental law reform, which more aggressively addresses the 
causes of environmental problems, rather than relying on risk-based priority setting.). 
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principles of ecological science.10  Pesticide law, perhaps more than any other pollution control law, lends 
itself to such analyses.   
Since 1972 when FIFRA was amended to take environmental concerns into account, considerable 
advances have been made in the ecological sciences.  Because regulation under FIFRA is accomplished 
through a national registration of products, risks are assessed on a one-time nationwide basis.  
Accordingly, localized ecological concerns are not considered.  Moreover, the regulation of pesticides is 
unique in that, unlike other areas of environmental protection where environmental laws can seek to 
eliminate or minimize hazardous releases that result in unintended consequences of manufacturing or other 
processes, pesticides are intentionally released into the environment for the express purpose of killing, 
injuring or disrupting the behavior of living organisms in the environment.  In other words, with 
pesticides, simply keeping them out of the environment is not an option.  Consequently, the complexity 
and uncertainty manifest in ecological systems, as well as the disequilibria inherent in such systems, must 
be addressed as part of any system designed to address ecological risks posed by pesticides.  This Article 
attempts to advance eco-pragmatism by consciously integrating principles of ecological science into an 
eco-pragmatic framework.  In addition, by employing the experiential approach inherent in eco-
pragmatism, this Article utilizes experience gleaned from over thirty years of U.S. policy on pesticide 
regulation to propose improvements to pesticide regulation within an eco-pragmatic framework. 
Part II of this Article provides an analysis of eco-pragmatic theory.  This Part further demonstrates 
the need for eco-pragmatic theory to be expanded to better integrate ecological concerns and shows how 
ecological principles can be used to bolster and further develop eco-pragmatism.  Part III lays out the 
history of ecological issues in pesticide regulation and highlights the areas where current pesticide law 
does not adequately address ecological concerns.  The ecological risks posed by traditional synthetic 
chemical pesticides and pesticidal genetically modified organisms are set forth.  This Part further 
demonstrates that for pesticide regulation, in particular, it is imperative to expand the role of ecological 
considerations.  Part IV of this Article describes current U.S. pesticide law and its application.  Part V 
evaluates FIFRA from an eco-pragmatic perspective and concludes that although some components of the 
statute are surprisingly eco-pragmatic, substantially more could be done to use eco-pragmatic theory as a 
means to improve FIFRAs ability to protect ecological integrity.  Finally, in Part VI, a new Eco-
                                                 
10  One recent attempt to analyze the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 - 1387, using ecological principles is Robert 
Adler, Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 Envtl. 
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pragmatic approach to pesticide regulation is proposed. 
II.  ECO-PRAGMATISM 
A.  The Historical Roots of Pragmatism 
The roots of eco-pragmatism can be traced back to the philosophical pragmatism11  
movement of the early twentieth century.  In its broadest sense, pragmatism can be described as a 
philosophy that relies on action, experimentation and workable solutions, rather than theoretical 
constructs.12  An aspect of philosophical pragmatism that is particularly relevant to integrating 
ecological principles into environmental law is pragmatisms flexibility, which is rooted in the 
acceptance of indeterminacy and the limitations of human understanding.13  Pragmatists embrace 
the idea that as more knowledge becomes available, and as society evolves, ethical concerns also 
evolve.  This philosophical acceptance of indeterminacy and change complements the ecological 
principles of uncertainty and change, which are discussed in greater detail below.  
Pragmatists also recognize that communities may hold many conflicting values.  Pragmatic 
methodology is designed to resolve conflicts in the way that best serves the community.14  
                                                                                                                                                                      
L. 29 (2003). 
11  Philosophical pragmatism has been applied over the years to a variety of disciplines.  For example, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes is credited with developing legal pragmatism, an attempt to apply pragmatism to legal theory.  Legal pragmatism 
grew out of Holmes belief that the law evolves out of experience rather than logic.  Other proponents of legal pragmatism 
included Benjamin Cardozo and Richard Posner.  See Joel A. Mintz, Some Thoughts on the Merits of Pragmatism as a 
Guide to Environmental Protection, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.REV. 1, 9-13 (2004).   
12  For a good discussion of early philosophical pragmatism, see generally Mintz, supra note 11. Philosophical pragmatism 
rejects dogma and particular outcomes in favor of a method of using experience and experimentation to determine what 
works. Mintz, supra note 11, at 1.  In pragmatism, decisions are measured by their consequences and the extent to which 
they fulfill the needs of society.  Pragmatism has been described as emphasizing practice over theory. See Ruhl, supra 
note CC, at 531.  Pragmatists believe that the value of an idea stems from its practical ability to benefit the community and 
to solve societys problems.  SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 14 (2003).  One of the most influential philosophical pragmatists of the twentieth century, John 
Dewey stressed the idea that knowledge is better gleaned from experience than abstract reasoning.  See generally, JOHN 
DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (Eugene Freeman, ed., 2d. Ed. 1971).  Other traditional philosophical pragmatists 
include William James, Charles Pierce, Josiah Royce and George Herbert Mead.  Mintz, supra note 11 at 1-2.  Also, see 
generally, THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS (Milton Konvitz and Gail Kennedy, eds. 1960).  In keeping with this practical 
measure of the value of ideas, pragmatists believe that ideas are valuable and true when they are accepted by what is 
referred to as a critical community of inquiry. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra at 16.  In other words, only after a 
community has analyzed, deliberated and vetted an idea and found it to be beneficial in solving a problem is that idea 
valuable to the community.  Further, the value of such ideas changes as the community changes.  
13  Early twentieth century philosophical pragmatists were fascinated by the scientific developments of the time.  Darwins 
theory of evolution led these early pragmatists to view human thought in evolutionary terms, constantly evolving as a 
problem-solving capacity, oriented towards survival. Id. at 15 (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 796 (1989).  Decisions may change as new experience or experimentation point to better ways to 
meet such societal needs.  
14  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 20.  
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Conflicts over environmental policy and law are borne of the conflicting values of those who seek 
to reduce environmental risks and those whose primary concern is economic efficiency.15  Thus, 
pragmatism can serve as a useful tool to reconcile the inevitable conflicts, which environmental 
policy must address.16  
B.  Farbers Eco-pragmatism 
Professor Daniel Farbers 1999 book, Ecopragmatism,17 paved the way for the recent flurry 
of scholarship attempting to use pragmatic theory as a guiding principle for environmental 
regulation.18  Many environmental law scholars seemingly have been yearning for a theoretical 
                                                 
15  See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 522, 23 (2000) (book review).(stating that [s]ince almost immediately after its statutory big bang in the 
early 1970s, [footnote omitted] two extreme and opposing philosophies  one devoted to protecting the economy and the 
other to protecting the environment  have waged a war of annihilation that has left in its wake a mish-mash of laws, 
regulations, judicial opinions, and countless administrative decisions and policies that we today call environmental law). 
16  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 21, 52.  
17  DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35 
(1999).  Eco-pragmatism draws on the wider movement in legal scholarship known as legal pragmatism FARBER, supra 
note AA, at 9.  Legal pragmatism holds that decisions should be made by drawing on many sources.  In the environmental 
setting, these sources include scientific understanding and normative judgments, as well as economic considerations. Id. at 
10.  Professor Farbers book starts from the premise that the legitimacy of environmental values is a given in the U.S. The 
harder question, he maintains, is what priority to assign to those environmental values, and how to weigh them against 
other values such as economic needs.  A basic tenet of Farbers approach is that for environmental law to be socially 
sustainable, it must be pluralist, flexible and not overly draconian.  In other words, to be socially sustainable, environmental 
protection must proceed as a marathon, not a sprint. Id. at 13. 
18  Although Farber was the first to develop the field of eco-pragmatism, the field of Environmental Pragmatism had been in 
existence since the late1980s.  See, e.g., ANDREW LIGHT AND ERIC KATZ, ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM (1996).  
Environmental pragmatism was developed as a way to apply philosophical pragmatism to attempt to address environmental 
concerns. Mintz, supra note 11, at 6.  Although eco-pragmatism certainly derives much from environmental pragmatism, 
Farbers eco-pragmatism is an attempt to apply pragmatism to environmental laws and policies in particular.  Id. at 14. 
Farbers book has been reviewed by a number of prominent environmental law scholars, generating varied reactions. While 
some scholars have expressed reservations over Farbers ideas, others have generally reacted positively to the overall thrust 
of the book, if not to the specifics.  See Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1421 
(2000) (book review) (criticizing Farbers approach for being too modest and not sufficiently transformative); Christopher 
H. Schroeder, Clear Consensus, Ambiguous Commitment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1876, 1880 (2000) (book review) (describing 
Farbers book as containing valuable discussion of [environmental] problems [and] offering important insights into 
dealing with them.); Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests and Pragmatists, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1065, 1097(2003) 
(stating that Pragmatisms essential appeal is thus that it is the best bet for putting environmental policy on a glide path to 
the goals that the [environmental] prophets wants, and indeed the steepest glide path feasible.); J. B. Ruhl, supra note 15 
(generally providing a very favorable review of eco-pragmatism, but expressing disappointment for its lack of passion).  
See also Paul Boudreax, Environmental Costs, Benefits, and Values: A review of Daniel A. Farbers Eco-Pragmatism, 13 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J 125, 167 (1999) (book review) (stating that while Farbers Eco-Pragmatism provides a good starting point 
for broad-based thinking about problems in environmental law, it fails in its specific recommendations on how to apply 
Pragmatism to environmental policy).  Despite any perceived shortcomings in the book, it cannot be denied that Farbers 
ideas have been provocative and have led the way for a flurry of scholarly analysis of how pragmatic ideas could be applied 
to environmental law.  See e.g., THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC 
VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, JIM CHEN, ED. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE  (Environmental Law Institute 2003)(a 
compilation of writing on eco-Pragmatism and related concepts including works by Jim Chen, Daniel Farber, J.B. Ruhl, 
Dan Tarlock, Christine Klein, Jonathon Alder, Christopher Schroeder, Douglas Kysar, James Salzman, Richard Lazarus, 
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framework to guide the development of an environmental middle ground between the two 
extremes of absolute risk-based regulation, which does not adequately take costs into account and 
cost/benefit analysis,19 which as described in section III.C.2.a below has many shortcomings in the 
area of environmental protection.  Eco-pragmatism, for many, provides the rationale for moving 
beyond the goal of economic efficiency and focusing instead on attempting to reduce human and 
environmental risks to the extent feasible.20  Nevertheless, despite the recent wealth of scholarship 
on eco-pragmatism, very few attempts have been made to apply the approach in any systematic 
way to an existing environmental regulatory scheme.21 
In his book, Farber outlines the four most difficult questions that need to be answered in 
developing an environmental regulatory system: 1) How we determine how much an 
environmental rule is worth, which taps into the long-standing debate over risk-based approaches 
to environmental protection versus cost/benefit approaches; 2) The appropriate baseline for 
environmental decision-making, which raises the issue of whether there is some inherent value in 
environmental protection such that we should err on the side of protection; 3) How we determine 
how much it is worth to spend today to achieve a benefit that may not occur until decades into the 
future, which raises the issue of what is the appropriate discount rate to use in environmental 
valuation;22 and 4) How we know when to proceed in the face of imperfect information, which 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Lisa Heinzerling, Holly Doremus, and Alyson Flournoy, among others); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 46 
(arguing that pragmatism provides the rationale for regulating based on risk, which has been missing from debates on 
environmental policy); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco)Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1037 (2003)(arguing that 
eco-pragmatisms middle ground compromise and flexibility must be tempered to include clear rules that can be adjusted 
over time.  Farber himself has continued to weigh-in on the subject. See Daniel A. Farber, Building Bridges Over Troubled 
Waters: Eco-Pragmatism and the Environmental Prospect, 87 MINN. L. REV. 854 (2003). 
19  FARBER, supra note 17, at 35. 
20  See generally SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 (providing much of the justification for a pragmatic approach to 
environmental law that Farbers book was criticized for lacking.)   
21  One of the few attempts to apply an eco-pragmatic approach to environmental law is J.B. Ruhls 2003 article, Is the 
Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003).  In this article, Ruhl identifies what he refers to as 
the five pillars of eco-pragmatism: 1) drawing an environmental baseline; 2) institutionalizing the precautionary principle; 
3) integrating impact assessment; 4) the importance of empiricism; and 5) adaptive management.  Id. at 888-889.  After 
testing the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against these five pillars, Ruhl concludes that all the eco-pragmatism pieces are 
there.  Id. at 941.  For example, Ruhl identifies the ESAs jeopardy prohibition as providing an environmental baseline, 
the ESAs take prohibition as an institutionalization of the precautionary principle, the ESAs incidental take procedure as 
utilizing impact assessment, the ESAs best available evidence standard as employing empiricism, and the recent 
implementation of habitat conservation planning under the ESA as incorporating adaptive management techniques.  Id. at 
941. 
22  There is much debate over the appropriate discount rates that should be used in environmental cost/benefit analyses or 
other forms of balancing, such as constrained balancing.  The higher the discount rate used, the more likely that the analysis 
will conclude that the resource using or polluting activity is efficient. Whereas, a low discount rate affords greater value to 
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raises the related issues of whether precautionary approaches should be used in environmental 
decision-making and how to incorporate adaptive management ideas into environmental laws.  
Farber sets out to answer these questions within a pragmatic framework, finding that the pragmatic 
answers to the four questions are: 1) economics should be utilized in a hybrid approach which 
bridges the gap between pure risk-based and cost/benefit approaches; 2) environmental law should 
start with a presumption in favor of the environment (an environmental baseline); 3) a low 
discount rate should be employed in the valuation of long-term environmental benefits; and 4) 
flexible, adaptive approaches are necessary to allow regulation to adapt as new information 
becomes available.  Despite the strengths of eco-pragmatism, as described more fully below, the 
theory could be strengthened considerably by more consciously incorporating into it principles of 
ecological science. 
C.  Strengthening the Eco in Eco-pragmatism 
1.  Background Discussion 
In his review of Farbers work, Professor J.B. Ruhl has described eco-pragmatism as a 
marriage of two themes: the eco theme, a scientifically based theme, which focuses on the 
dynamic character of natural systems, and the pragmatic theme, which draws on the philosophy 
of pragmatism.23  As Ruhl describes it, the fusion of the concept of ecological dynamism and 
environmental pragmatism form eco-pragmatism, a new approach to environmental decisions 
making in an uncertain world.24  Despite his general affinity for eco-pragmatism, Ruhl expresses 
                                                                                                                                                                      
future benefits, and as a result, is more likely to conclude that the benefits of regulation outweigh the costs.  Cost/benefit 
and other balancing analyses are influenced dramatically by the choice of discount rate.  Eco-pragmatism argues in favor of 
the use of a low discount rate.  FARBER, supra note 17 at 89-90,133.  Although a detailed discussion of the appropriate 
discount rate to use in environmental decision-making is used is beyond the scope of this article, there are sound reasons 
for adopting a low discount rate.  For instance, the consequences of environmental decisions extend deep into the future.  
The further out in time we attempt to predict environmental consequences, the more the accuracy of such projections 
diminishes. FARBER, supra note 17 at 133. Using a low discount rate is a way to take the long view. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 
539.  A low discount rate does not devalue long-term environmental benefits.  Moreover, our limited understanding of 
environmental issues lends support to more cautious predictions of future benefits.  As hard as it is to put a dollar value on 
environmental values, it is almost impossible to put a dollar value on what they will be worth in twenty or thirty years.  Our 
limited understanding of natural systems suggests we may not even begin to understand the value that natural systems may 
be found to hold in the future.  High discount rates can make significant future benefits look insignificant today. FARBER, 
supra note 17 at 151.  Perhaps the most compelling rationale for employing low discount rates is what is known as inter-
generational equity.  There is so much that is not known about the value of natural systems today, that it would be reckless 
to fritter away resources today which may later be found to have great value (utilitarian or otherwise) to future generations. 
Id. at 151-152.  Thus, we should be prudent in how much we discount the environmental benefits that natural systems hold 
for future generations. 
23  J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 523. 
24 Id. at 524.  
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disappointment that Farbers work fails to address, except in a very cursory fashion, the eco 
partner in the eco-pragmatism marriage.25  As Ruhl points out, the past thirty years have evidenced 
dramatic changes in the study of natural systems.26  During this period, the field of ecology has 
come into its own, and the new fields of conservation biology and ecosystem management have 
been born.  Moreover, unprecedented developments in our understanding of natural systems have 
occurred.  Our once-accepted view of the balance of nature has been challenged and we now are 
beginning to see nature as being considerably  more complex and dynamic than we once 
believed.27  Accordingly, environmental decision-makers must accept, and incorporate into their 
decision-making the continually changing nature of ecosystems.28 
A close study of ecological principles reveals that these principles are consistent in many 
ways with eco-pragmatism, and in fact, may serve to bolster and further develop Farbers ideas.  A 
good starting point for an attempt to understand the complexity of, uncertainty and changing 
nature of natural systems is an understanding of the numerous fields of inquiry and terminology 
used to describe these systems.  Ecology is the science of the interactions of living organisms with 
each other and their physical environment.29  The field of ecology has existed for many decades; 
however, it has only been in the last twenty years or so, that ecological study has advanced to the 
point where we are beginning to understand the importance of biodiversity to natural systems.  
Biodiversity has been defined as the richness, abundance, and variability of plant and animal 
species and communities and the ecological processes that link them with one another and with 
soil, air and water.30 The measure of biodiversity is not merely an accounting of the number of 
species present in an area; it also has a functional component.31 Accordingly, a focus on preserving 
individual species from extinction is not sufficient to preserve biodiversity unless ecological 
processes are also maintained.32 Thus, an overriding goal of biodiversity protection is to maintain 
all of the elements of biodiversity, including both structural diversity (i.e., forms and levels of 
                                                 
25  Id.          
26  Id. 
27  See generally, DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(1990) and Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 875 (1994). 
28  Ruhl, supra note CC, at 528.  
29  RICHARD O. BROOKS ET AL., LAW AND ECOLOGY: THE RISE OF THE ECOSYSTEM REGIME at 7 (ASHGATE, 2002).  
30  MALCOM L. HUNTER, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20-21 (1996) (providing the 1993 Wildlife 
Society definition of biodiversity).  
31  Id. at 21. 
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organization) and functional biodiversity (i.e., ecological and evolutionary functions).33 
A relatively new applied scientific discipline, conservation biology, addresses the complex 
relationship between human activities and the protection of ecological systems.  Professor Michael 
Soule, one of the founders of Conservation Biology has defined it as a new stage in the 
application of science to conservation problems, [which] addresses the biology of species, 
communities, and ecosystems that are perturbed, either directly of indirectly, by human activities 
or other agents.  Its goal is to provide principles and tools for preserving biological diversity.34  
Although conservation biology is still a relatively young, and not well-defined, science, 
certain postulates have been proposed.  Professor Soule divides these postulates into two 
categories: 1)  functional postulates; and 2) ethical or normative postulates.35  He describes the 
functional postulates as a set of fundamental rules gleaned from basic sciences, including ecology, 
that are geared toward the maintenance of both the form and function of natural biological 
systems.36  Perhaps most pertinent for legal analysis are Soules ethical or normative postulates, 
which can be utilized as a fundamental ecological baseline for an environmental management or  
regulatory system: 1) biological diversity is good; and 2) ecological complexity is good.37 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32  See id. at 21. 
33  Id. at 21, 28. 
34  Michael E. Soule, What is Conservation Biology? In  ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSITY ( R. Edward 
Grumbine, ed., Island Press, 1994).  Conservation biology has also been described as a regulatory science that seeks to 
develop scientific standards that can be applied to regulatory criteria and then to develop the management strategies to meet 
these standards. A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental 
Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1130 (1994).  Conservation biology arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a reaction 
to the unprecedented worldwide extinction crisis that many biologists believe is occurring due to the activities of humans. 
HUNTER, supra note 30,at 14.  Accordingly, conservation biology is an applied crisis discipline that is to biology what 
surgery is to physiology Soule, supra at 35.  The driving force behind conservation biology is the belief that without serious 
efforts to reverse the trend of mass extinctions, millions of species may be at risk of extinction Id.at 48.  The loss of species 
may have devastating consequences for humans, as well as for the planet as a whole.   Due to the permanence of extinction, 
rare species are often the focus of conservation biology.  EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 228 (Harvard 
University Press 1992). The seminal works on conservation biology include: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: AN 
EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael E. Soule & Bruce A. Wilcox, eds., Sinauer 1980) and CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY: RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT DECADE (Michael E. Soule & Cordon H. Orians, eds., Island Press 2001). 
35  Soule, supra note 34, at 38-45. 
36  Soules functional postulates include the following: 1) Many species are products of co-evolutionary processes  i.e., in 
most communities, species make up a significant part of other species environment; 2) Species are interdependent  i.e., 
mutualistic relationships exist between many species and thus, there are always uncertainties about the impact that the 
extinction of one species will have on another Species; 3) Many species are highly specialized. i.e., the majority of animal 
species depend on a particular host.  Thus, if such a host becomes extinct, many other species may be adversely affected; 4) 
Extinction of keystone species can have long-term consequences; 5) Introduction of generalist species may reduce 
diversity; and 6) Many ecological processes have thresholds below and which they become discontinuous, chaotic or 
suspended.  Id. at 38-42. 
37  Id. at 42-44.  
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Most of the law and policy initiatives focused on conservation biology and biodiversity 
protection have focused on deciding which lands to preserve based on their diversity, uniqueness, 
connectivity to other lands, or other factors. While the importance of preserving significant  lands 
cannot be overstated, such preservation would be in vain if steps are not taken to address 
contamination of air, water and land, both inside and outside of preserved areas.  Environmental 
pollution is the most subtle form of ecological degradation and despite the banning of numerous 
pesticides over the past thirty years, pesticide pollution remains one the most serious forms of 
ecological degradation.38  No matter how strictly protected an area is from human activity, it will 
never be truly protected if contaminants, such as pesticides, enter the area through the water or air, 
or if species that use the area are exposed to harmful contaminants whenever they leave the 
confines of the protected area.39  
Although some legal scholars have analyzed environmental law in a general sense from a 
conservation biology perspective,40 to date the attempts that have been made to evaluate specific 
management or regulatory schemes using such an approach have focused primarily on natural 
resources management or the Endangered Species Act,41 rather than pesticide law or pollution 
control law, more generally.  
Another important ecological concept is that of ecosystem management.  It has been said 
that conservation biology leads to ecosystem management.  In other words, ecosystem 
management is a tool to carry out the principles of conservation biology.  Although environmental 
literature is rife with varying descriptions and definitions of ecosystem management, there appears 
to be general consensus that  overriding goal of ecosystem management is to protect ecological 
                                                 
38  RICHARD B. PRIMACK, ESSENTIALS OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 145-46 (Sinauer 1993). 
39  Although the primary threat to species and ecosystem diversity is habitat destruction, even when habitats are preserved, 
many populations have been reduced in size to such an extent that they are extremely vulnerable to other environmental 
stresses, such as hazardous pollutants.  Moreover, the vast majority of land in the United States is privately owned, and it 
would be naive to believe that enough property could be put into perpetual preservation to achieve true ecological integrity 
on a large scale.  Thus, it is necessary to complement land preservation programs with effective regulatory programs that 
protect of widespread ecological integrity while allowing human activities to proceed.   
40  See, e.g., Walter Kuhlmann, Making the Law More Ecoccentric: Responding to Leopold and Conservation Biology, 7 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY 133 (1996); Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law:  Assessing the Challenges 
Ahead, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 911 (1994), Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on 
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994); and William H. Rodgers, Adaptation of Environmental 
Law to the Ecologists Discovery of Disequilibria, 69 CHI-KENT L. REV. 887 (1994). 
41  See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of New 
Age Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50 (2001). 
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integrity over the long term.42  Ecological integrity has been defined as the total native diversity of 
species, populations, and ecosystems, and the ecological patterns and processes that maintain such 
diversity.43 
Interestingly, at the same time that ecological science, conservation biology and ecosystem 
management were developing in the scientific world, parallel ideas including many of those that 
form the basis of eco-pragmatism, were developing in the legal arena.  While not couched in terms 
of conservation biology, eco-pragmatism, boiled down to its essentials, starts to look startlingly 
like conservation biology.  Parallels between the cross-disciplinary applied science of conservation 
biology and the legal theoretical construct of eco-pragmatism exist  in a number of respects.  For 
instance, both approaches articulate the need to start from an ecological baseline.  Moreover, both 
disciplines recognize the importance of adaptive management approaches to address the changing 
nature of both biological systems and our ability to comprehend them.  Finally, although both 
systems argue in favor of taking costs into account in environmental-decision-making, neither 
approach would elevate costs to the level of being the deciding factor.44 
Perhaps most significantly, both disciplines acknowledge that although we can never 
completely prevent all human disturbances, we do not necessarily need to.  Human disturbances 
that are similar in characteristic, magnitude and duration to natural disturbances are not as likely to 
pose significant risks to species or ecosystems as are human disturbances that are substantially 
different in characteristic, magnitude or duration from natural disturbances.45  
2.  The Role of Economics In Eco-Pragmatism 
Professor Daniel Farbers Eco-pragmatism, analyzes what role economic 
considerations should play in environmental decision-making from a pragmatic standpoint.  
                                                 
42 See  R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, Introduction, in, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSITY (R. Edward Grumbine, ed., 
Island Press, 1994)   
43  See Id. at 8 (citing B. Norton, A New Paradigm for Environmental Management23-41 in R. COSTANZA ET AL., 
ECOSYSTEM HEALTH (Island Press 1992). 
44  Leading conservation biologist, Professor Reed Noss, has described an approach to applying principles of conservation 
biology to environmental law. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As They Apply to 
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 887, 898-900 (1994).  Some of the guiding principles of conservation biology 
can be summarized as follows:  1) ecosystems are more complex than science can understand; 2) the less data or more 
uncertainty involved, the more conservative environmental decision-making should be; 3) ecosystems are not static, but 
instead are constantly in a state of disequilibria; 4) conservation biology is by its very nature value-laden and goal-driven; 
5) environmental management decisions must be concerned with ecological processes at multiple levels of biological 
organization See id. at 898-900. 
45  Tarlock, supra note 33, at 1130. 
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Farber offers a sound rationale for reaching the conclusion that a hybrid, or feasibility, 
approach is the most pragmatic.  Significantly, when ecological principles are incorporated 
into the eco-pragmatic analysis, they lend further support to Farbers conclusions. 
a.  A Rejection of Pure Risk-Based and Cost/Benefit Standards 
The past twenty years of environmental law scholarship is characterized by a struggle 
between two opposite extremes  those who believe environmental values are paramount and those 
who believe economic interests are paramount.46  Environmental regulation in the U.S. frequently 
is criticized for being unrealistic because it is based on protecting the public or environment from 
risks without considering the costs associated with such protection.47  Of course it would be absurd 
to attempt to  eliminate all environmental risks at all costs.48  Opponents of pure risk-based 
approaches contend that environmental regulations seek to attain zero risk regardless of the costs 
of attaining such a goal.  For the most part these criticisms are unfounded. 49 Despite the outcry of 
the opponents of risk-based regulation, the vast majority of federal environmental laws are not 
purely risk-based and few if any are zero-risk statutes.50  Instead, most environmental laws allow 
                                                 
46  FARBER, supra note 17 at 35. 
47  As Supreme Court Justice Breyer and Professor Cass Sunstein have described, some environmental risk reduction 
requires expenditures of money that go well beyond the bounds of common sense. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE 
VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 14 (1993) and Cass Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 CHI. L. 
REV. 1533 (1996). 
48  FARBER, supra note 17 at 3. 
49 Although examples of environmental excesses certainly can be found, many if not most of such criticisms have been 
demonstrated to be without merit. FARBER, supra note 17 at 22.  In one of the most comprehensive analyses of the costs of 
environmental regulation to date, Lisa Heinzerling, demonstrated that many of the oft-cited examples of the excesses costs 
of environmental regulations are not accurate.  Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L. J. 
1981 (1998).  Heinzerling has shown that many of the examples used by cost/benefit proponents are either exaggerations or 
are examples of regulations that were considered but never adopted for a variety of reasons Id.  In this article, Heinzerling 
scrutinizes the Morrall table, developed in 1986 by John Morrall, an economist at the Office of Management and Budget. 
 Id. at 1983, 1987-89.  The table includes information on the costs of various risk-reducing regulations per life saved.  Id. at 
1987-88.  The numbers from this table have been relied on extensively by scholars, environmental policy-makers and 
politicians to support arguments that environmental regulations are not cost-effective and that taxpayer money could be 
better spent elsewhere.  Id. at 1983.  Heinzerling demonstrates that the estimates of the costs of environmental regulations 
developed by Morrall, and widely relied upon by proponents of cost/benefit analysis, are seriously flawed.  First, 
Heinzerling shows how Morrall included a large number of regulations that were never adopted by the regulatory agency.  
Id. at 1999-2014.  Heinzerling demonstrates that the alleged highest cost environmental regulations on Morralls table have 
never taken effect.  Id. at 1983, 1999-2014.  In fact, some of these proposed rules were withdrawn by the agency 
specifically because of the high costs associated with them.  Id. at 2000-10.  Moreover, Heinzerling shows how Morralls 
use of cost estimates skew the results by being up to 1000 times higher than the agency estimates.  Id. at 1983, 1991-1993.  
Further, Heinzerling shows how Morralls estimates are misleading in that he used a high (10%) discount rate.  Id. at 2018-
24.  Heinzerlings analysis shows that by using the agencies cost estimates and a lower discount rate, the cost per life saved 
for most of these regulations falls well within the accepted range.  Id. 
50  This is for good reason.  It is impossible to eliminate all risk.  First, as risks are reduced to lower levels, the costs of 
eliminating remaining risks may be excessively high.  Second, in many cases it is impossible to attain zero risk because 
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or require the consideration of other factors such as the costs of regulation or the economic 
feasibility of regulation.  Even where zero-risk or absolutist risk-based environmental laws have 
been tried, frequently the recognition of the illogical outcomes that these approaches can result in 
have led to either the interpretation of the laws to take other factors into account, or the 
amendment of the laws imposing these strict risk-based requirements.51  
                                                                                                                                                                      
technology does not exist to measure very small amounts of pollutants or very small environmental disruptions that may 
cause risk.  Third, it is not uncommon for risk reduction measures that are employed to address one risk to cause some other 
unintended risk.  Finally, risk is inherent in nature.  Id. at 72-74. 
51 Perhaps the most notable absolutist zero-risk-based law was the Delaney Clause of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic 
Act (FFDCA). 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994).  As one of the few environmental statutes to attempt to impose a zero-risk standard, 
the Delaney Clause was highly controversial.  In fact, EPA attempted to interpret into the statute, a de minimis exception, 
despite the absolutist language contained in the law.  EPAs de minimis interpretation of the Delaney Clause was struck 
down by the Ninth Circuit in Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d. 985 (9th Cir. 1992).  After many years of controversy, Congress, in 
1996, eliminated the zero-risk language in favor of the more flexible safety standard in the Food Quality Amendment 
Act.  Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified at 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y and 21 U.S.C.A. §§ U301-381 (West Supp. 
1996). Prior the 1996, food additives in or on processed foods were regulated under section 409 of the FFDCA, whereas, 
pesticide residues in or on raw agricultural commodities were regulated under section 408 of the FFDCA.  Section 408 
deemed any poisons or deleterious pesticide chemical that is not generally recognized as safe added to a raw agricultural 
commodity unsafe unless a tolerance is established and the pesticide residue is within the tolerance limit.  Section 408 
authorized EPA to establish tolerances to the extent necessary to protect public health, and mandated that in making such 
determination EPA give appropriate consideration to certain factors including the necessity for the production of an 
adequate a, wholesome and economical food supply.  Thus, the standard for setting a tolerance under section 408 included 
economic considerations.  The term pesticide chemical is defined as any substance which, alone, in chemical 
combination or in formulation with one or more other substance, is a pesticide within the meaning of FIFRA and which is 
used in the production, storage or transportation of raw agricultural commodities.  21 U.S.C. § 321(q).  Generally 
recognized as Safe, or GRAS, is defined as generally recognized among experts qualified by scientific training and 
expertise to evaluate its safety as having been adequately shown trough scientific principles (or for a substance in food 
prior to January 1958, based on common use in food) to be safe under conditions of its intended use.  21 U.S.C. § 3221(s). 
For processed foods, however, a completely different standard applied.  Pursuant to the pre-1996 section 402 of the 
FFDCA, a food was deemed to be adulterated if it contained any food additive not authorized by a food additive regulation 
under section 409. The standard for setting a food additive regulation, however, was far different from the standard for a 
tolerance under section 408.  Under section 409, to issue a food additive regulation, EPA would have to find that the use of 
the food additive under the conditions of use specified in the regulation would be safe.  Further, section 409 contained the 
Delaney Clause which provided that no food additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when 
ingested by man or animals of if tests show it induces cancer in man or animals.  Accordingly, section 409 contained a 
strict safety standard and a complete prohibition of any carcinogenic food additive in any amount.  After many years of 
controversy over the disparity and unsuccessful attempts by EPA to interpret the Delaney Clause as imposing a de minimis 
risk standard rather than a zero risk standard, the 1996 FQPA amendments to FFDCA eliminated the absolutist Delaney 
Clause.  Further, the 1996 Act eliminated the prior standards in both section 408 and section 409 and substituted a standard 
of safety in both sections.  Accordingly, under the current law, tolerances must be established for pesticide residues in 
food, whether in raw agricultural commodities or processed foods, at a level that is considered safe.  Safe is defined to 
mean there is a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue.  
This reasonable certainty standard while still a risk-based standard, replaces the zero-risk Delaney Clause with a 
negligible risk standard.  
It should be noted that prior to 1970, the Food and Drug Administration regulated food additives as well as pesticide 
residues in food under the FFDCA.  Under the Reorganization Act of 1970, authority for the regulation of pesticides under 
both FIFRA and FFDCA was transferred to the newly formed Environmental Protection Agency.  Reorganization Plan No. 
3 of 1970, 84 § 2086.  Since 1970, EPA has regulated pesticide residues in or on raw agricultural commodities under 
section 408 of the FFDCA and pesticide residues in or on processed foods as food additives under section 409 of the 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum from the pure risk-based approaches to environmental 
regulation are those approaches that elevate economic efficiency above all other considerations. 
Cost/benefit analyses involve balancing the social benefit of a regulation against the cost to 
society to comply with the regulation.52  Cost/benefit standards are based on the premise that 
maximum economic efficiency is the goal of any regulatory system.53  Proponents of cost/benefit 
analysis often build their arguments in favor of economic efficiency by using examples of 
environmental regulations that achieved minimum risk reduction for enormous costs.54   
The cost/benefit analysis measure of value is the consumers willingness to pay for goods 
                                                                                                                                                                      
FFDCA.  
52  For a general overview of cost/benefit analyses, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002).  
53 The argument in favor of economic efficiency is that limited resources should be spent where they will do the most good. 
 This makes sense in the context of choosing between two technologies to achieve the same level of risk reduction.  For 
example, if, all else being equal, it would cost ten million dollars to install an end-of-pipe technology that would reduce 
water pollutants, thereby saving five lives, but it would cost only one million dollars to use alternative raw materials in the 
manufacturing process that would achieve the same risk reduction goal, no reasonable person would question the decision 
to utilize the more economically efficient risk reduction method.  However, the real world is rarely so clear-cut, and 
typically environmental decisions are not a choice between two equally effective risk reduction methods.  More often they 
involve complex trade-offs in risk reduction, costs and normative choices that are not easily monetized.  Consequently, 
cost/benefit analyses reach far beyond the obvious and simple goal of achieving an environmental benefit for the lowest 
cost possible. See FARBER, supra note 17 at 7. 
54  Id. at 22. For example, the fact that an individual drives a sport utility vehicle (SUV) that gets poor gas mileage does not 
necessarily imply that such person does not value clean air or energy efficiency.  The individual may have purchased the 
SUV with the primary consideration of safety and space for the family and its gear.  Nevertheless, the individual may value 
clean air and energy efficiency and may fully support the imposition of tougher fuel economy standards on SUVs.  
The phenomenon of individual economic preferences frequently conflicting with societal desires is well illustrated by the 
following exercise that Professor Scott Barrett of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns 
Hopkins University, uses in his classroom.  Professor Bartletts exercise can be seen as a variant of the prisoners dilemma 
to show individuals may make different choices when acting in a mode of consumer/wealth acquirer versus in a mode of 
democratic citizen.  Professor Barrett first hands out two playing cards, one black and one red, to each student in his class.  
He then instructs the students that each player will receive five dollars for keeping a red card plus one dollar for every red 
card handed in by any other player. Thus, if there are twenty students playing, and each player hands in her red card, each 
of the twenty students will receive twenty dollars.  If none of the twenty player hands in her red card, each student will 
receive only five dollars.  If six players hand in their red cards, the other fourteen students receive eleven dollars each, but 
the six who handed in their cards, only receive six dollars each.  The incentive for each individual player to keep her red 
card is obvious.  Accordingly, when Barretts class has played this game, typically less than two-thirds of the players turn 
in their red cards.  Barrett explains that this is what the economists call a public good.  All players benefit, and no player 
can be excluded from receiving that benefit.   
When Barrett asks these same students to vote anonymously on whether to allow a government regulation that 
would confiscate all of the red cards, thereby resulting the best possible outcome for all students (i.e., each student receives 
twenty dollars), invariably, a majority votes in favor of the government regulation.  In her article, What Makes 
Environmental Treaties Work?, in which she describes Professor Barretts game, Frances Cairncross reaches the following 
interpretation of this game: [I]n other words, left to themselves, individual players are selfish, but they yearn for some 
outside force to make everybody behave better and improve the outcome of the game for all the players.  Frances 
Cairncross, What Makes Environmental Treaties Work? CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE, vol. 5, num. 2, 12-19 (2004) 
(discussing Professor Scott Barretts book, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-
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or services.55  The concept of willingness to pay does not necessarily translate well to ecological 
values.56  Moreover, relying on willingness to pay may skew cost/benefit analyses away from 
protecting environmental values because embedded within the willingness to pay concept is an 
assumption that industry has the right to utilize resources, and that if environmentalists want to 
protect those resources, they have to be willing to pay for such protection.57   
                                                                                                                                                                      
MAKING (1990)). 
55  Id. at 36.  The willingness to pay standard is a key component of welfare economics.  For a good general discussion of 
the Pareto Criteria, as well as other theories of economic efficiency, including Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, see generally Jules 
Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization in FOUNDATION OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW (Avery 
Wiener Katz, ed., Foundation Press 1998). As Farber explains, welfare economics is based on the simple concept of the 
Pareto improvement.  Under this standard, a decision that results in at least one person benefiting and no one being harmed 
is a sound decision.  Of course, in real world decision-making, it is rare to find such a simple outcome.  Thus, welfare 
economics has developed the concept of economic efficiency whereby, an outcome is considered to be more economically 
efficient than other outcomes if in an overall sense, the gains of the winners outweigh the losses of the losers.  This is 
accomplished if a hypothetical transfer of some of the gains from the winners to offset the losses of the losers would result 
in a Pareto improvement (i.e., once the losers losses have been offset by some of the winners gains, the winners maintain at 
least some gain and the losers now have suffered no losses).  FARBER, supra note 17, at 44.  
56  It can be difficult to determine how much people would be willing to pay for a given ecological service or benefit.  
Although it may be a relatively easy task to determine how much people are willing to pay to for certain types of values, 
such as how much more people are willing to pay for a safe product versus an unsafe product, in the environmental arena, 
many values that are sought to be protected by environmental laws are what is known as non-use values.  These non-use 
values include option value, which is how much people are willing to pay to leave open the option of receiving a benefit 
in the future.  An example of option value is the value people are willing to pay to preserve tropical rainforests to preserve 
the option of obtaining plants with medicinal value in the future. Id. at 48.  Another type of non-use value is existence 
value, which is how much people are willing to pay to protect something that they will never directly benefit from. An 
example of existence value is how much people are willing to pay to protect an endangered species even if they will never 
receive any direct benefit from that species, and in fact may never even see that species.  Id.  These non-use values are 
much more difficult to monetize in a cost/benefit analyses than are other types of values that provide a more direct impact 
to the person who is wiling to pay for them. Id. at 49.  One way that economists attempt to monetize these values is through 
a survey technique called contingent valuation.  Cass Sunstein has criticized this technique as unreliable because surveys 
asking people hypothetically how much they would pay to preserve a particular non-use value may be skewed by people 
answering in a way that makes them feel morally satisfied rather than stating their real valuation.  Id. at 49 (citing CASS 
SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 142-43 (1997).  On the other side of the debate critics argue that 
contingent valuation is not an appropriate way to value natural resources.  John Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the 
Trouble?, 62 CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995). 
57  The question then becomes one of how much are the environmentalists willing to pay to protect the resources.  If 
instead, one assumes that environmentalists have the right to protect resources, and that industry must pay 
environmentalists, or the public, if it wishes to utilizes those resources, the question becomes one of how much are 
environmentalists or the public willing to accept to allow the resources to be used.  The amount of money environmentalists 
are willing to accept to allow a resources to be used is typically twice as high as the amount of money the same 
environmentalists is willing to pay to protect the resource. Id. at 100.  Nevertheless, most cost/benefit analyses use 
willingness to pay. SHAPRIO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 57.  This is but one example of how cost/benefit analyses are 
not value-neutral.  The value-based assumptions that underlie the analyses can dramatically alter outcomes.  See also Id. at 
56, explaining that willingness to pay and willingness to accept are typically different due to the distribution of wealth in 
society.  A persons wealth does not tend to limit willingness to accept in the same way it limits willingness to pay.  As a 
result, willingness to pay tends to result in less regulation.  Id. at 66. 
An example of the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept provided in Farbers book is the 
example of whalers desiring to kill a pod of whales.  If one assumes that the whalers have a right to kill the whales for their 
own economic benefit, the question becomes how much are the environmentalists willing to pay the whalers not to kill the 
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Proponents of cost/benefit analysis believe that sound decision-making is based on market 
indicators, whereas, environmentalists believe that such decision should be based on political 
indicators (Farber refers to this as willingness to pay versus willingness to vote).58  This 
distinction has been described as follows: social regulation expresses what we believe, what we 
are, what we stand for as a nation, not simply what we wish to buy as individuals.59  Moreover, 
relying solely on consumer choices leaves out the possibility of decision-making based on 
community analysis, deliberation and vetting of ideas.60  Critics of cost/benefit analysis focus their 
arguments on the distinction between private consumer choices and public choices based on public 
values.61  In the pesticides arena, an economic argument could be made that the fact that most 
consumers purchase food that is treated with chemical pesticides means that consumers are making 
a conscious choice to do so, based on economic and other factors.  While it is true that consumers 
may purchase such foods because they are generally significantly less expensive than foods that 
are grown without chemical inputs, to assume that this consumer choice means that consumers 
have consciously determined that the health and environmental risks of pesticides in food are 
outweighed by the increased cost of organically produced food is overly simplistic.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
whales.  This willingness to pay then becomes the economic value of the whales.  If instead, one assumes that the 
environmentalists have the legal right to protect the whales, the question becomes how much are the whalers willing to pay 
the environmentalists the right to hunt the whales.  Under this scenario, it is likely that the environmentalists will demand a 
much higher price from the whalers than they would be willing to pay in the first scenario.  One explanation for this 
phenomena is that by assuming the environmentalists have the right to protect the whales, and the consequent right to sell 
the hunting rights to the whales, the environmentalists have been made wealthier and more powerful.  Thus, the demand 
curve is shifted in favor of a higher price to hunt the whales.  Consequently, under the second scenario, the whaling that 
may have been economically efficient under the first scenario, may no longer be efficient.  Id. at 99. Another explanation 
for the difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, may be that people tend to be attached to the status 
quo and that change can only be purchased at a high price.  Id. at 100. 
58  FARBER, supra note 17 at 42. 
59  Id., quoting MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH:  PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT at 17 (1988).  
Professor Cass Sunstein made this point eloquently, when he explained human character as being more than simply the acts 
an individual chooses to do at any given point in time.  See Id. at 54-55.   
60  See SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, note 12 at 60. 
61  Nevertheless, economists do recognize that there is a difference between private consumer choices and environmental 
benefits.  Economists consider environmental benefits to be a public good.  Public goods cannot be provided solely through 
the marketplace because all members of the public benefit from the good and there is no way to charge all members of the 
public for the benefit they receive.  The classic example of a public good in the environmental context is clean air.  All 
members of the public breathe air, and thus, there is no way for a private enterprise to charge the public for the air it 
breathes.  Accordingly, there is no way for the private enterprise to benefit financially by ensuring its operations result in 
clean air.  In recent years, Professor Cass Sunstein has introduced a modified form of cost/benefit analysis, in which public 
values rather than private preferences govern environmental decision-making.  See FARBER, supra note 17 at 95 (describing 
the proposal in CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 139 (1996) involving a two-stage decision-making 
process.  A traditional quantitative cost/benefit analysis would constitute the first stage.  The second stage would take into 
consideration other non-quantifiable values.).  FARBER, supra note 17 at 95. 
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First, consumers may not be fully informed of the environmental and health risks 
associated with pesticide use.  The time and thought that go into sorting out technical risk 
assessment information may be more than the average consumer can, or desires to, commit.  
Moreover, as described at length in this article, many of the risks of pesticides use are not well 
understood, even by the experts. Thus, it would be unreasonable for consumers to be able to make 
decisions on preliminary or confusing data that experts are having difficulty grappling with.  
Moreover, the price of food treated with pesticides do not reflect the true cost of growing the food 
because of a failure to internalize what economists refer to as negative externalities.  For example, 
the price of purchasing food treated with pesticides does not reflect the price that society may have 
to pay later to clean-up pesticide contaminated sites, the long-term costs of society of the loss of 
insect pollinators, or the long term costs to society of the development of pest resistance due to 
overuse of pesticides.  Moreover, the price of the food is artificially low due to numerous 
government programs that encourage the use of chemical inputs in agriculture.62  While these 
numerous and complex programs are far beyond the scope of this article, the fact that crop 
subsidies, crop protection insurance and other government programs provide economic incentives 
for using pesticides and economic disincentives for growing crops without chemical pesticides, 
results in artificially low food prices, which in turn, results in consumers perhaps purchasing more 
food grown with pesticides than they would in a pure market.63  Accordingly, in the agricultural 
pesticide arena, as well as many other arenas, a cost/benefit analysis that relies on market costs and 
benefits does not reflect consumers true preferences.  Moreover, this example makes clear that the 
assumptions upon which cots/benefit analyses are based, including perfect information, no 
externalities, and a truly free market, deviate so far from reality that cost/benefit analysis, standing 
alone, are an unreliable guide. 
One controversial issue in the cost/benefit debate is whether environmental values are 
                                                 
62  For a detailed discussion of government policies that encourage pesticide use, see Kenneth A. Dahlbert, Government 
Policies that Encourage Pesticide Use in the United States, in THE PESTICIDE QUESTIONS: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS AND 
ETHICS 281 (David Pimentel & Hugh Lehman, eds., 1993) (discussing a wide range of local, state, and federal programs 
including price supports, incomes supports, farm credit programs, crop insurance programs, export policies, and tax 
policies) See also David Pearce & Robert Tinch, The True Price of Pesticides in BUGS IN THE SYSTEM:  REDESIGNING THE 
PESTICIDE INDUSTRY FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE 50 (William Vorley & Dennis Kenney, eds. 1998). 
63  Id.  For a good summary of agricultural price supports, see Robert L. Thompson, Agricultural Price Supports in the 
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, available at http://www.econlib.org//library/enc./Agricultural Price Supports.html 
(last visited July 18, 2003). 
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significant only to the extent that they can be translated into economic terms.64  Opponents of 
cost/benefit analysis maintain that economists price everything and value nothing. 65  
Cost/benefit analysts tend to limit their view of the benefits of environmental regulation to human 
lives saved or cancers averted.66  The true benefits of environmental protection extend far beyond 
counting the numbers of lives saved.  For example, non-lethal human health effects, including 
subchronic neurological, behavioral or reproductive effects are not well understood, not easily 
quantified, and rarely included in any meaningful way in cost/benefit analyses.67  Moreover, as 
described in detail below, ecological systems are not well understood by science and the value of 
such systems is not readily quantified.  Consequently, human disruptions to ecological systems are 
rarely part of cost/benefit analyses.  Further, ethical, religious, aesthetic and other normative 
values of environmental protection are not typically included in cost/benefit analyses.  Finally, 
even those components of the cost/benefit analysis that are more easily monetized, such as the cost 
of compliance with environmental regulations, are difficult to estimate.  Frequently, regulatory 
agencies are asked to take industry at its word,68 and often in retrospect, the true costs of 
compliance are not as high as the pessimistic estimates of industry would suggest.69   
Another concern often raised by opponents of strict cost/benefit analyses is that even when 
costs and benefits are balanced in an overall sense, what is left out of the equation is who pays the 
costs and who gets the benefits.  In other words, if a disproportionate share of the costs are borne 
by segments of the population who do not share proportionally in the benefits, is there truly a 
balance of the costs and the benefits?  Environmental risks tend to be disproportionately borne by 
vulnerable populations   frequently people of color, low income and/or weak political power 
                                                 
64  FARBER, supra note 17, at 35. 
65  See generally, FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND 
THE VALUE OF NOTHING (The New Press 2004).  See also, DAVID PEIRCE & DOMINIC MORAN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN CONSERVATION BIOLOGY FOR THE COMING DECADE (Chapman & Hall 1998). 
66  FARBER, supra note 17 at 88. Cost/benefit analyses typically rely on the concept of statistical lives saved, because 
under most risk assessments, it is virtually impossible to identify the actual person that would have died but for the 
environmental regulation.  Typically people value a statistical life less than an actual life.  This is illustrated by the lengths 
that people will go, and the money they are willing to spend to save a child who falls into a well, as compared to how much 
society is willing to spend to save an anonymous statistical person.  See e.g., SHAPRIO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 64.  
In the ecological context, there are many examples of people going to great lengths to save a beached whale, while only 
being willing to spend a significantly lesser amount to save the statistical dolphin from the shrimpers net.  It is even harder 
to predict how much people will be willing to spend to protect a statistical ecological service. 
67  FARBER, supra note 17 at 88. 
68  Id. at 90. 
69  FARBER, supra note 17 at 167-68. 
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who do not share in the benefits gained by industrial pursuits.70  The benefits of development and 
industry typically go the advantaged segments of society who typically do not bear a great portion 
of the risks resulting from such activities.  Environmental Justice71 proponents point out that 
cost/benefit analyses and other market-based systems can lead to the creation of risk hot spots, 
where overall the cost/benefit analysis may weigh in favor of an activity going forward, but within 
a given segment of society, typically economically and politically disadvantaged populations, the 
cost/benefit analysis weighs in the opposite direction  i.e., hot spots of risk with very little 
benefit.  Accordingly, proponents of Environmental Justice reject strict cost/benefit analyses.72  
A similar argument can be made with regard to ecological resources.  Risk hot spots may 
emerge in situations where, overall the cost/benefit analysis weighs in favor of allowing a 
pesticide to be used, but in a particular geographic area, or with a particular species or ecosystem, 
risk may be disproportionately high.  This may occur with regard to  sensitive species, including 
threatened or endangered species, or with ecosystems with low resistance and or low resilience.  
One example of such a risk hot spot is the global amphibian crisis, in which pesticides are 
implicated.73  Although the cost/benefit analysis for a particular pesticide may reflect that the 
benefits outweigh the costs overall, this does nothing to protect the highly sensitive and highly 
vulnerable amphibian populations.74 
                                                 
70  See generally CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND 
REGULATION (Carolina Academic Press 2003). 
71  Although a detailed consideration of Environmental Justice is beyond the scope of this article, it is a compelling issue in 
environmental policy, and it provides one example of how cost/benefit analysis does not adequately address ethical, moral 
or fairness issues that cannot be monetized. For an excellent discussion of how market-based approaches disproportionately 
impact vulnerable populations see Id. at 33-37. 
72  Proponents of cost/benefit analysis counter this argument by pointing out that segments of society that are disadvantaged 
will not necessarily be better off under an inefficient system.  However, Environmental Justice advocates do not argue in 
favor of inefficiency for inefficiencys sake, but rather they are willing to tolerate some level of economic inefficiency to 
accomplish other important societal goals such as fairness.  
73  See Carlos Davidson, et al., Spatial Tests of the Pesticide Drift, Habitat Destruction, UV-B, and Climate-Change 
Hypotheses for California Amphibian Declines, 16 CONS. BIOL. 1588 (2002). 
74  Moreover, the amendment of FIFRA by the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act to include a safety standard for human 
food consumption may have resulted in a shift of risk away from food consumers to occupational workers and ecological 
resources.  For example, organophosphate pesticides degrade quickly into benign breakdown products in the environment 
and on agricultural food products.  Thus, the FQPA standard of safety for human food consumers may favor the use of 
organophosphate pesticides over other pesticides that do not break down as quickly, and thus leave residue on foods.  
However, as described above, organophosphates are highly acutely toxic to humans, other mammals, and birds and have 
been implicated in thousands of bird deaths.  Accordingly, relying more heavily on organophosphates to meet the FQPA 
standard, while reducing risks to food consumers, may result in significantly increased risk to vulnerable farm worker 
populations and to ecological resources. The risk to farmworkers for pesticide exposure is extremely high.  Ivette Perfecto 
& Baldemar Velasquez, Farmworkers: Among the Least Protected, in Rechtshaffen & Gauna, supra note 70, at 67-68.  
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Finally, the values inherent in ecological integrity or biodiversity are particularly ill suited 
to be reduced to a dollar value.75  Of course many ecological products and services have 
instrumental value.  Although, many species in nature can be eaten, made into medications, made 
into clothing or shelter, burned for fuel or otherwise used in a market-based economy,76 what is 
considerably more difficult to value are the aesthetic, inspirational, religious or spiritual reasons 
that many people value ecosystems.77  And perhaps even more challenging is attempting to reduce 
to dollars and cents the value that species have as members of ecosystems.  For example, species 
in an ecosystem may serve important roles as producers, consumers, decomposers, competitors, 
dispersers, or pollinators.78  Each of these roles provides value to other members of the ecosystem, 
including humans.79  Another concern with the strict cost/benefit approach is that the lack of 
knowledge and uncertainty regarding biological systems, argues in favor of a cautious approach to 
the cost/benefits analysis.  Our current limited understanding of ecological systems and inadequate 
methodologies for monetizing values, limit the ability of cost/benefit analyses to be sufficiently 
precise to control environmental decision-making.80 
In sum, the shortcomings of cost/benefit analysis are numerous.  First, current data and 
methodologies are not adequate for accurate and precise analyses.  Second, cost/benefit analyses 
do not adequately address ecological values, community values and other normative 
considerations.  It is impossible to reduce such values to monetary terms.  Finally, far from being 
value-neutral, cost/benefit analyses are laden with biases in favor of those who seek to use 
resources and away from those who seek to protect resources.  Accordingly, Eco-pragmatism 
rejects the notion that cost/benefit analyses should control environmental decision-making.  
Nevertheless, economic analyses are considered to be useful factors to inform environmental 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Because the cast majority of farmworkers are minorities  primarily Latinos  theses risks raise significant environmental 
Justice concerns.  Id. 
75  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 543.  
76  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 43.  
77  Id. Noted zoologist E.O. Wilson has coined the term biophilia to describe the deep emotional and spiritual relationship 
that many people share with other living organisms and the related sense of awe that frequently accompanies experience 
with the natural world.  See generally, E.O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND WITH OTHER SPECIES (1984). 
78  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 52. 
79  Id. at 52. 
80  FARBER, supra note 17 at 42.  Farber estimated the costs and benefits of a number of environmental regulations from 
1988 and determined that the costs ranged from 55 to 77 billion and the benefits ranged from 16 to 135 billion dollars.  Id. 
At 167-68.  Thus, he concludes, the return on every dollar spent ranged between 21 cents and $2.27.  Id.  As Farber puts it 
we were either losing 80 percent of our investment or a more than doubling our money and we dont know which!  Id. at 
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decision- makers.81  In other words, cost/benefit analysis should assist rather than control 
environmental decision-making.82 
b.  The Eco-Pragmatic Response: Embracing Feasibility  
In contrast to strict cost/benefit approaches, eco-pragmatism attempts to grapple with the 
complexities and lack of understanding of species and ecosystem values.  Eco-pragmatism also 
recognizes that, in the real world, public policy decision-making must occur within certain 
unavoidable constraints.  Accordingly, one of the foundations of pragmatism is a rejection of 
comprehensive rationality in favor of bounded rationality.83 In a perfect world with perfect 
scientific data on ecological risks and perfect cost/benefit methodologies that adequately value all 
costs and benefits, a cost/benefit approach may be compelling.  However, with the complexity 
pervasive in ecological systems, the dearth of good data and the confused state of cost/benefit  
methodology, all coupled with the need to act now, the pragmatist must find another way.  The 
pragmatist will look to what has worked best in the experience of environmental law to date, and 
what has worked best is at least arguably, technology-based approaches. 
All but the most staunch proponents of cost/benefit analysis seem to recognize that 
cost/benefit analysis involves so many assumptions, judgment calls, values  and unquantifiable 
factors, that it is overly simplistic to view cost/benefit analysis as a clear-cut quantifiable test, 
where all one has to do is plug the numbers in and the right answer comes out.84  Eco-pragmatic 
theory recognizes that there are many ethical considerations that go beyond mere economic 
efficiency that must be taken into account in making environmental decisions.85 
For all of the reasons discussed above, eco-pragmatism rejects pure risk-based approaches 
                                                                                                                                                                      
168. 
81  FARBER, supra note 17 at 9; see also, SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 63. 
82  Ruhl, supra note 15 at 538. 
83 Bounded rationality recognizes that institutions that make policy decisions do not have complete information or 
unlimited time so as to enable them to make some theoretically optimal choice in every case.  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, 
supra note 12 at 23.  The reality is that all institutional decision-making is bounded by limited time, limited costs and 
limited information. Id.  If these bounds did not exist, arguably cost/benefit analysis would be able to provide optimal 
choices. Pragmatism does not ignore the existence of such bounds, but instead accepts these constraints and recognizes that 
decision-making must take them into account, and adapt as new information becomes available. 
84  FARBER, supra note 17 at 94.  Although economists are quite adept at providing simplified examples of how market 
efficiencies work in theory, for every clever example described by an economist, one can find an equally clever examples 
highlighting the shortcomings of pure market efficiencies in the environmental arena describe by proponents of risk-based 
approaches.  
85  Id. at 9.  As Shapiro and Glicksman have put it, we should be trying to do better than simply attempting to achieve the 
optimal level of injury, death or environmental destruction.  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 21, 50.  
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and cost/benefit analysis in favor of a hybrid approach based on the concept of feasibility.86  Under 
the hybrid approach, environmental risks are reduced to the amount feasible and cost/benefit 
analysis is used to assist, rather that control decision-making.87  This type of approach has been 
described as doing the best that we can.88  In other words, while the goal is environmental risk 
reduction, there is recognition that at some point the costs of further risk reduction become too 
high to justify. Pragmatic risk regulation attempts to reconcile conflicting values by striving to 
achieve the maximum level of protection consistent with reasonable costs. 89 
Although there has been extensive debate in the academic world over the appropriateness 
of utilizing a cost/benefit analyses or pure risk based approaches in environmental regulation, the 
truth is that for the most part, Congress has rejected both pure risk-based and cost/benefit 
standards and most of the substantial environmental regulatory programs involve hybrid 
standards  i.e., risk based standard that take economic considerations into account but do not 
require strict cost/benefit balancing. Professors Shapiro and Glicksman have surveyed existing 
environmental regulatory statutes to determine which contain cost/benefit standards, which contain 
feasibility standards, and which are pure risk-based.  Their work demonstrates that the majority of 
existing statutes contain standards that require risk to be avoided to the extent feasible or to the 
extent that the best available technology can achieve.  Accordingly, these statutes are referred to as 
technology-based statutes. The most common examples of environmental statutes that utilize 
technology-based standards include the Clean Water Act 90 and the Clean Air Act.91  While these 
standards take costs into account, they are not cost/benefit balancing standards. 
Shapiro and Glicksman describe constrained balancing as regulation whereby the 
legislature establishes a level of environmental protection to be achieved by identifying regulatory 
objectives based on some model technology.92  In this way, costs are considered in choosing an 
                                                 
86  Farber has defined feasibility as where costs are not grossly disproportionate to the benefits to be achieved.  FARBER, 
supra note 17 at 94. 
87  Id. at 122-123.   
88  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 22, 50. 
89  Id. at 147. 
90  See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (setting forth technology-based standards for point sources of water pollution). 
91  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (1) (specifying that existing stationary sources of air pollution in nonattainment areas 
implement all reasonable available control technology). 
92  Id. at 37. 
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appropriate technology as the model, but costs are not directly weighed against benefits.93  This 
approach is what is commonly referred to as technology based94 standard setting and is also 
what Farber refers to as feasibility based decision-making.  Under constrained balancing or 
                                                 
93  Id. at 37.  Examples of this type of approach include: the Clean Air Acts requirement for non-attainment areas that 
existing stationary sources implement all reasonably available control technology as expeditiously as practicable, 42 
U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1), the requirement of the Safe Drinking Water Act that EPA establish maximum contaminant levels as 
close as feasible to achieving the level at which no known or anticipated health effects will occur.  42 U.S.C. § 300g-
1(b)(4). 
94Technology-based standards are credited with much of the pollution reduction that has occurred since the environmental 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s.  See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. Ill. L. 
Rev 83, 85 (2000).  Technology-based standards are the dominant mode of controlling the amount of pollution released in 
to the environment in the US.  Id. at 88.  These standards typically are developed by EPA in response to a Congressional 
mandate for EPA to establish pollution limitations based on some prescribed standard such as the best available 
technology.  Id. at 89.  Once Congress has mandated the use of a particular technology-based standard, EPA will conduct 
a review of currently available technologies for specific industrial sectors and chooses the technology that best fulfills the 
Congressionally-prescribed standard. Id.  Typically, the specific technology chosen is not required to be employed.  
Instead, EPA determines the level of pollution control that can be achieved using the chosen standard. Id.  Industry is then 
free to utilize any technology it chooses that complies with the numerical standard.  Id.  Accordingly, industry has an 
incentive to develop the most efficient technology to meet the numerical standard.  One drawback to using feasibility as a 
standard is that feasibility will vary with the economic strength of the industry. FARBER, supra note 17 at 83.  For example, 
it may be feasible for a strong manufacturing sector may be able to install costly pollution control technology, while it may 
be completely infeasible for a weak sector of the economy to install the same technology.  As a result, more economically 
successful industries are penalized for their success with the imposition of stricter rules that do not apply to less successful 
industries. Id.  Many justifications have been expressed for using technology based approaches to environmental protection. 
 These approaches tend to better address non-economic values, while still taking economic concerns into account. See 
SHAPRIO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43  at 65.  In addition, feasibility-based approaches recognize and account for bounded 
rationality See id. at 65.  See also, note 83 and accompanying text.  A feasibility standard is pragmatic in the sense that it is 
consistent with widely-shared beliefs that environmental protection is important to society.  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra 
note 12 at 21.  Feasibility approaches tend to prod industry toward environmental risk reduction, until the point is reached 
where additional protection would be technologically or economically infeasible.  See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 537. 
 Moreover, some commentators maintain that technology based standards are the best standards available because we do 
not have enough data to conduct true cost/benefit analyses for most environmental decisions Adam Babich, Too Much 
Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119 (2003).  Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, technology 
based approaches have worked well in our thirty year history of environmental law implementation. See generally, Wagner, 
supra.  After conducting an extensive analysis of the role of technology-based standards in environmental law over the past 
thirty years, Professor Wendy Wagner concludes that technology-based approaches are one of the most important 
innovations in environmental law.  Id. at 86.  Wagner also lauds technology-based standards for being relatively easy to 
promulgate, readily enforceable, even-handed, adaptable and efficient.  Id. at 94-105 (finding that the rate of promulgation 
for technology-based standards outpaces other standards from three to ten times and describing how technology-based 
standards apply equally to all members of the regulated industry within a given category). Wagner explains that 
technology-based standards are easily enforceable because the numerical level of pollution allowed is clearly prescribed by 
rule.  Id. Once emissions or discharges are sampled for pollutants, regulated entities either meet the numerical standard or 
they do not.  Id.  How they choose to meet the standard is irrelevant.  For the same reason, technology-based standards are 
very predictable.  Id.  Regulated entities can readily determine what numerical standards they are expected to comply with 
by looking at the EPA rule for that industry category.  Id. at 100. See also, THOMAS O. MCGARITY, MEDIA, QUALITY, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND COST/BENEFIT BALANCING STRATEGIES FOR HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159-199, N. 194 (1983).  Wagner demonstrates that technology-based standards generally are very 
efficient.  See generally Wagner, supra. She also asserts that technology-based standards create incentives for regulated 
interests to develop more efficient technologies.  Id.  Wagner describes technology-based approaches as fulfilling a moral 
imperative for industry to do the best it can to reduce environmental harm.  Id. at 92. 
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feasibility approaches, risk reduction is sought to the point that additional reduction would result 
in extraordinary or disproportionate costs.95 
Shapiro and Glicksman refer to the second category of balancing approaches as open-
ended balancing, which they describe as a type of balancing whereby the legislature prescribes 
the factors that the agency must consider in making a decision, but does not dictate the weight the 
agency must give to any particular factor.96  Interestingly, Shapiro and Glicksman describe FIFRA 
as an open-ended balancing statute.  And while it is true that a facial reading of the statutory 
standard of unreasonable affects effects would lead one to believe that it is indeed an open-
ended balancing statute, whereby the agency has been directed to consider a variety of risk and 
benefit factors, but has not been directed as to how to weigh such factors, in practice, FIFRA has 
been interpreted and applied by EPA as being a cost/benefit balancing statute whereby for a 
pesticide to be registered its benefits must outweigh its costs.  This interpretation has been 
articulated in agency orders97 and upheld in many judicial decisions.98  Thus, despite the 
significance of pesticides in the development of environmental law, FIFRA virtually stands alone 
in its cost/benefit approach to environmental protection.99  
3.  The Necessity of a Baseline 
One of the most significant concepts in Farbers work on eco-pragmatism is the idea of 
starting with an environmental baseline. Farber argues that there must be some overarching 
principle to help guide decision-making and to serve as a tie-breaker in the close cases.100  
Farber posits that environmental risks should be reduced to the extent feasible and that the 
environmental baseline should be protected except in the case where the costs of protecting the 
baseline are grossly disproportionate to the benefits.101  Eco-pragmatisms baseline starts with a 
                                                 
95  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 52.  
96  Id. at 39.  . 
97    In the Matter of Stevens Industries, Inc, et al., I.F.& R. Docket Nos. 63, et al. (Consolidated DDT hearings, June 2, 
1972). 
98  Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 594 (1971).  
99  The only other major environmental statute that employs a strict cost/benefit balancing approach is TSCA Section 6, 15 
U.S.C. § 2605, which has been rendered impotent by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal decisions in Corrosion Proof Fittings 
v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir 1991) (holding that EPA did not have a reasonable basis to conclude that asbestos presents 
an unreasonable risk and that EPA failed to choose the least burdensome alternative to protect against such risk). 
100  FARBER, supra note 17 at 93, 104. 
101  Id. at 12. 
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presumption in favor of the environment.102  However, Farber does not provide a comprehensive  
explanation of what the baseline should be. Ecological principles can be used to assist in 
developing an appropriate baseline. 
Farbers primary justification for starting with an environmental baseline is the long-term 
commitment to environmental protection in the US.103  Farber posits that there is a general 
recognition that nature has inherent value that goes far beyond the purely utilitarian uses of nature 
for human purposes.104 Another justification for the environmental baseline is the limited scientific 
understanding, enormous data gaps, complexity and uncertainty of environmental issues.105  
Without a full understanding of the complex issues involved, prudence suggests a presumption in 
favor of environmental protection.  Consequently, environmental law should take a stance in favor 
of environmental protection instead of attempting to be neutral.  Under eco-pragmatism, there is a 
presumption in favor of environmental protection, but the presumption can be rebutted where the 
costs of protecting the baseline are disproportionately large.106    
                                                 
102  Ruhl, supra note 15 at 537.  As Farber explains, for any environmental regulatory scheme, there are at least three 
possible baselines that could be employed.  FARBER, supra note 17 at 103.  The first such baseline would be a neutral 
baseline in which there is neither a presumption in favor of the environmental nor one in favor of industrial/economic 
pursuits.  Id. at 103.  The second such baseline in one that holds a presumption in favor of industrial/economic pursuits.  
Under this baseline, regulated interests begin with a presumptive entitlement.  Id.  The third such baseline is one in which 
the presumptive entitlement is assigned to those who stand to benefit from the regulatory program.  Id.  In other words, 
under the third baseline, there is a presumption in favor of environmental protection.  Farber asserts that the environmental 
baseline is the appropriate baseline to use. 
103  Id. at 94 .  Farber has been criticized for overstating the public commitment to environmental protection.  See Paul 
Boudreaux, Costs, Benefits and Values: A Review of Daniel A. Farbers Eco-Pragmatism, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 148 
(1999) (asserting that Farber has overstretched and that although Americans like to label themselves as environmentalists, 
the depth of their commitment is unclear).  Nevertheless, there are numerous surveys and studies that consistency 
demonstrate the existence of such a commitment.  For a general discussion of American environmental values and public 
opinion surveys regarding such values, see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER AND 
JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (4th ed. Aspen 2003).  One recent study 
conducted by the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, indicates that most Americans are seriously concerned 
about the countrys environmental health and want more attention paid to environmental problems.  This survey also 
suggests that most Americans, whether they be Democrat, Republican or Independent, are as concerned with problems of 
air pollution and toxic contamination of soil and water as they are with issues of jobs and the cost of gas.  See The 
Environmental Deficit: Survey on American Attitudes on the Environment, Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, 
Yale University School of Forestry & Environmental Studies (May 2004). 
104 Moreover, to the extent to which nature provides utility, it is a public good that should not be frivolously plundered to 
benefit a few.  FARBER, supra note 17 at 108-109. 
105  Id. at 12. 
106  Id.  Although beyond the scope of this article, Farber also asserts that the ecological baseline should be adopted by the 
judicial system as canon of statutory interpretation, which he refers to as a green canon.  Id. at 124.  Farber looks to 
legislative intent, as well as to the more formalistic view of the statutory mandate of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (2004), for the government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential 
considerations of national policy to achieve certain prescribed environmental goals, as bases for his green cannon.  Id. at 
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Deciding to establish an environmental baseline, raises the issue of what is an 
environmental baseline, particularly in the area of ecological protection.  Is the environmental 
baseline a zero-risk baseline, or is some other measure of environmental protection more 
appropriate?  Farber does not attempt to answer this question.  In the area of ecological protection, 
establishing an environmental baseline takes on additional complexity beyond that of human 
health protection.107  This article proposes the use of the maintenance of ecological integrity as an 
environmental baseline.  One significant component of ecological integrity is biodiversity  a 
measure of species abundance and richness used by ecologists to assess the health of 
ecosystems.108 In addition to having considerable scientific justification for protecting biological 
diversity, it is important to keep in mind that the protection of biodiversity is mandated under 
international law.  The 1992 United Nations Environment Programme Convention on Biological 
Diversity109 first created the international obligation to protect biodiversity.  However, although 
the United States is a signatory to the Convention, the convention has not been ratified, and 
therefore, the United States is not formally bound by it.  Nevertheless, Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a State that has signed a Treaty must refrain from 
acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.110  Accordingly, the United States 
arguably is prohibited from taking any action that would defeat the purpose of the 1992 
Convention to Protect Biological Diversity. 111  Accordingly, there is at least some basis in 
international law for arguing that the United States is obligated to have in effect programs that 
conserve biological diversity. 
Support for an ecological integrity baseline also exists in U.S. domestic law.  A number of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
124-127. 
107 For example, in human health protection, a no carcinogenicity baseline could be established.  Alternatively, a de 
minimis risk baseline could be established (e.g., a baseline of one cancer death per million).  Other approaches could 
include establishing a baseline that is no greater than the risk from ambient pollutant levels.  In the ecological arena, 
however, the issues are more complex. 
108 Professor Fred Bosselman has published a comprehensive analysis of scientific issues that biologists recognize as 
inherent in the concept of biodiversity.  He maintains that the term biodiversity lacks the precision needed for a 
workable legal standard and sets out to provide a series of example to illustrate the various approaches that the law could 
take to address these scientific issues.  Fred Bosselman, A Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 354 (2004). 
109  United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. 20 (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 
818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).   
110  May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
111  Moreover, as Professor Daniel Tarlock has pointed out, Chapter 15 of Agenda 21, which was approved by the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, obligates States to develop strategies to conserve biodiversity and 
for the sustainable use of biological resources A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Conservation in the United States: A Case 
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statutes express goals and policies directed toward maintenance of ecological integrity.  For 
example, the Clean Water Act provides the broad environmental objective to restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nations waters.112  Perhaps the strongest 
support for such a baseline, however, can be found in the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).113  In particular, section 101 of NEPA provides, among other things that it is the 
continuing policy of the U.S. to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can 
exist in productive harmony. . .114 
While biodiversity certainly is an important indicator of ecosystem health, ecosystem 
health also relies on the integrity of the physical and chemical components of such systems, as 
well as the relationship between species and the physical world.  Of course, one measure of 
ecological integrity is the presence of a diversity of species.  Nevertheless, not all species within 
an ecosystem provide the same level of value to the other members of the ecosystem.  
Conservation biologists have identified certain types of species that provide greater value to 
ecosystems, and accordingly should be afforded greater protection.  One such type of species, 
known as the controller species, plays a major role in controlling the movement of energy and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Study in Incompleteness and Indirection, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 10529 (2002). 
112  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2004).  See also, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2004)( expressing one of the objectives of the Clean Air Act 
as being to protect the public health and welfare from adverse effects of air pollution).  For further discussion of U.S. 
authorities that support an ecological integrity baseline, see also BROOKS, supra note 29; Robert L. Fischman, Biological 
Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 Envtl. L. 435 (1992).  In addition to the specific 
provisions related to ecological integrity that can be found in domestic environmental pollution control laws, several 
commentators have argued that other areas of the law support the protection of ecological or biological integrity.  See, e.g., 
Robert L. Fischman, The Meanings of Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental Health, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
989 (2004) (analyzing the National Wildlife Refuge mandate to ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and 
environmental health of the (Refuge) System are maintained.); and Terry W. Frazier, Protecting Ecological Integrity 
Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53 (1998) (arguing that ecological integrity should be a 
guiding principle by which legislatures, courts and administrative agencies, interpret, and apply property rules). 
113  42 U.S.C. § 4321 to 4370f (2004). 
114  42 U.S.C. § 4331(2004).  This section declares the policy of the United States to use all practicable means to achieve a 
list of broad environmental goals.  These goals include the following: 1.  Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as 
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; 2.  Assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and 
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; 3.  Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; 4.  Preserve important historic 
cultural and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports 
diversity and variety of individual choice; 5.  Achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit 
high standards of living and a wide sharing of lifes amenities; and 6.  Enhance the quality of renewable resources and 
approach the maximum obtainable recycling of depletable resources.  Id.  For a detailed discussion of the possible use of 
NEPA as an environmental baseline which can inform statutory interpretation, see generally, Mary Jane Angelo, Crouching 
Textualist, Hidden Intentionalist: Reclaiming Our Stolen Green Destiny out of the Judicial Sparring Over the 
Interpretation of Environmental Statutes, in ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS:  DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT IN AND 
UNWELCOME JUDICIAL CLIMATE (Michael Wolf, ed., 2005). 
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nutrients within an ecosystem.115 Another type of species of special importance is known as the 
keystone species.  These species provide more value to the ecosystem than would be predicted 
by their abundance in the ecosystem.116  Some conservation biologists believe that the extinction 
of a keystone species has the potential to result in a domino effect, whereby numerous species go 
extinct and the entire ecosystem is drastically altered.117  Umbrella species are species that 
typically have very large home territories, such that protecting a keystones species habitat will 
have the effect of protecting many other species as well.118 Finally, species that are very sensitive 
to pollutants and other environmental stresses, such that the health of these populations serves as a 
good indicator of overall ecological health, are known as indicator species.119  Of course, while 
certain types of species such as controller species and keystone species may warrant greater 
protection, due to our extremely limited understanding of the workings of ecological systems, it 
would be imprudent not to assume that every component of an ecosystem has some value unless 
proven otherwise.120  
Both individual species and ecosystems exhibit a wide range of resilience to man-induced 
changes.121  Because of the dramatic differences between species and between ecosystems and 
because so little is understood about the ability of a particular species or particular ecosystem to 
tolerate or bounce-back after damage from human activities, it is very difficult to determine 
whether a particular change will result in significant habitat destruction.122  While it may be a 
gross overstatement to say that all ecosystems are so delicate and intricate that removing one part 
will necessary cause the demise of the entire system, it is not an overstatement that removing one 
species from an ecosystem can negatively impact other species and, in the words of Princeton 
conservation biologist, David Wilcove, there is no way of knowing ahead of time where the chain 
reaction will end. 123 
                                                 
115  Controller species typically include decomposer species.  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 52. 
116  One commonly cited example of a keystone species is the red-cockaded woodpecker, which excavates cavities in living 
trees, providing habitat for a variety of species who live in tree cavities, but are not capable of excavating their own 
cavities.  Id.  
117  Id. at 74. 
118  Id. at 54. 
119  Id at 55. The pelicans sensitivity to DDT made it a good indicator species for organochlorine pesticide contamination.   
120 DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDORS SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA AT 12 (1999).   
121  Id. at 6. 
122  Id. at 9. 
123  Id. at 11-12. 
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Moving beyond protection of individual species, even those of particular ecological import, 
the protection of ecosystem124 diversity is crucial to the maintenance of overall ecological 
integrity. Ecosystems themselves provide numerous services,125 some of which are easily 
quantifiable, and others of which are not.  As Professor Laura Westra has stated [h]uman survival 
depends on many of natures goods and services that are invisible to markets and the economy; 
some are no doubt invisible to scientists.126  Natural resource economists have identified 
numerous ecosystem services that, if humans had to replace them, would be extremely expensive, 
if not technically infeasible.  If fact, the value of global ecosystem services has been estimated at 
33 trillion dollars.127  Of course, as with individual species, our lack of understanding of the 
workings of these complex systems leaves open the very likely possibility that ecosystems perform 
many other valuable services that we do not yet fully understand or that we are not yet able to 
quantify. 
Because ecology encompasses the relationships between the physical, the chemical and the 
biological, ecological integrity necessarily includes physical integrity, chemical integrity and 
biological integrity.  To fully address ecological integrity, a variety of indicators of ecosystem 
health must be considered including not only the number of organisms or species, or the status of 
threatened or endangered species, but also the state of physical, chemical, and biological processes 
which, together with biological considerations, comprise ecological integrity.  Ecological integrity 
can be measured by starting with a baseline condition found at a site with a biota that is the 
product of evolutionary and biogeographic processes in the relative absence of the effects of 
modern human activity. 128  Then existing or predicted conditions can be compared to this 
baseline to measure the extent of deviation. Numerous attempts have been made by scholars of 
conservation biology to define qualitatively, if not quantitatively, biological or ecological 
                                                 
124  An ecosystem is defined as a group of interacting organisms, or a community, and the physical environment they 
inhabit a particular point in time.  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 62. 
125  One example of an ecosystem service is a wetland (a type of ecosystem) serving as a filter to treat water supplies.  
HUNTER, supra note 30, at 69.  Other examples include beach dunes buffering upland properties from the effects of storms, 
and saltmarshes supporting fisheries, air purification, soil renewal, climate stabilization, and crop pollination.  Id. at 69; see 
also, J.B. Ruhl, supra note 15 at 544 (citing NATURES SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997)).  
126  Laura Westra et. al., Ecological Integrity and the Aims of the Global Integrity Project, in ECOLOGICAL INTEGRITY:  
INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT, CONSERVATION AND HEALTH 25 (David Pimentel et. al. eds., 2000). 
127  FARBER, supra note 17 at 67 (describing a 1997 report in the scientific journal Nature); see also, Robert Costanza et al., 
The Value of the Worlds Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 252 (1997). 
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integrity.  For example, James R. Karr has developed an index of biological integrity (IBI) to 
address the objective articulated in the Clean Water Act,  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2004), to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nations Waters.129   
Whatever metrics are employed to evaluate whether an environmental regulatory program 
preserves ecological integrity, some system of measurement is needed to take into account 
diversity, health of significant species, and integrity of the physical and chemical world.  By 
clarifying that ecological integrity will serve as the environmental baseline in eco-Pragmatism, a  
clear reference point can be established to which ecological changes of proposed man-induced 
activities can be measured against.  Accordingly, whenever an environmental regulation or other 
risk reduction measure is proposed, an evaluation of the regulation will start with the presumption 
that the regulation must be sufficient not to completely preserve the status quo, but to maintain 
ecological integrity.  Then the proposal can be evaluated to determine whether it will accomplish 
the goal of maintaining ecological integrity. 
4.  Lack of Information and Changing Information 
The fourth question sought to be answered by eco-pragmatism is, because our 
understanding of environmental issues continues to evolve as new information becomes available, 
how do we know when to proceed in the face of imperfect information and when to wait for better 
information before taking action.  This question raises the related issues of whether precautionary 
approaches should be used in environmental decision-making and how to incorporate adaptive 
management ideas into environmental laws.  
The lack of scientific understanding of natural systems overshadows the entire  
environmental decision-making process.130  The limited ability for science to provide clear 
                                                                                                                                                                      
128  Westra, supra note 126, at 23. 
129 James R. Karr, Health, Integrity, and Biological Assessment: The Importance of Measuring Whole Things, in Westra, 
supra note 126, at 209, 219-223.  The IBI has been compared to the index of leading economic indicators, which considers 
a number of financial measures to assess the overall state of the economy.  Similarly, the IBI takes into consideration a 
number of metrics to assess the overall condition of an ecological system.  Examples of metrics used in determining the IBI 
include species richness, stress intolerant and tolerant indicator species, relative abundance of trophic guilds, presence of 
alien species, and the incidence of disease, lesions tumors or other anomalies in the biota.  The IBI does not call for the 
measurement of physical or chemical parameters, but instead assumes that their impacts will be manifest in biological 
indicators.  Because of the regional differences between ecological systems, the IBI must be calibrated on a regional basis.  
Id. 
130  FARBER, supra note 17 at 1, 5. 
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answers to environmental questions, has been on ongoing problem in environmental law.131  As 
Justice Breyer has described, there is scientific uncertainty involved in every stage of any risk 
assessment.  Thus, if there are ten independent steps in a risk analysis and each step involves an 
uncertainty factor of two, the estimate of the total risk has an uncertainty factor of one thousand.132 
 Even beyond the complex field of risk assessment, uncertainty pervades virtually all 
environmental decision-making.133  The regulated community has taken full advantage of this 
scientific uncertainty.  Decisions to regulate, they assert, should wait until science can 
conclusively demonstrate the need for such regulation.134  Of course, using a lack of certainty as an 
excuse not to act can result in serious, and sometimes irreparable, environmental consequences.   
Our very limited understanding of environmental issues, coupled with the complexity of 
ecological systems, suggests a basis for proceeding cautiously when deciding whether to allow 
potentially risky activities to occur.  The precautionary principle, which has been adopted by a 
variety of international  environmental agreements,135 is one approach to proceeding cautiously. 
The precautionary principle resolves doubts in favor of the environment.136 
The precautionary principle recognizes that as predictions are made further out in time, 
uncertainty tends to increase.  Moreover, the precautionary principle takes into account the fact 
that inherent in any scientific evaluation is the opportunity for scientific error to occur.137  
Opponents of the precautionary principle contend that it is based on vague and baseless fears 
regarding environmental risks.  But, the same could be said to argue for a precautionary approach. 
                                                 
131  See Tarlock, supra note 34 at 1135 (discussing the tension between scientific uncertainty and the laws desire for clear 
standards.). 
132  FARBER, supra note 17 at 163 (citing Breyer, supra note 47, at 45). 
133  See e.g., Tarlock, supra note 34 at 1135-39. 
134  See e.g., id. at 1135-36. 
135  See e.g., The Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (hereinafter Maastricht Treaty) 
(adopting the precautionary principle as a governing principle of European Union Law).  See also   1992 United Nations 
Environment Programme Convention on Biodiversity.  The preamble to the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety provides that 
it is reaffirming the precautionary approach . . . contained in . . . the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development . . 
.  Article 10(6) of the Protocol provides that [l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information 
and knowledge regarding potential adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity in the Party or import . . . shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as appropriate, . . . in 
order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects. 
136  Ruhl, supra note 15 at 537. 
137  Type scientific  I errors are those that mistakenly conclude an effect is real when it isnt, whereas type II errors are 
those that mistakenly conclude that an effect is not real when it really is.  In the field of environmental protection, type II 
errors are of the greatest concern.  If, for example, decision is made that allowing a particular activity to proceed will not 
cause harm to an endangered species, and that decision is based on a type II error, the activity may unintentionally result in 
jeopardy to the endangered species.  FARBER, supra note 17 at 173. 
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 Often the costs of regulation are based on vague and baseless fears about the potential economic 
consequences of regulation, dire predictions of which rarely come true.138 
 Farber emphasizes the need to proceed cautiously.  He maintains that when environmental 
risks are still uncertain, we should take reasonable precautions.  There are times when it is 
necessary to make difficult regulatory decisions with very incomplete or inconclusive data.139  It 
may not be prudent to wait until complete or conclusive data are available.  For many 
environmental decisions, a decision to wait is a decision to irreversibly impact a resource.  Such is 
the case with a decision to withhold regulatory action on the protection of an endangered species 
due to incomplete information. By the time complete information becomes available, the species 
may be extinct or beyond recovery.   
 As described above, scientific uncertainty perhaps is even more profound in assessing risks 
to ecological systems than in assessing human health risks.140  Once again, the incorporation of 
ecological principles into eco-pragmatism lends further support to the theory.  Moreover, with 
regard to ecological issues, flexible and adaptive approaches are even more critical than with 
human health concerns.  The science of understanding how species and ecosystems work and how 
human disruptions may impact them is still in its infancy.141  During the early years of ecology we 
believed that natural systems were stable and that ecosystems evolved in a predetermined set of 
stages (known as succession) toward a stable climax community.142  In the past twenty five 
years, the paradigm that ecosystems exist in a state of equilibrium has been replaced with the more 
complex nonequiblirium paradigm.143  In recent years, ecological science has discovered that 
natural system have multiple persistent states and multiple successional pathways.144   Thus, the 
                                                 
138  Another way to view the precautionary principle is as a burden-shifting device, which shifts the burden of proof to the 
resource uses or polluter to demonstrate its activities should be allowed. Id. at 171.  By placing the burden of proof on the 
regulated entity, ties are resolved in favor of the environment. 
139  Id. at 164. 
140  See generally, Daniel A. Farber, Probability Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003) (describing the high level of scientific uncertainty surrounding environmental problems). 
141  Id. at 167.  In their article, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 847 (1994), Professors Bosselman and Tarlock review four periods of ecological thought during the twentieth century 
and analyze how each period influenced environmental law and policy. 
142 See generally Meyer, supra note 27.  
143  See generally BOTKIN, supra note 27.  The nonequilbirium paradigm was not widely accepted until the 1980s.  See 
Tarlock, supra note 34 at 1129. 
144  Meyer, supra note 27 at 876. 
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current paradigm rejects the balance of nature paradigm.145  To capture this concept, Professor 
Judy Meyer has coined the phrase dance of nature to replace the outdated balance of nature.146 
 Ecologists also began to realize that natural systems are periodically and continually 
disturbed by natural phenomena such as fire, flood, drought, and disease and pest outbreak, as well 
as by similar types of disturbances resulting from human activity.147  Consequently, human 
disturbances are not necessarily bad for natural systems.148  The goal for environmental 
protection, thus, should not be to suppress all human-caused disturbances, but rather to prevent 
human-caused disturbances that are not in line with the natural disturbance regime of the 
ecosystem.149  To be able to proceed consistently with natural disturbance regimes, therefore, 
requires knowledge of the historical record of an ecosystem.150  Unfortunately, this type of long 
term historical monitoring data rarely is available. 
The non-equilibrium paradigm, however, should not lull us into believing that, because 
ecosystems naturally experience change, all anthropogenic change is acceptable.151  
Anthropogenic changes frequently differ from natural changes in character, magnitude and 
frequency.152  Moreover, natural systems frequently react to anthropogenic disturbances in 
completely unpredictable ways.153  Even very small disturbances can flip ecosystems into vastly 
different behavioral states, sometimes well after the event that started the reaction.154  Thus, as  
Meyer concludes, [a]nthropogenic change is acceptable only if that change is within limits.155  
The limits depend on the specifics of the ecosystems and its ability to keep pace with the changes 
that occur.156 
                                                 
145  Id. at 877.   
146  Id. at 877. 
147  Id. at 876. 
148  Ruhl, supra note 21, at 906-907. 
149  Meyer, supra note 27, at 879.  
150  Id. at 879.   
151  Id. at 882. See also, Tarlock, supra note 34 at 1130 (explaining that the nonequilibrium paradigm does not undermine 
the case for protection of ecosystems). 
152  Meyer, supra note 27 at 882. 
153  See Ruhl, supra note 21, at 906. 
154  Id.  This phenomenon is frequently analogized with the tipping point of a canoe.  A canoe can be progressively tipped 
more and more with only minor effect, until it reaches its tipping point, at which point the canoe completely capsizes.  
Once a tipping point is reached, the entire system can collapse or undergo dramatic change. 
155  Meyer, supra note 27 at 882. 
156  Id. at 882.  Despite the complex and delicate nature of interactions between species in an ecosystem, both history and 
disequilibria theory teach us that change, including human disturbance, is not necessary detrimental to overall ecosystem 
health.  Ecosystems do possess the ability to resist certain disturbances and to recover from those that do have a detrimental 
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 In addition to precautionary approaches, eco-pragmatism argues in favor of developing 
flexible regulatory systems that allow decisions to be modified as additional information becomes 
available.157  One of the most significant aspects of pragmatism in general is the recognition that 
the combination of limited information and an ever changing society cannot tolerate static 
decision-making.  Instead, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that as new information 
becomes available or as societys values evolve, the law must be able to adapt incrementally and 
accordingly.158  Thus, eco-pragmatism suggests that environmental laws must have mechanisms 
built into them to allow regulatory agencies to make incremental adjustment to regulation to take 
into account new information, as well as to correct old mistakes.159  Under the existing regulatory 
system, agencies such as EPA tend to be so concerned with making the right decision up front, 
that any lack of information or controversy tends to paralyze them.  Instead, a pragmatic approach 
would favor agencies to make the best decision they have available based on the best information 
currently available with a corresponding recognition that such decisions will need to be adjusted 
over time.160  Of course, one of the reasons that agencys are so concerned with making the perfect 
decision on the front end is that under the existing regulatory system, it is generally extremely 
                                                                                                                                                                      
effect.  In ecological terms, resistance is the degree to which a ecosystem changes in response to a disturbance whereas 
resilience is the degree to which an ecosystem recovers after it has been disturbed.  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 74.  Thus, 
while not all human disturbance is detrimental to ecosystems, it is the frequency of the disturbance, the magnitude of the 
disturbance and the nature of the disturbance that determine whether there will be long term negative effects on the 
ecosystem.  Meyer, supra note 27, at 882.  Ecosystems tend to respond better to human disturbances that mimic those that 
occur in nature.  In addition, the overall health of an ecosystem will determine how well the ecosystem will respond to 
disturbances.  For example, species-rich areas may be both more resistant and more resilient to human disturbances than 
ecosystems that do not possess a great abundance and diversity of species.  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 86-91.  It is well 
established that genetic variability within a species improves the likelihood that the species will survive and evolve in 
response to a changing environment.  Id. at 86-87.  Likewise, variability between species within an ecosystem can improve 
the chances for an ecosystem to survive and evolve in response to human disturbances.  Id.  In fact, a lack of genetic 
diversity may cause problems even in ecosystems that are not experiencing change.  For example, genetically uniform 
species may experience low fertility and high mortality rates among offspring, as is evidenced by the problems associated 
with the lack of genetic diversity in many zoos.  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 88.  Likewise, ecosystems that have not be 
compromised by chemical contamination may respond better than those that have been so compromised 
157  FARBER, supra note 17 at 12. 
158  See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 24-27. Shapiro and Glicksman have referred to such incremental 
adjustment as muddling through and argue that it is often the most rational way to make policy.  Id. at 24.  In fact, 
pragmatism shies away from dramatic reforms in favor of such incremental adjustments.  Id. at 26. 
159  Id.  
160  See id. at 25.  This willingness to change as new information becomes available must work both ways  i.e., one the one 
hand if a regulation is found not to be protective enough there should be a mechanism to adapt quickly to provide the 
requisite protection, and on the other hand, if a regulation is found to be too stringent, there should be a mechanism to 
provide quick regulatory relief.  FARBER, supra note 17 at 12. 
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difficult and time-consuming to change course in mid-stream.161 
The inherent complexity and unpredictability of natural systems,162 coupled with our 
limited scientific understanding of such systems has led to the ground-breaking development in the 
field of conservation biology of adaptive management.163  Adaptive management was developed in 
the  context of natural  resource management.164  Nevertheless, to date, it has not been used widely 
in environmental regulation.165  Adaptive management requires both a willingness to make 
environmental policy decisions even with limited scientific information, and the recognition that 
such decision must be continually monitored and evaluated and adjusted as new information or 
changed circumstances warrant.166  
More flexible regulatory systems are needed to adapt to change or as new information 
becomes available.  In addition, more emphasis must be put on acquiring necessary data through 
monitoring outcomes of environmental decisions.  Based on information of the effects of a 
particular regulatory action acquired through monitoring programs, adjustments to can be made to 
produce better, more science-based, regulations.167  Eco-pragmatism calls for a more experimental 
approach to regulation  i.e., in which regulatory actions are implemented, monitored and adjusted 
                                                 
161  The stasis inherent in the regulatory system stems in part from the time-consuming and cumbersome requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq., the agencies fear that any opening up of the rulemaking process 
will invite legal challenges, and the expectation on the part of the regulated community that once a decision is made, they 
will be able to rely on it indefinitely. 
162  The developing theory of dynamic systems is also referred to as complexity theory or chaos theory. See FARBER, supra 
note II at 146.  Farbers article explores the uncertainty about environmental problems in the context of complexity theory.  
Farber posits that complexity theory provides strong support for adaptive management. Id. at 147. 
163  For a detailed discussion of adaptive management and how it is used in a number of environmental programs, including 
Habitat Conservation Planning under the ESA, U.S. Forest Service management planning, and everglades restoration, see 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults:  Toward a Bounded 
Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943 (2002). 
164  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12 at 167.  
165  Id. 
166  Id.  Previous experience is used to inform adjustments to policy.  Perhaps Bosselman and Tarlock said it best: 
ecosystems are patches or collections of conditions that exist for finite periods of time [footnote omitted].  The 
accelerating interaction between humans and the natural environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state of 
nature.  At best, ecosystems can be managed rather than restored or preserved, and management will consist of a series of 
calculated risky experiments that must be judged against a moving target.  Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 40, at 869-
870.  Although environmental experimentation is rife with risk, it may be the only effective way to proceed.  For any 
system or organization to adjust to changing information or circumstances, feedback loops are necessary.  See Tarlock, 
supra note 34 at 1139.  To date, such feedback loops have not been widely used in environmental law, which tends to favor 
the consistency and predictability of clear fixed rules.  Id. In fact, environmental law has tended to adhere so strongly to 
scientific findings, that it fails to reconsider such findings even as new data prove them to be incorrect.  Id.  
167  FARBER, supra note 17 at 179. 
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based on the results of the monitoring.168  
The difficulties with these types of flexible or adaptive schemes is that neither the law, nor 
the regulatory agencies that implement it, are quick reactors to change.  Eco-pragmatism attempts 
to address this problem by proposing more decentralized approaches, whereby decisions can be 
modified on a local level and smaller scale more quickly to adapt to new information than could be 
accomplished in a large centralized system.169  A decentralized system tends to be more  flexible 
and to respond more quickly to new information.170  One mechanism for accomplishing 
decentralization is through a devolution of regulatory responsibility to state and local 
governments.  However, although there are certain advantages to localized decision-making, 
delegation to too much authority to states or local governments could result in a race to the 
bottom.171  Thus, safeguards are necessary to prevent a disintegration of environmental 
protection.  Such safeguards could include national minimum standards and national oversight of 
state regulation.172 
In sum, eco-pragmatism provides a useful framework for environmental decision-making.  
Many of the shortcomings of eco-pragmatism can be overcome by consciously integrating it with 
principles of ecological science.  An eco-pragmatic evaluation of pesticide law must start with an 
understanding of the history of pesticide use and the ecological risks posed by pesticides. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF THE PESTICIDE/ECOLOGY RELATIONSHIP 
A.  History of Pesticide Use 
Scientists believe that pesticides have been used by humans for over two thousand years.173 
 Although metals, such as arsenic lead and copper were used as pesticides extensively in the early 
                                                 
168  Id.  
169  Id. at 180.   
170  Ruhl, supra note 15 at 540. 
171  FARBER, supra note 17 at 182-83.  For an excellent analysis of the race to the bottom theory, see Kirsten H. Engel, State 
Environmental Standard-Setting: Is there a Race and is it to the Bottom, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 271 (1997).  For an 
opposing view of the theory, see Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A 
Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997). 
172  Id. 
173  Homer described how Odysseus used burning sulfur as a fumigant to control pests. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Edward 
McCrorie, transl. 2004).  For a more complete description of the history of pesticide use, see Clive A. Edwards, The Impact 
of Pesticides on the Environment, in THE PESTICIDE QUESTION: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 13 (David 
Pimentel & Hugh Lehman, eds., 1993).  Additional documentation of pesticide use, such as the use of arsenic to kill 
insects, can be found in literature dating back to the time of Christ. There is documentation that arsenic has been used to 
control insects dating back to the year 70 AD, when Pliny the Elder recommended the use of arsenic to kill insects.  Arsenic 
was also used as a pesticide in 16th century China.  Id.  
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20th Century, most pest control up until that time was accomplished by means of  cultural controls, 
such as cultivation, 174 sanitation, 175 crop rotation,176 and sowing and harvesting practices.177  It 
was not until the latter half of the 20th century that the development of synthetic chemical 
pesticides led to an explosion of global pesticide use.178  Because these new synthetic chemical 
pesticides were spectacularly effective at controlling a wide variety of pests, they quickly gained 
favor and, before long, were ubiquitous.  Estimates of global pesticide use are staggering.  More 
than 1600 types of pesticides are currently available.179  More than five billion pounds of 
pesticides, with a value of over 30 billion dollars,  are used annually in the world.180  Pesticide use 
in the United States accounts for 27 percent of global pesticide usage, with U.S. exports to other 
countries exceeding 450 million pounds of pesticides per year.181 
The rapid worldwide adoption of synthetic chemical pesticides began during World War II, 
with the development of two primary categories of chemical insecticides, the organochlorines and 
the organophosphates.  The organochlorines, which include the notorious pesticide, DDT,182 were 
first considered to be highly desirable because, while they are very toxic to a broad range of 
                                                 
174  HELMUT F. VAN EMDEN & DAVID B. PEAKALL, BEYOND SILENT SPRING: INTEGRATED PEST MANAGEMENT AND 
CHEMICAL SAFETY 115-17 (1996).  Many pest insects live out at least part of their life cycles in soil, weeds or accumulated 
crop debris in farm fields.  Plowing the top layer of soil kills many of these pest insects.  Accordingly, soil tillage 
historically was a critical component of agricultural pest management.  It was not until relatively recently that, as a way to 
minimize soil erosion, tillage was abandoned in favor of zero or minimum tillage systems, which rely on herbicide usage to 
control weeds.  The demise of tillage as a core component of modern agricultural systems has resulted in a dramatic 
increase in certain soil-dwelling pests.  Id.  Other cultivation pest control techniques used historically include mulching, 
compacting and manuring.  Id.  
175  Sanitation practices are one of the most effective pest control practices used in both ancient and modern agriculture.  Id. 
at 117-18.  By destroying residues of crops left in fields after harvesting, many pest populations that live in such residues 
are destroyed.  Related practices such as destruction of weed hosts and selective pruning also serve as effective pest control 
tools.  Id. at 118-19. 
176  Crop rotation, one of the oldest forms of pest control, is a very effective pest control technique for minimizing soil-
dwelling pests.  By alternating the planting of different crops in a particular field, populations of soil-dwelling insects that 
feed on a particular crop will not be able to build up during periods when their food crop is not present.  Thus, when the 
crop eventually is planted, populations of the pest species generally will not be high enough to cause serious problems.  Id. 
at 120-21.  
177  Timing sowing and planting dates to avoid pest outbreaks or to ensure the crop plant is in a resistant growth stage when 
pest outbreaks are likely to occur, as well as carefully tailoring seed and planting rates and early harvesting also can be 
effective tools for avoiding pest damage to crops.  Id. a 120-23.  
178  Edwards, supra note 173, at 13.   
179  These figures are based on EPA pesticide market estimates for the years, 2000-2001.  See 
http://www.epa.gov/oppbead/pestsales/01pestsales/sales2001.htm and See 
http://www.epa.gov/oppbead/pestsales/01pestsales/usage2001-3.htm (Last visited June 17, 2005). 
180  See Id. 
181  Edwards, supra note 173, at 13.  
182  DDT is the abbreviation for synthetic insecticide, 1, 1, 1-trichloro-2, 2-bis (p-chlorophenyl) ethane.  ROBERT E. PFADT, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF APPLIED ENTOMOLOGY at 755, 3rd ed. (1978). 
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invertebrates, they are not highly acutely toxic to humans or other mammals.183  These pesticides 
also are extremely persistent in the environment, which makes them highly effective for long-term 
effective pest control. However, their persistence in the environment became their downfall when 
the long-term ecological consequences of these pesticides became apparent.  Organochlorine 
pesticides, such as DDT, are credited with saving thousands of lives from insect borne diseases 
during World War II.184  Nevertheless, it soon became evident that these pesticides accumulated in 
living tissues and bioconcentrated as they moved through the food chain.  This resulted in serious 
impacts to predators at the top of the food chain, including the American Bald Eagle.  In 
consequence, most organochlorine pesticides were either banned or severely restricted, at least in 
the developed countries of the world.185 
The other major category of pesticides that was developed during World War II is the 
organophosphate pesticides. These pesticides were initially developed as wartime nerve gases.186  
Although these pesticides have the environmental advantage of being far less persistent in the 
environment than are organochlorine pesticides, the organophosphates tend to be highly acutely 
toxic to humans, other mammals and birds.187  These pesticides became the pesticides of choice in 
the United States after most organochlorine pesticides were banned or severely restricted.  
Organophosphates remain the largest category of chemical insecticide in use in the United States 
today.188  In addition to posing risks of acute poisoning to farm workers, these pesticides have 
been implicated in a large number of avian and wildlife poisonings.189   
                                                 
183  Edwards, supra note 173, at 14.  
184  Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, and Public Health: Explaining the Paradox of 
Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2002).  
185  Edwards, supra note 173, at 14.  A number of international agreements exist to restrict the use of persistent organic 
pollutants, such as the organochlorine pesticides.  For a detailed discussion of such agreements, see Michael P. Walls, 
International Chemicals Update 2005, SK 058 ALI-ABA 661 (2005).  It should be noted that there has been a recent 
resurgence in efforts to loosen restrictions on DDT due to its potential use in combating malaria and other insect-borne 
diseases.  See, e.g.,  Morriss & Meiners, supra note 184.  
186  Id. at 15 
187  Id. 
188  See http://www.epa.gov/oppbead/pestsales/01pestsales/usage2001-3.htm (Last visited June 17, 2005). 
189 Id.  Other categories of chemical pesticides include the synthetic pyrethroids and carbamates.  Pyrethrum is a naturally-
occurring pesticide derived from chrysanthemum flowers.  Id.  Synthetic pyrethroids are synthetically produced versions of 
pyrethrum.  These pesticides have the environmental benefit of having very low mammalian toxicity and low 
environmental persistence.  Id.  Nevertheless, they are highly toxic to a broad range of invertebrates, including many 
beneficial insects.  Id.  They are also highly toxic to fish and other aquatic organisms.  Carbamates are more persistent than 
organophosphates in the environment and are generally broad-spectrum, having adverse impacts on many different groups 
of organisms. Id.  Other commonly used pesticides are: nematicides, which not only are of high mammalian toxicity and 
broad-spectrum, but also are very transient in soil; herbicides, which generally are not highly toxic to mammals, but travel 
 
 40 
Although from an ecological standpoint, narrow-spectrum pesticides are preferable, broad-
spectrum synthetic pesticides continue to dominate U.S. pesticide usage.190  This phenomenon is at 
least in part attributed to the time and costs associated with bringing a new pesticide to the market. 
 The average time to bring a new pesticide to commercialization is five to ten years, with an 
associated cost of ten to twenty million dollars.191  Moreover, the average life-span of a pesticide 
for a specific use is ten years.192  Accordingly, pesticide manufacturers may be inclined to adopt 
research and development strategies that favor broad-spectrum pesticides with broad market 
opportunities, in order to get the biggest bang for the buck during the limited life span of a 
pesticide.193 
In the past ten years, the fasting growing sector of the pesticide industry has been the 
biotechnology sector.  Naturally-existing microbes have been genetically modified to make them 
toxic to insects and other pests.  In addition, agricultural crop plants themselves have been 
genetically modified to produce substances that have pesticidal effects.  These pesticidal living 
organisms pose novel ecological risks by virtue of their ability to reproduce and spread in the 
environment. 
B.  Ecological Risks of Pesticides 
Scientists estimate that as many as 10 million species, or 99% of the earths wild 
biodiversity, not including cultivated and weedy species, are in a precarious condition.194  Causes 
and contributors to the decline of so many species include indirect habitat destruction through 
clearing for agriculture and development, the spread of non-native invasive species, pollution, over 
harvesting of species and disease.  Although there is no doubt that direct habitat destruction is the 
leading contributor of species loss (estimated as being implicated in 85% of U.S. species decline), 
                                                                                                                                                                      
easily in water, where they may be toxic to fish and aquatic organisms; and fungicides, which vary greatly in their toxicity. 
 Id. 
190  WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 407 (West, 2d ed. 1994). 
191  Id. 
192  Id.  The reasons for the relatively short life span of pesticides include the tendency for pests to develop resistance to 
pesticides, rendering the pesticides obsolete for that pest and the fact that FIFRA allows for me-too registration, which 
tend to reduce the market share of the original pesticide.  A me-too registration allows a pesticide manufacturer, in lieu of 
developing its own data to support registration, to rely on data generating by a previous registrant provided the me-too 
applicant makes an offer to compensate the previous registrant for the use of the data. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii).  
193  RODGERS, supra note190, at 407-09. 
194  EDWARD O. WILSON, forward to DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDORS SHADOW: THE LOSS AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE 
IN AMERICA xiv (1999).   
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pollution, including pesticide pollution is implicated in 24 percent of U.S. species decline.195  
Pesticide poisoning of fish and wildlife is a significant factor in species decline.196 
Because pesticides are by definition intended to kill or disrupt living organisms, and 
because they are intentionally released into the environment, often in large quantities over large 
areas, it is not surprising that pesticides pose a wide array of risks to individual species as well as 
to overall ecosystem function.  Many pesticides are broad-spectrum, affecting diverse species, 
including many non-target organisms.197  Others are more narrowly targeted to pest species.  
However, even these may have significant impacts on non-target species that are closely related to 
the intended targets.198  Some pesticides persist in the environment for weeks, months and even 
years, while others breakdown relatively quickly.199  Moreover, living organisms vary significantly 
in their susceptibility to pesticides.200  The potential ecological risks of pesticide use depend on a 
number of factors including toxicity or other hazard of the pesticide, method of application, 
persistence in the environment, amount used and susceptibility of non-target organisms.  
Moreover, there are not many data available on the environmental effects of pesticide usage on 
many species.  Accordingly, the ecological risks of pesticides cannot be easily described or 
quantified. Nevertheless, some generalizations can be made. 
Many pesticides are highly acutely toxic to some or all non-target mammals, birds, reptiles, 
amphibians, fish and invertebrates.  Many pesticides in current use in the U.S., as well as in other 
parts of the world, are highly acutely toxic and are known to cause adverse effects on non-target 
mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish and invertebrates.201  Birds and other wildlife may be 
                                                 
195  WILCOVE, supra note 120, at 8. 
196  Moreover, the spread of non-native species is implicated in 49 percent of U.S. species decline. In one study of the 
decline of  fish species in the Untied States, Canada and Mexico, it as determined that the destruction of physical habitat 
was implicated in 73 percent of the decline, the displacement by introduced species was implicated in 68 percent of the 
decline, the alterations of habitat by chemical pollutants was implicated in 38 percent of the declines, and hybridization 
with other species and subspecies was implicated in 38 percent of the declines, and over harvesting was implicated in 15 
percent of the declines.  The numbers add up to more than one hundred because more than one factor is implicated in many 
of the fish population declines.  WILSON, supra note 34, at 253-254.  Thus, while pesticide usage in itself may not directly 
destroy habitat (although clearing for agriculture certainly does) chemical pesticides may be a significant contributor to 
species decline, and pesticidal GMOs, which pose risks of spread in the environment similar to non-indigenous species 
release, may also be important contributors.  Habitat Destruction, spread of nonnatives, pollution, overkill and disease have 
been referred to as the five horsemen of the environmental Apocalypse.  WILCOVE, supra note 120, at 8. 
197  See supra note 190, and accompanying text. 
198   See Edwards, supra note 173, at 17-24. 
199  Id. at 17. 
200  Id. at 18. 
201  For a detailed discussion of the risks pesticides cause to wildlife species, see Comments on the Proposed Joint 
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exposed through direct spraying, ingesting pesticide granules, drinking water that has been 
contaminated by pesticides or eating prey organisms that have been contaminated by pesticides. 
For instance, the pesticide carbofuran is highly toxic to avian species.  While the banning and 
severe restriction of certain pesticides such as DDT over the past thirty years has dramatically 
reduced certain risks to wildlife, many risks remain.202   In addition to effects from direct exposure 
to pesticides, birds and other wildlife may also be exposed to pesticides by ingesting prey animals 
that have been contaminated.203  
Other less visible species also are at considerable risk from exposure to pesticides.  For 
example, for the past decade, there has been considerable concern and debate in the scientific 
community over the worldwide decline of amphibians. There are now significant data to support a 
conclusion that certain pesticides, such as the herbicide atrazine, may be contributing to the world-
wide decline in amphibian populations.204     
                                                                                                                                                                      
Counterpart Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, filed by Defenders of Wildlife and twenty-nine 
other commenters, contained in a letter to Gary Frazer, Assistant Director for Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and Phil Williams, Chief, Endangered Species Division, NOAA Fisheries, dated April 16, 2004. 
202   One startlingly example is that when roughly 10,000 dead birds were tested for the presence of West Nile Virus in 
2000, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation determined that pesticides and other chemicals 
actually were responsible for more bird kills than was the virus.  Laura A. Haight, Local Control of Pesticides in New York: 
Perspectives and Policy Recommendations, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 37, 51 (2004).  As further evidence of the 
effects on bird populations, studies have shown substantially higher nesting rates of birds, as well as significantly higher 
bird abundance and avian species richness, on organic farms as compared to conventional farms that use synthetic 
pesticides.  Nancy A. Beecher, Ron J. Johnson, James R. Brandle, Ronald M. Case, and Linda J. Young, Agroecology of 
Birds in Organic and Nonorganic Farmland, 16 CONS. BIOL. 1620 (2002). 
203  The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation has found a number of different avian species, such as 
screech owls, red-tailed hawks, American kestrels and other raptors that have died as a result of eating small rodents that 
had consumed rat poison.  Id.  
204  Haight, supra note 202, at 51.  For example, in 2002, the organization Californians for Alternatives to Toxics (CATS) 
filed suit seeking an order requiring the state Department of Pesticide Regulation to reevaluate the state registration of 
pesticide products containing the pesticidal active ingredients malathion, chlorpyrifos, diazinon, methidathion, endosulfan, 
chorothalonil, and trifluralin.  The lawsuit contends that these pesticides may be responsible for significant population 
declines of several species of amphibians in the Sierra Nevada Mountains.  Until very recently, the results of many studies 
on the effects of pesticides on amphibians have been puzzling because pesticide levels in nature tend to be much lower than 
levels found to be lethal in the laboratory setting See Rick Relyea, Predators Make Pesticides More Lethal, in 
CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE, vol. 5, no. 2, 2004, at 5, 5 (excerpting Rick Relyea, Predator Cues and Pesticides:  A Double 
Dose of Danger for Amphibians, 13 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1515-1521 (2003)).  See also Carlos Davidson, H. Bradley 
Shaffer, and Mark R. Jennings, Spacial Tests of the Pesticide Drift, Habitat Destruction, UV-B, and Climate-Change 
Hypotheses for California Amphibian Declines, 16 Cons. Biol. 1588 (2002).  A recent study sheds new light on this 
dilemma.  Scientists have determined that the combination of the pesticide carbaryl and stress from the presence of 
predators was more lethal in certain amphibian species, than the pesticide by itself.  Id.  In other words, there appears to be 
a synergistic affect at work between pesticides and predators, making the combination of the two more lethal than the sum 
of the parts, and resulting in even low concentrations of pesticides in nature being highly lethal to amphibians.  Of course, 
amphibians in nature must cope with other stress such as the presence of predators, in addition to the stress of pesticides.  
Accordingly, this study demonstrates that amphibians in nature may be significantly more sensitive to pesticides than they 
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Although the most obvious adverse effects of pesticide use are those to humans and large 
animals such as mammals and birds, it is likely that the most significant adverse effects of 
pesticides are those to invertebrates, which are closely related to target pest species.205  Casualties 
from this friendly fire are widespread in the invertebrate world.206  
Perhaps equally if not more important than direct acute effects on nontarget organisms are 
the chronic effects upon growth, physiology, reproduction and behavior.207  Much less is known 
about these effects.208  Even where a pesticide is not toxic enough to kill an organism, it can have 
very significant sublethal effects on the organism by affecting the organisms life span, growth, 
physiology, behavior and reproduction.209  Moreover, pesticides have been documented to have 
significant indirect effects on nontarget organisms by reducing the populations of animals or plants 
that serve as food or cover for other species.210  
One of the most insidious risks posed by pesticides is the tendency of certain synthetic 
pesticides to mimic hormones, such as estrogen in humans and wildlife.  Only recently has science 
begun to understand these complex effects.211  Estrogen mimicking substances include a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
are in the sterile isolated confines of the research laboratory.  Id.  
205  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 156-157.   
206  See May Berenbaum, Friendly Fire, WINGS: ESSAYS ON INVERTEBRATE CONSERVATION, Spring 2004 at 8-12 (a 
publication of the Xerces Society).  One example is that the insect Order Lepidoptera contains not only many pest moth 
species, but also contains many non-pest butterfly species.  These butterfly species may be beneficial pollinators and may 
be aesthetically pleasing colorful and interesting species, such as the monarch butterfly.  Also, the Order Lepidoptera, 
contains a number of butterfly species that have been listed as threatened or endangered under the federal Endangered 
Species Act.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 - 1544 (2004). Pesticides that are used to kill pest moth species generally do not 
discriminate within the Lepidoptera Order, and will also kill non-pest, beneficial butterflies, including endangered species.  
See HUNTER, supra note 30, at 157.  Mosquito control pesticides have been indicted as one of the threats to the continued 
survival of the endangered Miami Blue Butterfly over the past few decades Jaret C. Daniels & Thomas C. Emmel, 
Floridas Precious Miami Blues, WINGS:  ESSAYS ON INVERTEBRATE CONSERVATION, Spring 2004 at 3-7.  This recent 
issue of the Xerces Society publication was devoted exclusively to butterfly conservation; four out the five articles listed 
pesticides as a significant contributor to butterfly population declines.  See id. Moreover, recent studies demonstrate a 
reduction in the abundance of non-target butterflies on conventional farms as compared to butterflies on organic farms.  
D.J. Hole, et al., Does Organic Farming Benefit Biodiversity has been published electronically by the journal Biological 
Conservation, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2004.07.018 (last visited, August 4, 2005). 
207  Edwards, supra note 173, at 24. 
208  Id.  
209  Id. For example, extreme low doses of some pesticides have been determined to disrupt honeybees homing flight 
behavior, thereby adversely affecting POLLINATION. H.M Thompson, Behavioural Effects of Pesticides in BeesTheir 
Potential for Use in Risk Assessment 12 Ecotoxicology 317-330(2003).  Available at 
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/ectx/2003/00000012/F0040001/05112975 (last visited, August 4, 2005). 
210  Edwards, supra note 173, at 28-29. 
211  Although the term environmental estrogen was coined in the 1970s, it was not until the past 15 years that any 
scientific studies were conducted to lend support to the hypothesis that environmental exposure to certain synthetic 
chemicals could cause estrogenic effects.  For a detailed discussion of the risks of endocrine disrupting chemicals and the 
legal shortcomings in addressing such risks, see generally, Noah Sachs, Blocked Pathways: Potential Legal Responses to 
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pesticides as well as a wide variety of other products in common use, such as toiletries, 
spermicides and plastics.212  Exposure to these compounds, particularly when the exposure occurs 
in the fetus or young children, has been correlated with a large number of effects in humans 
including decreased sperm counts, breast and testicular cancer, endometriosis, deformed or stinted 
reproductive organs, neurological defects and low birth weights.213  In addition to these human 
health effects, these substances have also been implicated in numerous wildlife impacts including 
deformed alligators and turtles, and reproductive difficulty in birds, fish and mammals.214  These 
estrogenic effects can be extremely complex, unpredictable and difficult to understand.215  
Another concern is the uncertainty regarding the potential effects of pesticides on 
ecologically significant microorganisms.  Very little is known about the complex ecology of 
microorganisms.216  Although there are not many data to suggest that most types of pesticides pose 
significant risks to microorganisms, soil fumigants, which are designed to destroy soil 
microorganisms and are applied at very high does, may pose substantial risks to beneficial 
microorganisms.217  For example, the killing of soil microbes and invertebrates resulting from 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals, 24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 289 (1999); see also THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR STOLEN 
FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OUR FERTILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SURVIVAL?  A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (1996); 
Matthew P. Longnecker, Walter J. Rogan, and George Lucier, Effects of DDT (Dichlorodiphylytrichloroethane) and PCBs 
(Polychlorinated Biphenyls) and an overview of organochlorines in public health, 18 REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 211 (1997); 
Louis J. Guillette, Jr., Timothy S. Gross, Greg R. Masson, John M. Matter, H. Franklin Percivil, and Allan R. Woodward, 
Developmental Abnormalities of the Gonad and Abnormal Sex Hormone Concentration in Juvenile Alligators from 
Contaminated and Control Lake s in Florida, 8 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPEC. 680 (1994); D. Crews, E. Willingham and J.K. 
Skipper, Endocrine Disruptors: Present Issues, Future Directions, 75 Q. REV. OF BIOL. 243 (2000). 
212  ID. AT 302-07. 
213  Sachs, supra note 211, at 293-298. 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at 300.  For example,  DDT exposure has been demonstrated to cause gulls to begin sharing nests with other females 
rather than males and young gulls had grossly feminized reproductive tracts.  See Susan M. Salvatore, Estrogens in the 
Environment, 69 FLA. B.J. 39, n. 35 (1995).  Moreover, a large number of studies on various species of fish exposed to 
estrogenic compounds have shown effects such as increased time to maturity, smaller gonads and reduced fertility.  Id. at n. 
36.  Similarly, declines in the reproductive rates of mammals, such as, minks has been linked to ingesting fish contaminated 
with estrogenic substances.  Id. at n. 37.  The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has  reported that between 1985 and 1990, 
67% of male Florida panthers were born with one or more undescended testes, compared with only 14% 10 years earlier. 
Id. at n. 38.  Although not fully understood, scientists suspect a link with exposure to estrogenic substances in the 
environment.  Perhaps the most widely cited wildlife examples of endocrine dysfunction in wildlife are the feminization of 
alligators and occurrence of masculinized female fish in Florida.  Interestingly, although we are only beginning to 
understand the estrogenic effects of certain pesticides, in her 1962 book, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson predicted such 
effects: A substance that is not a carcinogen in the ordinary sense may disturb the normal functioning of some part of the 
body in such a way that malignancy results.  Important examples are the cancers, especially of the reproductive system, that 
appear to be linked with disturbances of the balance of sex hormones . . . [t]he chlorinated hydrocarbons are precisely the 
kind of agent that can bring about this kind of indirect carcinogenesis.  CARSON, supra note 2 at 235. 
216  Edwards, supra note 173, at 18.  
217  Id.  
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pesticide use may actually cause crops to become more susceptible to disease and may thereby 
reduce crop growth.  In addition, populations of  nitrogen-fixing organisms may be reduced 
thereby requiring higher levels of fertilizer application.218 Critical ecological services provided by 
microorganisms, including decomposition may also be impacted by certain pesticides.219 
The problem of ecological risk from pesticide exposure is exacerbated by the tendency of 
certain pesticides to undergo a phenomenon known as bioaccumulation.  Bioaccumulation of 
pesticides become widely recognized during the 1960s as a result of Rachel Carsons book, Silent 
Spring.  In her book, Carson explained how DDT and other organochlorine pesticides have the 
ability not only to persist in the environment for years if not decades, but also to accumulate in the 
tissue of animals and humans.220  These pesticides accumulate in animals on the bottom of the 
food chain and then are passed from prey to predator until they can be found in very high 
concentrations in top predators.  This phenomenon is known as biomagnification. Pesticides that 
persist, accumulate, and biomagnify are especially insidious in that they can adversely affect 
organisms far removed in both time and space from the original release of the pesticide into the 
environment.221 
Moreover, although agricultural systems in themselves are not natural systems per se, they 
are generally located in close proximity to natural ecosystems and often contain within their 
borders, sizable natural and semi-natural ecosystems.222  Thus, adverse effects from pesticide 
usage in agricultural systems may negatively impact ecosystems within the farm boundaries as 
well as nearby ecosystems that may be contaminated by pesticide runoff in water, drift through the 
air, or movement of contaminated organisms. 
As described above, invertebrate nontarget species may be a greatest risk from pesticide 
use.  Loss of invertebrate biodiversity, however, is not the only  concern.  Equally concerning, is 
the ecological and economic disruptions that frequently occur as a result of nontarget predator and 
                                                 
218  Id. at 31. 
219 David Pimentel, et al., Assessment of Environmental and Economic Impacts of Pesticide Use, in THE PESTICIDE 
QUESTIONS: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 47,68-69 (David Pimentel & Hugh Lehman, eds., 1993) 
220  CARSON, supra note 2, at 21-23. 
221  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 156.  Other risks posed by pesticides have only recently begun to be studied.  For example, 
in recent years, the extent of atmospheric transport of pesticides has come to light.  Edwards, supra note  173, at 32-33.  
Moreover, the pesticide methyl bromide has been determined to be a significant contributor to the thinning of the 
stratospheric ozone layer.  See 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982 (December 23, 2004). 
222  HUNTER, supra note 30, at 276. 
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parasites being killed by pesticides.  Many pest populations are kept in check in nature by the 
existence of organisms that feed on pest species.  Consequently, if these predators or parasites are 
eliminated or greatly reduced in number, the population of pest species will experience a 
population explosion.  In addition to existing pest species population increases resulting from 
pesticide usage, new pest species may also be created as a result of this phenomenon.223 
In the past ten years, a completely new suite of risk concerns have emerged regarding the 
use of pesticidal genetically modified organisms (GMOs).  Although many of the risk 
considerations for biotechnology pesticides are similar, if not the same, as those for traditional 
chemical pesticides, these new pesticides pose a number of novel risks not presented by chemical 
pesticides. One of the most significant novel risk considerations for pesticidal GMOs is the 
potential for spread of the living organism or the organism's genetic material.  For example, plants 
can reproduce sexually and/or asexually, and as a result, the genetic material that was introduced 
into the plant and that enables the plant to produce pesticidal substances could spread through 
agricultural or natural ecosystems.  Thus, if a plant that produces a pesticide has the capacity to 
spread in the environment, or to spread its genetic material to other plants, there would be a greater 
potential for increased exposure to non-target organisms than there would be for a pesticide 
produced in plant that can only grow in a limited geographic area or does not have the ability to 
cross-fertilize with other plants in the environment.224  This is a particular concern for pesticides 
produced in plants that have wild relatives in the United States.225  If these wild relatives acquire 
the ability to produce the pesticide, through cross-fertilization, many additional nontarget 
organisms could potentially be exposed to the pesticide.226 One of the most cited concerns 
                                                 
223  Id.  An example of new pest creation resulting from pesticide use is the bollworm, which is now a major economic pest 
of cotton.  Hunter, supra note 30, at 158.  Although the bollworm existed previously, it was not a pest until pesticides used 
to control the boll weevil, another pest of cotton, killed the natural enemies of the bollworm, allowing its population to 
explode.   Id. 
224  For a detailed discussion of the potential risks and benefits of pesticidal GMOS, see Mary Jane Angelo, Genetically 
Engineered Plant Pesticides: Recent Developments in the EPAs Regulation of Biotechnology, 7 U. FLA. J. L & PUB. POLY 
257 (1996). 
225 Id. at 287. 
226 The potential for a GMO or its genetic material to spread from one plant to another raises additional risk issues beyond 
those of exposure to humans and nontarget organisms.  One potential risk of biotechnology products parallels the risk of the 
introduction of any non-native species into a new environment.  David J. Earp, The Regulation of Genetically Engineered 
Plants: Is Peter Rabbit Safe in Mr. McGregors Transgenic Vegetable Patch?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1633, 1666-69 (1994). Even 
very small genetic manipulations can result in significant changes in an organisms ability to survive and flourish in a 
particular ecosystem  Id.  Examples abound regarding the disastrous, but unpredicted, effects of the introduction of non-
native species into the environment displacing native species.  See J.J. Kim, Out of the Lab and Into the Field: 
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significant concerns regarding pesticidal GMOs is over the potential for the development of 
"superweeds" through the out-crossing of pesticidal GMOs to wild relatives.227 Development of 
such a superweed has the potential to result in substantial disruption of agricultural and natural 
ecosystems.228 
Perhaps the most serious concern with pesticidal GMOs stems from the fact that the risks 
of GMOs are uncertain.  Moreover, although the risk of a GMO organism released into the 
environment creating a new superweed or disrupting the balance of natural ecosystems may be 
small, the consequences could be disastrous and potentially irreversible.229  The precise nature and 
magnitude of the risk is difficult to predict because of the almost infinite variety of potential 
genetically modified organisms, the ability of GMOs to reproduce and spread, the complexity 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Harmonization of Deliberate Release Regulations for Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 1160 
(1993).  Genetically modified organisms introduced into the environment could have similar impacts See Earp, supra  at 
1653.  One of the most significant risks is the risk of a genetically engineered plant becoming a weed or pest itself or 
outcrossing to related species to create new weeds or pests Id. at 1654-55.  Once released into the environment, the spread 
of a GMO may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to control Id. 
227  For example, the ability to produce a pesticide that makes a plant resistant to insect or viral pests can be spread to a wild 
relative, and subsequently passed on to subsequent generations of that relative.  Consequently, the wild relative, by virtue 
of its newly acquired ability to resist insects or viruses, has the potential to become a hardy weed, or superweed.  
228  For a GMO plant to transfer its genes to related existing weed species, wild relatives of the GMO plant must grow in 
the geographic areas where the GMO plant is introduced.  See Earp, supra note 226 at 1666-69.  Most crops grown in the 
U.S. are of foreign origin.  Thus, the risk of hybridization between transgenic crops and wild relatives is unlikely in the 
U.S.  Most of the major U.S. crops, including soybeans, corn, and wheat, have been bred to the point where they have lost 
their ability to compete with wild species in the environment.  Thus, these crops are unlikely to become weeds when 
genetically altered.  Id.  Nevertheless, once these GMOs are exported (intentionally or otherwise) to other parts of the world 
that have wild relatives of the GMOs, the risks become more profound.  Although beyond the scope of this article, the issue 
of potential risks posed by GMOs to human health, particularly by exposure through foods that have been genetically 
modified is a significant concern.  Another issue that has received considerable attention is the issue of the potential for 
plant-incorporated protectants in foods to pose a risk of allergenicity to humans.  The primary concern appears to be that if 
a gene that leads to the production of a pesticide is moved from one plant, for example a peanut, into another plant, for 
example corn, people who know they are allergic to peanuts will not know to avoid the corn plant.  Thus, if the pesticide 
derived from the peanut plant contains an allergen from the peanut plant, allergic consumers could be put at risk.  See 
generally, Judith E. Beach, No killer Tomatoes:  Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants,  53 Food 
Drug Law 181 (1998) and Celeste Marie Steen, FIFRAs Preemption of Common Law Tort Actions Involving Genetically 
Engineered Pesticides, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 763 (1996).  In addition, the movement of genes from animals to plants may be of 
concern to subpopulations of people with special dietary preferences such as vegetarians or persons who observe kosher 
(Jewish) or halal (Muslim) laws.  Environmental Defense Fund, A Mutable Feast: Assuring Food Safety in the Era of 
Genetic Engineering (New York 1991).  Finally, GMO herbicide tolerant plants may result in increased herbicide usage.  
Moreover, recently, some studies have shown evidence of a reduction in biodiversity in areas of some GM herbicide 
tolerant crops due to herbicide use decreasing in weeds and other plants that produce seeds, for insects, birds, and other 
species.   L.G. Firbank, et al., The Implications of Spring-Sown Genetically Modified Herbicide Tolerant Crops for 
Farmland Biodiversity:  A Commentary on the Farm Scale Evaluations of Spring Sown Crops (2003), available at 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/fse/ (last visited, August 4, 2005).  
229  See John Charles Kunich, Mother Frankenstein, Doctor Nature, and the Environmental Law of Genetic Engineering, 74 
S. CAL. L.R. 807, 819 (2000-2001).  
 
 48 
inherent in natural ecosystems, and the dearth of long term data on the effects of GMOs.230 
C.  History of Ecological Issues in Pesticide Regulation 
From its first introduction in the 1930's until its demise in the early 1970's, the pesticide 
DDT serves as stark illustration of the meteoric rise of a pesticide based on significant economic 
and human health benefits and subsequent dramatic fall of the same pesticide based on severe 
ecological and human health risks.  Starting in 1939, and continuing through World War II, the 
military used DDT extensively to control insect vectors of deadly diseases such as typhus.231  DDT 
is created with saving millions of lives from such diseases during the war.232  By 1945, DDT had 
become a favorite agricultural pesticide, used in most of the world to control a variety of 
agricultural pests, as well as biting insects such as mosquitoes.233  At its peak in the 1950's, an 
estimated 6000 tons of DDT were released into the environment in the U.S. alone.234  Rachel 
Carsons 1962 book, Silent Spring, brought to the publics attention for the first time the downside 
of the seemingly miracle pesticide.  In her book, Carson raised a number of significant ecological 
concerns regarding the widespread use of DDT, including the concern that the pesticide killed 
beneficial as well as pest insects, the disruptive effects of the pesticide in upsetting the natural 
ecological balance, and the bioaccumulation of the pesticide in the food chain resulting in risks to 
aquatic organisms, avian species and humans.235  Carsons book led to a public outcry against the 
threats of DDT and other persistent pesticides.  Once the link between DDT and the dramatic 
                                                 
230 See Steen, supra note 228 at 764.  This discussion of the risks of GMOs, is not intended to suggest that these pesticides 
have no benefits.  In fact, many scientists believe that GMO pesticides may provide a less risky alternative to chemical 
pesticides.  Many GMOs are less toxic than chemical GMOs, more narrowly targeted towards the intended pest and 
released into the environment in smaller quantities.  Nevertheless, the purpose of this discussion on the unique ecological 
risks posed by GMO pesticides is merely to highlight the complex ecological risks at issue and the large amount of 
uncertainty regarding such risks.  It is worth noting that although there has not been any catastrophic damage caused by the 
GMOs that have been in the marketplace for the past several years, the pesticidal GMOs which have been commercialized 
to date are largely relatively innocuous from an ecological standpoint.  All of the products in commercialization to date 
include genes from bacteria and viruses that are non-toxic to humans, that are naturally ubiquitous in the environment and 
have been applied widely to food crops in their microorganism form for decades.  For example, the B.t. delta-endotoxin 
produced by numerous plant incorporated protectants in wide use, is essentially the same B.t. toxin that occurs naturally in 
soil and is ubiquitous in the environment.  However, there are literally thousands of GM products in the research and 
development stage that are not so innocuous or well understood.  Research is being done on just about every GM product 
that human ingenuity can conceive including corn plants that product a spider silk that can be used to make bullet proof 
jackets and soy plants that produce a scorpion toxin.  These new products must be approached with much greater caution. 
231  Morriss & Meiners, supra note 184 at 7. 
232  Id. 
233  In the Matter of Stevens Industries, Inc, et al., I.F.& R. Docket Nos. 63, et al. (Consolidated DDT hearings, June 2, 
1972). 
234  Id. 
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decline of numerous bird species, including the American Bald Eagle, was established, a 
movement developed to ban the use of DDT.  Images of avian egg-shell thinning, deformed birds, 
and other ecological effects caused by DDT and its relatives fueled the publics new concerns over 
environmental issues and played a significant role in the development of the environmental 
movement of the 1960's and early 1970's.  In 1969, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, then the 
agency in charge of pesticide registration,236 cancelled certain uses of DDT and initiated an 
intensive review of other uses.  Shortly after its creation, the newly formed EPA began a formal 
review under FIFRA of the remaining uses of DDT.  In 1972 EPA issued the final order canceling 
the registration for most uses of the pesticide DDT.237  In the final order, EPA concluded that the 
long-range risks of continued use of DDT were unacceptable and outweighed any economic or 
societal benefits it provided.238  
The DDT controversy, which gained attention through the publication of Silent Spring, 
became one of the primary motivators behind the establishment of the EPA in 1970.  The 
controversy also paved the way for a 1972  major overhaul of FIFRA, which had been on the 
books in a somewhat less ambitious form for over 60 years.  The origins of FIFRA can be traced 
back to the federal Insecticide Act of 1910.239  The 1910 Act was a consumer protection statute 
aimed at addressing concerns with false claims about the effectiveness of many pesticide products, 
which turned out to be useless, and the converse problem of pesticides that were too strong and 
thus caused crop damage.240  This consumer protection emphasis carried over into the first 
enactment of FIFRA in 1947.  The 1947 Act contained the first registration requirement for 
pesticides (referred to by the Act as "economic poisons").241  The 1947 Act, however, did not 
establish significant safety standards for pesticides. A pesticide could be registered if the 
composition of the pesticide was such as to warrant the proposed claims for it and if the pesticide 
                                                                                                                                                                      
235 See generally, CARSON supra note 2. 
236  Prior to the creation of EPA in 1970, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was responsible for administering FIFRA.  In 
1970, these responsibilities were transferred to EPA.  Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 § 2086.  
237  In the Matter of Stevens Industries, Inc, et al., I.F.& R. Docket Nos. 63, et al. (Consolidated DDT hearings, June 2, 
1972). 
238  Id. 
239  Act of 1910, April 26, 1910, CH. 191, 36 Stat., repealed 61 Stat. 163, 172 (1947). 
240  RODGERS, supra note 190 at 412-413. 
241  Ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947). 
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and its labeling complied with the requirements of FIFRA.242 The 1947 Act remained intact until 
1972. The 1972 amendments to FIFRA completely overhauled the statute and included provisions 
aimed at protecting environmental interests for the first time.  The 1972 amendments form the 
backbone of the current FIFRA. 
Despite the focus on ecological risks that dominated the DDT controversy and paved the 
way for the 1972 overhaul of FIFRA, ecological concerns played a much more modest role in the 
implementation of FIFRA during the 1980s and 1990s.  In fact, only a handful of cancellation or 
suspension actions primarily based on wildlife or other ecological risks were brought by the EPA 
during that period.  The only reported judicial or administrative case in which regulatory action 
primarily was based on risks to wildlife was Ciba Geigy v. EPA,243 in which EPA proposed 
canceling of certain uses of the pesticide diazinon on golf course and turf due in large part to its 
risk to wild birds.244  In addition to the diazinon case, EPA considered canceling certain uses of 
pesticides based on risks to wildlife during the 1980s and 1990s.  However, EPA failed to take any 
significant action to address such risks.245   
                                                 
242  Id. 
243  874 F2d 277 (5th Cir. 1989). 
244  Id. at 278.  This case involved the effects on birds of the use of diazonin on golf courses and turf. Id.  Specifically, the 
case addressed the question of whether FIFRA requires a precise determination of risk or harm (e.g. the chemical has 
adverse effects 51% of the time it is used) in order to support cancellation of a registration.  Id.  Another related point of 
contention was whether devastating effect on bird populations or merely a significant adverse effect will justify 
cancellation.  Id. at 280.  In this case, the chemical companys contentions, that there should be more exact thresholds and 
more significant effects on the overall bird population, were rejected by the court.  Id.  The fifth circuit held that FIFRA 
gives the Administrator sufficient discretion to conclude that recurring bird kills are an unreasonable adverse environmental 
effect regardless of whether they significantly reduce bird populations.  Id.  Ultimately, the case was remanded to the 
Administrator to rectify the former administrators failure to read the word generally as meaning usually, commonly, 
or with considerable frequency.  The phrase generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on the environment is also 
read to include any potential general causation of adverse effects.  Id. at 279-280. 
Further, despite suffering a stinging defeat in 1989 at the hands of environmental groups claiming that EPAs 
continued registration of the pesticide strychnine, was a violation of the federal Endangered Species Act, EPA continued to 
register, and allow the continued registration of, pesticides that pose risks to threatened and endangered species.  Defenders 
of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).  In Defenders, the court found that EPAs continued registration of the 
pesticide strychnine constituted a taking under section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, even though there was no evidence 
as to the chain of possession of the strychnine or other links between EPAs registration of the pesticide and the ultimate 
death of the listed species.  Id. at 1301.  The court held, in essence, that EPAs decision to allow the registration to remain 
in effect, rather than suspending or canceling the registration, subjected the agency to Section 9 liability.  Id.  In concluding 
that EPAs decision to register pesticides containing strychnine or to continue those registrations was critical to the 
resulting poisoning of the endangered species, the court clearly was influenced by the fact that the pesticide could not 
legally be sold or distributed except under an EPA registration.  Id.  
245  For example, in 1991, EPA proposed the cancellation of the pesticide ethyl parathion, due to risks to both humans and 
wildlife from the high acute toxicity of this pesticide.  After negotiating with the manufacturers of ethyl parathion, 
however, EPA accepted a settlement which involved the cancellation of only the ground application uses of the pesticide, 
which posed significant risks to human farm workers, but did not include the cancellation of aerial application, which posed 
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In the past few years, there have been a number of controversies over the adverse impacts 
to wildlife species, including threatened and endangered species, from pesticides.  One such 
controversy started in 2002, when forty environmental groups, including the American Bird 
Conservancy and Defenders of Wildlife, sent the EPA a Notice of Intent to Sue for Violations of 
the Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Administrative Procedures Act 
Concerning the Registration of the Pesticide Fenthion due to the high risks the pesticide posed to 
avian species.  Later that year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recommended that EPA cancel 
existing registrations for fenthion immediately due to unreasonable adverse effects fenthion posed 
to avian species protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)246 and the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (MBTA).247  When EPA did not take action to reduce the risks from fenthion, in 
October of 2002 Defenders of Wildlife, the American Bird Conservancy and the Florida Wildlife 
Federation filed suit against EPA in federal district court alleging EPA had violated the ESA and 
MBTA.  In 2003 the manufacturer of fenthion voluntarily canceled its registration of fenthion. 
In addition, in September of 2004, environmentalists won a significant victory when the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision 248 affirming a district courts 2004 order that 
found that EPA had violated the ESA because it had failed to take steps to ensure that the 
registration of 54 pesticides would not jeopardize the survival of listed salmon species.  The Court 
upheld the district courts injunction, which imposed detailed buffer zones restricting the use of 
more than 30 pesticides along listed salmon-supporting waters in California, Oregon, and 
Washington states.249  
                                                                                                                                                                      
the greatest risks to birds and other wildlife due to spray drift associated with this form of application.  See 56 Fed. Reg. 
65061-01 (Dec. 13, 1991), 57 Fed. Reg.3500-01 (Jan. 29, 1992), and 57 Fed. Reg. 6168-01  (Feb. 20, 1992).  In fact, ethyl 
parathion had been implicated in the deaths of thousands of birds.  Nevertheless, EPA declined to take regulatory action to 
prevent or minimize these risks.  Id.  Ultimately, the remaining uses of ethyl parathion were voluntarily cancelled in 2001, 
after a concerted campaign led by the American Bird Conservancy in partnership with Defenders of Wildlife, the Pesticide 
Action Network, and the World Wildlife Fund to pressure EPA and the manufacturer of the pesticide to end all uses.  Ethyl 
Parathion: Notice of Use Cancellation, 66 Fed. Reg. 47667-01 (Sept. 13, 2001).  However, despite the fact that ethyl 
parathion was considered to be one of the most toxic pesticides in current use and had been documented as the cause of 
thousands of bird kills, and despite decades of study by EPA, the agency itself failed to take regulatory action to protect 
wildlife.  
246  16 U.S.C. §§ 1532 - 1544 (2004). 
247  16 U.S.C. §§ 703 - 711 (2004). 
248  See Wash. Toxics Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Order issued January 22, 2004.  This Order 
was the third in a series of orders granting injunctive relief to the environmental plaintiffs in this matter.  See Wash. Toxics 
Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Orders issued July 16, 2003 and August 8, 2003. All of these 
Orders are available on EPAs website at http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html (Last visited January 7, 2005). 
249  Id. 
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As these recent cases illustrate,  EPA has been reluctant to take  regulatory action to 
prevent registration of, or cancel the registration of, a pesticide that poses significant ecological 
risks.  In fact, EPA has failed to take such actions even when challenged by environmental 
organizations.  Instead, such challenges have led to the manufacturers voluntarily canceling its 
registrations, as in the case of fenthion, rather than EPA taking action to reduce ecological risks.  
EPAs reluctance to take action to address purely ecological concerns resulting from pesticide use 
illustrates the broader problem that much of environmental protection law is focused 
predominantly on human health issues, with ecological concerns receiving little or no attention.   
It should not be considered a bold statement to assert that environmental protection law is 
intended to protect the environment, yet it is.  As the illustrations above show, implementation of 
FIFRA seems largely to have ignored any such intent.  And if environmental protection is the goal, 
it would be logical to expect environmental protection law to be guided by the science of ecology 
(the study of the interactions of living organisms and their environments).  However, after more 30 
years of significant public concern over environmental protection and more than 30 years of 
implementation of numerous environmental protection laws, it is surprising how little these laws 
have been used to address environmental concerns, and how little ecological science has informed 
environmental law.  Typically, environmental concerns are addressed only where there is a 
sufficient, independent human health-related motivation.  Moreover, many of the first generation 
environmental laws were developed in an ad hoc way in reaction to the particular environmental 
crisis of the moment.250  This collection of piece-meal laws have not kept pace with the scientific 
worlds ever-increasing understanding of ecological systems.251  
In recent years there have been greater attempts to incorporate ecological principles into 
environmental law and policy decisions.  Professor Dan Tarlock has argued that environmental 
law derives its legitimacy from science.252  Toxicology, engineering and other sciences have 
                                                 
250 See Brooks, et al., supra note 29. 
251  For a proposal to create a single umbrella environmental statute, see Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: 
Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind? 1989 WISC. L. REV. 463 (1989). 
252  See generally Tarlock,  supra note 34.  In this article, Tarlock explains how science not only has been used to identify 
environmental harms, but also to develop ways to remedy such harms.  Tarlock argues that science remains the primary 
justification for environmental protection policy.  Without a scientific foundation, Tarlock states, environmentalism would 
be the marginal aesthetic movement that it was between the progressive conservation era and the late1960s.  Id. at 1136-
37.  But see Holly Doremus, Listing Decision Under the Endangered Species Act:  Why Better Science Isnt Always Better 
Policy, 75 Wash. L. Q. 1029 (arguing that science alone cannot solve difficult environmental policy problems). 
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certainly played a significant role in environmental law.  The role of the ecological sciences, 
however, has been much more modest.  Although the science of ecology has informed certain 
areas of environmental law, such as endangered species protection, 253 most pollution-focused laws 
have not undertaken to incorporate ecological principles in any significant way.  Indeed, if 
ecological sciences have significantly informed any area of environmental law, it is in the areas of 
natural resource management, endangered species protection, and wetlands protection, rather  than 
the myriad of so-called pollution control laws that form the complex regulatory web of 
environmental regulation.  The manner in which EPA has implemented the classic pollution 
control laws  the Clean Water Act (CWA)254, the Clean Air Act (CAA) 255, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)256 and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)257  tends to be highly focused on the protection of 
human health and tends to treat protection of the environment as almost an afterthought.258 Of 
course human health protection is of primary concern to most people, and few would place the 
value of protecting a bird, let alone an insect, above protecting human life.  Nevertheless, it should 
not be forgotten that these environmental protection laws were intended to protect both human 
health and the  environment and that environmental concerns not related to human health provided 
the impetus for the development of these regulatory programs. Even the bulk of scholarly literature 
in environmental law  has failed to adequately grapple with ecological concerns.259  In addition to 
                                                 
253  See Tarlock, supra note 34, at 1125 (describing how environmental law draws on three disciplines:  economics, 
engineering and ecology).  
254  33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 - 1387 (2004). 
255  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 -7671q (2004). 
256  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (2004). 
257  42 U.S.C. §§ 6901- 6992k (2004). 
258  Robert L. Fischman, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435, 
441 (1992) (stating that while virtually every statute that EPA is responsible for implementing contains language that would 
enable EPA to address ecological concerns in its regulatory programs, EPA has failed to utilize these broad authorities to 
address ecological concerns.)  A few of the many examples of EPAs broad authority to address ecological risks include the 
following:  33 U.S.C. §1314(a)(1)directs EPA to develop water quality criteria that accurately reflecting the latest scientific 
knowledge on the effect on the health and welfare including plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, plant life, shorelines, 
beaches, esthetics, and recreation, as well as on the concentration and dispersal of pollutants, or their byproducts , through 
biological, physical, and chemical processes and on biological community diversity.  42 U.S.C. §. 9605(a)(8)(A), EPAs 
national contingency plan for hazardous discharge clean-up, must take into account the potential for the destruction of 
sensitive ecosystems.  The Clean Air Act requires EPA to promulgate secondary national ambient air quality standards to 
protect the public welfare.  The statute defines the term welfare to include the effects of pollution on soils, water, 
vegetation, animals, wildlife, and the climate.  42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1)(B) (2004).  For a more comprehensive discussion of 
EPAs statutory authority to consider ecological concerns in its regulatory programs, see generally Fischman supra. 
259 Both Professors J.B. Ruhl and Lisa Heinzerling have criticized the scholarly discourse on environmental law as being 
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the higher priority that human health concerns assume, it is probable that the limited attempts to 
protect the environment may stem, at least in part,  from the fact that despite years of study, the 
ecological sciences have barely scraped the surface of understanding the complex machinery of the 
natural world.  What little is known teaches us that ecological systems are extremely complex, and 
ever changing.260  Accordingly, it is difficult to design regulatory programs to protect what we do 
not fully understand and what can be perceived as a moving target. 
IV.  FIFRA (A LICENSE TO KILL) 
The regulation of pesticides in the U.S. is conducted primarily under the authority of the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).261  FIFRA requires that all 
pesticides262 that are sold or distributed in the United States be registered by EPA.263  Generally, a 
pesticide may be registered only if it will not cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the 
environment.264  Accordingly, in determining whether to register a pesticide, EPA engages in a 
cost/benefit analysis, weighing the costs or risks associated with the use of a pesticide against the 
economic and social benefits of the pesticide.  A pesticide may be registered only if the benefits of 
the pesticide outweigh the costs resulting from the use of the pesticide.265  To determine whether, 
or the extent to which, FFIRA is eco-pragmatic, or in other words, the extent to which FIFRA 
                                                                                                                                                                      
too focused on human health concern and not focused nearly enough on the important goals of protecting natural systems. 
Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 459, 461 (1997) and J.B. Ruhl, Working Both 
(Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 541 (2000) 
(book review).  
260  For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. Supreme Courts understanding and use of ecological principles in its 
decision-making in environmental cases, see Robert W. Alder, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science 
in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L.REV. 249 (2003). 
261  7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2004).   
262  Id. § 136(u) provides that the term pesticide means any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, 
destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest. . .   Id. § 136(u). 
263  Id. § 136a(a).  This subsection provides: 
Except as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not 
registered under this subchapter.  To the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the 
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered under 
this subchapter and that is not the subject of an experimental use permit under section 136c of this title or an emergency 
exemption under section 136p of this title. 
Id. § 136a(a). 
264  Id. § 136a(c)(5).  Section 136(j) provides that the term environment includes water, air, land, and all plants and man 
and other animals living therein and the interrelationships which exist among them.  Id.§ 136(j). 
265  Under FIFRA, cost/benefit terminology is used the opposite way it is used in discussing most environmental regulation. 
 Typically, in doing a cost/benefit analysis, the regulatory agency compares the sots of regulation (e.g., the cost of installing 
pollution controls) to the benefits of regulation (e.g., lives saved or cancers avoided).  Under FIFRA, however, the costs 
are considered to be the costs of allowing the use of the pesticide (e.g. cancer deaths), whereas the benefits are considered 
to be the benefits of allowing the use of the pesticide (e.g., reduction in crop loss from pest insect damage). 
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addresses the issues of uncertainty, complexity, and change, a close analysis of FIFRA, as well as 
its implementation by EPA, is warranted. 
A.  Registration and Other Approval Mechanisms 
FIFRA section 3(a) provides that the Administrator shall register a pesticide if the 
Administrator determines that, when considered with any restrictions imposed its composition is 
such as to warrant the proposed claims for it, its labeling and other material required to be 
submitted comply with the requirements of FIFRA, it will perform its intended function without 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, and when used in accordance with widespread 
and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable adverse affects on the 
environment.266  Unreasonable adverse affects on the environment is defined by FIFRA to mean  
any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and 
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide.267  Accordingly, when making the 
determination of whether to register a pesticide, EPA must consider not only any risks the 
pesticide poses to man or the environment, but also must consider the economic and social 
implications of using the pesticide.  Noticeably, however, in defining unreasonable adverse effect 
on the environment, while Congress did direct EPA to take into account economic factors, it did 
not explicitly mandate that EPA conduct a strict cost/benefit analysis.268  In fact, the legislative 
history of FIFRA suggests that adverse affects were not  intended to be tolerated unless there are 
overriding benefits from the use of the pesticide.269  Nevertheless, for more than thirty years, 
EPA has interpreted FIFRA to require a cost/benefit balancing, and this interpretation as been 
upheld by the court.270 
                                                 
266  Id. §136a(c)(5) provides: 
The Administrator shall register a pesticide if the Administrator determines that, when considered with any restrictions 
imposed under subsection (d) of this section  
(A)its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims for it; 
(B)its labeling and other material required to be submitted comply with the requirements of this subchapter; 
(C)it will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment; and    
(D)when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause unreasonable 
adverse affects on the environment. 
Id. § 136a(c)(5).   
267  Section 136(bb) defines the term unreasonable adverse effects on the environment as any unreasonable risk to man 
or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any 
pesticide. . .   Id. § 136(bb). 
268  SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 12, at 32, 29. 
269  See RODGERS, supra note 190, at 451-53. 
270  Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. Denied 
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Significantly, although one prong of the test for registration requires EPA to determine that 
the pesticide will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment,271 FIFRA expressly states that EPA shall not make any lack of essentially a criterion 
for denying registration of any pesticide and that where two pesticides meet the requirements for 
registration, one should not be registered in preference to the other.272  Thus, to obtain a 
registration, there is no requirement to demonstrate that a pesticide is essential.  Moreover, the 
availability of alternative pesticides for the same use does not preclude registration.  Further, 
FIFRA expressly authorizes EPA to waive all data requirements pertaining  to efficacy and in fact 
EPA has, by rule, done so.273   
One of the most important requirements is that the registrant submit data in support of 
registration.274  FIFRA gives EPA discretionary authority to register products in certain situations 
                                                                                                                                                                      
431 U.S. 925 (1977) (stating that to evaluate whether use of a pesticide poses an unreasonable risk to man or the 
environment, [EPA] engages in a cost-benefit analysis . . .); In the Matter of Chapman Chemical Co., et al., FIFRA 
Dockets No. 246 et al. (EPA 1976) (stating that before any pesticide can be cancelled under FIFRA [EPA] must be 
persuaded that the risks to man or the environment from continued use of the pesticide outweigh the benefits of its 
continued use.);  In the Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., et al., FIFRA Docket Nos. 625, et al (1989) (stating that the 
risk-benefit assessment involves a balancing of the risks . . . against the benefits . . . ). 
271  Id. § 136a(c)(5)(B).   
272  Id. § 136a(c)(5) provides that:  
The Administrator shall not make any lack of essentiality a criterion for denying registration of any pesticide.  Where two 
pesticides meet the requirements of this paragraph, one should not be registered in preference to the other. In considering an 
application for the registration of a pesticide, the Administrator may waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy, in 
which event the Administrator may register the pesticide without determining that the pesticides composition is such as to 
warrant proposed claims of efficacy. 
273  40 C.F.R. § 158.640(b)(1).  The burden of providing EPA with the necessary information to determine whether the 
standard for registration is met rests at all times with the registrant or applicant for registration. The procedures for 
registering pesticides are set forth in the statute and regulations (primarily 40 CFR Part 152) . 
274  7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2004) provides: 
(a)Requirement of registration 
Except as provided by this subchapter, no person in any State may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide that is not 
registered under this subchapter.  To the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the 
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale or use in any State of any pesticide that is not registered under 
this subchapter and that is not the subject of an experimental use permit under section 136c of this title or an emergency 
exemption under section 136p of this title. 
Id. § 136a(c)(2)(a) provides: 
(2) Data in support of registration (a) In general 
The Administrator shall publish guidelines specifying the kinds of information which will be required to support the 
registration of a pesticide and shall revise such guidelines from time to time. . . .  In the development of these standards, the 
Administrator shall consider the economic factors of potential national volume of use, extent of distribution, and the impact 
of the cost of meeting the requirements on the incentives for any potential registrant to undertake the development of the 
required data. . . . 
 
Data requirements are found at 40 CFR Part 158, and provide for the submission of health and environmental effects data. 
The applicant for registration must bear the cost of gathering and generating the necessary data. To avoid duplicative data 
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even though not all data necessary to make a decision on registration have been generated.  This is 
called "conditional registration."  Conditional registration can be used for products with 
composition and proposed uses identical or substantially similar to currently registered pesticides, 
products with proposed new uses, or certain products with new active ingredient.275  For the first 
two categories, EPA must determine that despite the lacking data, approval of the conditional 
registration would not significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment.276  For new active ingredients, EPA must determine that the use of the pesticide 
during the period of conditional registration will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment and use of the pesticide is in the public interest.277 
Most environmental risk reduction measures under FIFRA are achieved through labeling 
restrictions.  An applicant for registration must submit all proposed labeling with the registration 
application.278  A FIFRA "label" is the written, printed, or graphic matter on, or attached to the 
pesticide.279  The term "labeling" under FIFRA includes the label as well as all other written, 
printed, or graphic matter that accompanies the pesticide or to which reference is made on the 
label.280  All registered products must bear a label or labeling setting forth precautionary 
                                                                                                                                                                      
generation, the statute encourages the joint development of data and provides that applicants seeking to reach agreement on 
the terms of a data development arrangement may seek binding arbitration.  Id. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii).  Data already submitted 
to the Agency to support an existing registration, may be relied upon to support a new registration application provided the 
applicant for the new registration offers to pay compensation to the registrant who originally submitted the data.  Data 
submitted to support a registration the first time a particular active ingredient is registered is protected by the "exclusive 
use" provisions of FIFRA and cannot be considered by EPA to support additional registrations for a period of ten years.  Id. 
 In addition, FIFRA § 10 generally governs the disclosure of information submitted to EPA pursuant to FIFRA 
requirements.  Section 10(d) provides that health and safety data must be made available to the public, except that § 10(g) 
prohibits disclosure of health and safety data to multinational pesticide producers except during public proceedings under 
law or regulation. Sections 10(b) and 10(d) provide that other confidential business information ordinarily may not be 
released and provide specific protection for the formula and information on inert ingredients. Exemptions from these 
confidentiality protections are provided to avoid imminent public health risks and when the Administrator determines that 
disclosure is in the public interest during a proceeding to determine whether a pesticide causes unreasonable adverse 
effects. Any such release of information is subject to procedural protections involving prior notice and opportunity for 
district court review. 
275  Id. § 136a(c)(7), registration under special circumstances, provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (5) -- 
(A) The Administrator may conditionally register or amend the registration of a pesticide if the administrator determines 
that (I) the pesticide and proposed use are identical or substantially similar to any currently registered pesticide and use 
thereof, or differ only in ways that would not significantly increase the risk of unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment, and (ii) approving the registration 
276  Id. § 136a(c)(7)(A). 
277  Id.  
278  Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C). 
279  Id. § 136(p)(1). 
280  Id. § 136(p)(2).       
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statements, warnings, directions for use of the product, and an ingredient statement.  A product 
whose label or labeling does not contain the information required by EPA or which sets forth false 
or misleading information is misbranded.281  FIFRA requires users of pesticides to follow all label 
directions.282  The requirement for users to follow label instructions is the only obligation placed 
by FIFRA on users of pesticides.  Thus, the label is the only mechanism to regulate user behavior 
to accomplish risk reduction goals. 
Under section 3(d)(1), a pesticide may be classified for either general or restricted use.283 A 
restricted use pesticide may be used only by or under the supervision of a certified applicator and 
is not available for purchase by the general public.284  A pesticide is classified for restricted use if 
it would cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment in the absence of such a 
restriction.285  Certification of applicators is primarily a state function.  State certification plans 
must conform to certain standards enumerated in the statute.286 
FIFRA provides for several forms of pesticide approval in addition to registration under 
section 3.  First, EPA may grant an emergency exemption under FIFRA section 18.287  Section 18 
provides that the Administrator has discretion to exempt any Federal or State agency from any 
provision (normally, the registration requirement) of the Act if emergency conditions require such 
an exemption.288  An emergency condition means an urgent, non-routine situation and is deemed 
to exist when: no effective pesticides are available under the Act that have labeled uses registered 
                                                 
281  Id. §§ 136(q) and 136j(a)(1)(E). 
282  Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to use any pesticide in a manner inconsistent with 
its labeling. 
283  7 U.S.C. § 136a(d)(1). 
284  Id. § 136a(d)(1). 
285  Id.  
286  Id. § 136i, regarding the use of restricted use pesticides, provides: 
Use of restricted use pesticides; applicators 
(A) certification procedure 
(1) Federal certification 
In any State for which a State plan for applicator certification has not been approved by the Administrator, the 
Administrator, in consultation with the Governor of such State, shall conduct a program for the certification of applicators 
of pesticides. . . . 
(2) State certification 
If any State, at any time, desires to certify applicators of pesticides, the Governor of such State shall submit a State Plan for 
such purpose.  The Administrator shall approve the plan submitted by any State [meets certain general conditions regarding 
the states legal authority, funding mechanisms, etc.] 
Id.  
287  Id. § 136p. 
288  Id. 
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for control of the pest under the conditions of the emergency; no economically or environmentally 
feasible alternative practices which provide adequate control are available; and the situation 
involves the introduction or dissemination of a new pest, will present significant health risks, will 
present significant environmental risks, or will cause significant economic loss.289 
In addition to federal pesticide registration under FIFRA, States may issue registrations of 
pesticide products or uses of such products to meet special local needs under FIFRA section 
24(c).290  A section 24(c) registration may be issued to allow use of a new formulation of a 
federally registered pesticide, to amend federal registration to permit use on additional crops or 
pests or at additional sites or to permit use of different application techniques, rates and 
equipment, to amend federal registration with special label directions necessary to prevent adverse 
effects or to ensure efficacy under local conditions, or for any other purposes consistent with 
FIFRA.  Valid State registrations are treated as federal registrations under FIFRA.291 
FIFRA section 5 authorizes EPA to issue Experimental Use Permits (EUP's) for field 
testing of unregistered pesticides.292  The Administrator may issue an EUP if she determines that 
the applicant needs such a permit to accumulate information necessary to register a pesticide under 
section 3 of FIFRA.293  Finally, Section 3(a) authorizes EPA, to the extent necessary to prevent 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, to issue regulations limiting the distribution, 
sale, or use of any pesticide that is not registered under the Act and that is not subject to an EUP 
under section 5 or an emergency exemption under section 18.294 
B.  Continuing Duties of Registrants 
Once a pesticide is registered, registrants face a number of continuing responsibilities, 
particularly with regard to supplying additional data.  In 1978 Congress added a provision to 
FIFRA (section 3(c)(2)(B)) giving EPA the authority to require holders of existing registrations to 
provide data to support the continued registration of a pesticide.295  Section 3(c)(2)(B) allows the 
Agency at any time to require additional data to support an existing registration.  The penalty for 
                                                 
289  Id. 
290  Id. § 136v. 
291  Id. § 136v(c)(1). 
292  Id. § 136c. 
293  Id. 
294  Id. § 136a(a). 
295  Id. § 136a(c)(2)(B). 
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failure to supply this data is suspension of the registration, which results in a prohibition on sale 
and distribution of the product.296  Prior to suspension under section 3(c)(2)(B), a registrant has a 
right to a limited adjudicatory hearing.  The only issues to be considered at such a hearing are 
whether "the registrant has failed to take the action," which is the basis of the suspension and 
whether the disposition of existing stocks is consistent with the Act.297 
In addition to information required to be submitted under section 3(c)(2)(B), registrants are 
under a continuing obligation under FIFRA section 6(a)(2) to submit factual information regarding 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment of the pesticide, whenever the registrant has such 
information.298  EPA has adopted a rule, which describes specifically the types of information that 
must be reported, and the time frame for submission of these reports.299 
The 1972 revisions to FIFRA included a tougher standard for initial registration of 
pesticides and mandated that the Agency go back and reexamine previously registered 
pesticides.300  This reexamination or "reregistration" reflects a congressional determination that 
previously-registered pesticides ought to be as "safe" as newer ones and a recognition that the data 
EPA had for these older pesticides was not as complete or up to date as that for newer pesticides.  
Reregistration has proved to be one of the most critical and one of the most difficult regulatory 
tasks for EPA's pesticide program.301  Because reregistration efforts were moving so slowly, in 
1988 Congress enacted a new section 4 of FIFRA, which prescribes specific reregistration 
                                                 
296  Id. § 136a(c)(2)(B)(iii). 
297  Id. 
298  Id. § 136d(a)(2). 
299  40 C.F.R. Part 159.  In addition to authority to require information reporting, EPA has broad enforcement authority, 
which it shares with the states under FIFRA.  EPA generally is responsible for manufacturer/producer enforcement, while 
the States have primary responsibility for user enforcement.  The manufacturer/producer enforcement provisions give the 
Agency authority to register pesticide establishments, (7 U.S.C. § 136e).  to inspect and to take samples, (Id. § 136g). to 
inspect books and records, (Id. § 136f), and to issue "stop sale, use or removal" orders and to institute seizure actions (Id. § 
136i-2).  Pursuant to section 27  of FIFRA, a state must have adequate pesticide laws and regulations and must be 
implementing such laws and regulations in order to maintain primary enforcement responsibility for pesticide use 
situations.  Id. § 136v.  The Agency can respond to an emergency requiring immediate action if a state is unwilling or 
unable to respond.  Id. § 136w-1.  Under section 16(c), the Agency is authorized to seek an injunction against violations of 
the Act in federal district court.  Id. § 136n(c).  A person who violates any provision of the Act may be subject to civil 
penalties under section 14(a).  Id. § 136l.  The amount of the penalty is determined by a consideration of the 
appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the business, the effect on the violator's ability to stay in business, and the 
gravity of the violation.  Id. § 136l(a)(4).  Moreover, a person who knowingly violates any provision of the Act may be 
subject to criminal penalties which carry larger fines and the possibility of a prison sentences.  Id. § 136l(b). 
300  Id. § 136a-1. 
301  RODGERS, supra note 190, at 431. 
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requirements intended to dramatically change both the pace and the nature of reregistration.302  
The 1988 amendments require EPA to complete, over a 9-year period, the reregistration review of 
each registered product containing any active ingredient initially registered before November 1, 
1984.303  The amendments redirected the initial burden of identifying data gaps from EPA to the 
affected registrants.  Moreover, the amendment establishes a multi-phased process with a number 
of deadlines that ensures that reregistration moves at a more accelerated pace.  Failure of 
registrants to meet the prescribed deadlines may result in suspension or cancellation of 
registration.304 
C.  Cancellation and Suspension 
EPA may cancel or suspend existing registrations based upon certain risk/benefit 
determinations.  FIFRA section 6(b), which specifically addresses cancellation, states that EPA 
may issue a notice of intent to cancel if a pesticide or its labeling does not comply with FIFRA or 
if when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, the pesticide 
generally causes unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.305  Under section 6(b) there are 
two types of cancellation actions: section 6(b)(1) -- notice of intent to cancel or change 
classification; and section 6(b)(2) --notice of intent to hold a hearing to determine whether or not 
registration should be cancelled or classification changed.306  For both sections 6(b)(1) and 6(b)(2), 
                                                 
302  7 U.S.C. § 136a-1. 
303  Id. 
304  Id. 
305  Id. § 136d(b).  FIFRA requires review of the proposed cancellation notice by the Secretary of Agriculture (USDA) and 
the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP). The statute dictates that the notice must be submitted to USDA and the SAP 
60 days prior to notification of the registrant or publication (whichever comes first). If USDA and the SAP do not submit 
comments within 30 days, EPA may publish the notice. If USDA and the SAP do submit comments, EPA may, after 
reviewing such comments, withdraw the notice, issue a final notice without modification, or modify the notice, as 
appropriate.  
Once the notice is published, persons adversely affected have 30 days to request a hearing. If no such hearing is requested, 
the notice of intent to cancel becomes final. If a hearing is requested, the hearing is considered a formal adjudicatory 
proceeding and is held before an ALJ. Such a. proceeding is governed by the Agency's rules at 40 CFR Part 164. 
306  Id. § 136d.  
Administrative review, suspension 
(b) Cancellation and change in Classification 
If it appears to the Administrator that a pesticide or its labeling . . . does not comply with the provisions of this subchapter 
or, when used in accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, generally causes unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment, the Administrator may issue a notice of the Administrators intent either- 
(1) to cancel its registration or to changes it classification together with the reasons (including the actual basis) for the 
Administrators action, or  
(2) to hold a hearing to determine whether or not its registration should be canceled or its classification changed. 
. . . In determining whether to issue any such notice, the Administrator shall include among those factors to be taken into 
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EPA must make a finding that the risks appear to outweigh the benefits.  For section 6(b)(2), 
however, a hearing may be held when the Administrator's judgment concerning the risks and 
benefits of a pesticide is only tentative.307  Before taking final action under section 6(b), the 
Administrator must determine whether any unreasonable risks posed by a pesticide's use can be 
sufficiently reduced by regulatory measures short of cancellation.  Such measures include the 
imposition of additional labeling restrictions and/or the classification of the pesticide for restricted 
use.  If the Administrator determines that adequate risk reduction cannot be achieved by such 
regulatory measures, the registration of the pesticide for that use must be cancelled.  An EPA Final 
Order on a cancellation is reviewable in District Court.308 
FIFRA also authorizes EPA to suspend the registration of a pesticide based on certain 
findings. FIFRA provides for two types of suspension proceedings -- "ordinary" and "emergency" 
suspension.309  Ordinary suspension is issued where such action is necessary to prevent an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
account the impact of the action proposed in such notice on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food 
prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy.  At least 60 days prior to sending such notice to the registrant or making 
public such notice, whichever occurs first, the Administrator shall provide the Secretary of Agriculture with a copy of such 
notice and an analysis of such impact on the agricultural economy.   
. . . The proposed action shall become final and effective at the end of 30 days from receipt by the registrant, or publication 
of a notice . . . , unless within that time either (I) the registrant makes the necessary corrections, if possible, or (ii) a request 
for a hearing is made by a person adversely affected by the notice. . . In taking any final action under this subsection, the 
Administrator shall consider restricting a pesticides use or uses as an alternative to cancellation and shall fully explain the 
reasons for these restrictions, and shall include among those factors to be taken into account the impact of such final action 
on production and prices of agricultural commodities, retail food prices, and otherwise on the agricultural economy. 
Id. § 136d(b). 
307  There is no distinction between § 136d(b)(1) and § 136d(b)(2) hearing in the manner of conduct, burden of proof, or 
nature of initial decision by ALJ. One issue generally considered as part of the cancellation process is whether the Agency 
should allow the continued sale and use of existing stocks of the pesticide. 
308  Of the more than 60 pesticide cancellations and suspensions, only approximately one third have been judicially 
reviewed.  RODGERS, supra note 190, at 480.  EPAs refusal to initiate proceedings to cancel or suspend a registration is 
considered a final order reviewable in District Court.  See Envtl. Defense Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
309  7 U.S.C. §136d(c) (2004) - Suspension 
(1) Order 
If the Administrator determines that action is necessary to prevent an imminent hazard during the time required for 
cancellation or change in classification proceedings, the Administrator may, by order, suspend the registration of the 
pesticide immediately.  Except as provided in paragraph (3) no order of suspension may be issued under this subsection 
unless the Administrator has issued or at the same time issues, a notice of intention to cancel; the registration, or change the 
classification of the pesticide under subsection (b) of this section.  Except s provided in paragraph (3), the Administrator 
shall notify the registrant prior to issuing any suspension order.  Such notice shall include findings pertaining to the 
question of imminent hazard.  The registrant shall then have an opportunity . . .for an expedited hearing before the 
Administrator in the question of whether an imminent hazard exists. 
(2) Expedited hearing 
If no request for a hearing is submitted to the Administrator within five days of the registrants receipt of the notification . . 
. , the suspension order may be issued and shall take effect and shall not be reviewable by a court.  If a hearing is requested, 
it shall commence within five days of the receipt of the request for such hearing unless the registrant and the Administrator 
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imminent hazard during the time required for cancellation proceeding.  "Imminent hazard" is 
defined as a substantial likelihood of serious harm during the duration of cancellation 
proceedings.310  The term is not limited to a concept of crisis.  The function of a suspension action 
is to assess the evidence required to determine the risks and benefits for the period involved, not an 
ultimate resolution of the cancellation issues.311  In an ordinary suspension, notification to the 
registrant of the intent to suspend and an opportunity for a hearing is required prior to 
effectiveness of suspension.  Only a registrant may request an adjudicatory hearing. The order 
becomes effective either after a favorable decision following a hearing, or 5 days after notification 
if no hearing is requested.312  If no hearing is requested, the suspension order is not reviewable by 
a court.313  If a hearing is requested, an expedited administrative adjudicatory hearing is held 
before an ALJ, in which interested persons can intervene.  The sole issue at the hearing is whether 
an imminent hazard exists.314 
An emergency suspension order, which is effective immediately, may be issued if an 
emergency exists that does not permit even an expedited hearing before suspension takes place.315 
 Registrants have 5 days to request an expedited hearing and the hearing must begin within 5 days 
of the Agency's receipt of such a hearing request.316  If an expedited hearing is requested, the 
emergency order remains in effect until the issuance of a final suspension order following the 
hearing.317  No party other than the registrant and the Agency may participate in the expedited 
hearing, except for the filing of briefs.318  An emergency suspension order is subject to immediate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
agree that it shall commence at a later time. 
(3) Emergency order 
Whenever the Administrator determines that an emergency exists that does not permit the Administrator to hold a hearing 
before suspending, the Administrator may issue a suspension order in advance of notice to the Registrant.  The 
Administrator may issue an emergency order under this paragraph before issuing a notice of intention to cancel the 
registration or change the classification of the pesticide under subsection (b) . . .In the case of an emergency order, 
paragraph (2) shall apply except that (A) the order of suspension shall be in effect pending the expeditious completion of 
the remedies provided by that paragraph and the issuance of the final rode on suspension, and n(b) no party other than the 
registrant and the Administrator shall participate except that any person adversely affected may file briefs within the time 
allotted by the Agencys rules. 
310  Id. § 136(l). 
311  Id. § 136d(c)(1). 
312  Id. § 136d(c)(2). 
313  Id. 
314  Id. 
315  Id. § 136d(c)(3). 
316  Id. 
317  Id. 
318  Id. 
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review in District Court.319 
D.  Enter GMOs 
Pesticidal GMOs are regulated under FIFRA in much the same way as are traditional 
chemical pesticides. 320  For pesticidal GMOs, this means using FIFRA to regulate the pesticide 
                                                 
319  Id. § 136d(c)(4).  The export of pesticides is regulated under section 17 of FIFRA.  Section 17 reflects a somewhat 
limited role for EPA in the export of pesticides. The primary emphasis of this section is on the provision of information to 
foreign governments.  Section 17 (a) provides that no pesticide intended solely for export to any foreign country shall be 
deemed in violation of the Act if it is prepared or packaged according to the specifications or directions or the foreign 
purchaser and in the case of unregistered pesticides, if prior to export the foreign purchaser signs a statement 
acknowledging that the purchaser understands that such pesticide is not registered for use in the United States.  In addition, 
section 17 (b) mandates notice to all countries of certain regulatory control actions taken by EPA (section 17(b)).  
Specifically, section 17(a) provides:   
(a)  Pesticides and Devices Intended for Export. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, no pesticide or device 
or active ingredient used in producing a pesticide intended solely for export to any foreign country shall be deemed in 
violation of this Act (1) when prepared or packed according to the specifications or directions of the foreign purchaser . . .; 
and (2) in the case of any pesticide other than a pesticide registered under section 3 or sold under section 6(a)(1) of this Act, 
if, prior to export, the foreign purchaser has signed a statement acknowledging that such pesticide is not registered for use 
in the Untied States and cannot be not sold in the United States under this Act.  A copy of that statement shall be 
transmitted to an appropriate official of the government of the importing country. 
Id. § 136o(a). 
Section 17(b) provides:  
(b) Cancellation Notices Furnished to Foreign Governments. -- Whenever a registration, or cancellation or suspension of 
the registration of a pesticide becomes effective, or ceases to be effective, the Administrator shall transmit through the State 
Department notification thereof to the governments of other countries and to appropriate international agencies.  Such 
notification shall, upon request, include all information related to the cancellation or suspension of the registration of the 
pesticide and information concerning other pesticides that are registered under section 3 of this Act and that could be used 
in lieu of such pesticide. 
Id. § 136o(b). 
320 The decision to treat GMOs similarly to traditional pesticides is rooted in the early U.S. biotechnology policies of the 
1980's.  The United states Government's first systematic attempt to address the regulation of biotechnology in a 
comprehensive fashion was with the publication of the 1984 document entitled "Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology.  Notice of Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. 
Reg. 50,8566 (1984). The purpose of this document was "to provide a concise index to U.S. laws related to biotechnology, 
to clarify the policies of the major regulatory agencies that will be involved in reviewing research and products of 
biotechnology, to describe a scientific advisory mechanisms for assessment of biotechnology issues, and to explain how the 
activities of the Federal agencies in biotechnology will be coordinated.  Id.  In 1986, the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy ("OSTP") published in the Federal Register "Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: 
Announcement of Policy and Notice for Public Comment" ("the coordinated framework").  51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986).  
This approach was based on a belief that rDNA technology in itself does not create risk.  See Steen, supra note 228, at 766. 
 Instead, certain types of products of biotechnology may pose risks that can be addressed in the same fashion as regulatory 
agencies address the risks posed by traditional chemical products. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the executive branch 
of the US government was focused on promoting biotechnology as the USs hope for strong economic future.  The feeling 
at the time was that the US how allowed Japan to beat it in the electronics industry.  The federal government was 
determined not to allow this to happen with the biotech industry. The message was clear that regulatory agencies were not 
to stand in the way of biotechnology.  There would not be any new biotechnology legislation and agencies would continue 
to rely on existing regulatory programs. For pesticidal GMOs this meant FIFRA.  Moreover, a raging debate ensued over 
whether regulatory agencies should be regulating the process of genetic engineering or the products of genetic 
engineering.  At that time, it was determined that from a risk standpoint, the process was irrelevant and that agencies should 
regulate only products of biotechnology.  Under the coordinated framework, the regulatory approach taken by U.S. 
regulatory agencies, including EPA, has been to rely on existing statutes and to focus on the product rather than the 
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rather than targeting regulation at the process by which the pesticide is created.321  GMOs that are 
intended to kill, disrupt, repel or mitigate pests are regulated in much the same way as traditional 
chemical pesticides under FIFRA.  As described above, section 2(u) of FIFRA defines the term 
"pesticide" as:  "(1) any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, 
repelling, or mitigating any pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use 
as a plant regulator, defoliator, or desiccant * * * ."  This definition is very broad and can include 
living organisms and substances produced by living organisms as well as traditional chemical 
pesticides.  The definition of pesticide in FIFRA does not depend on the process by which a 
particular pesticide is produced.  EPA has interpreted this definition to include biological 
pesticides and genetically modified pesticides.  Thus, pesticidal GMOs must be registered under 
FIFRA prior to sale or distribution in the U.S. The standard for registration is the same for 
pesticidal GMOs are for traditional chemical.  EPA has developed some data requirements 
specifically geared to address potential risks from microbial pesticides, including microbial 
GMOs.322  
One category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under FIFRA includes microbial 
GMOs.  EPA has regulated naturally-occurring microbial pesticides, such as B.t., for many years.  
Microbial pesticides are regulated in much the same way as traditional pesticides at the large-scale 
testing and registration stages.  EPA has expressed concern about the potential for adverse effects 
associated with small-scale environmental testing of certain microbial pesticides, both naturally-
occurring and genetically engineered. Small-scale testing of most traditional pesticides generally is 
considered to pose very limited risks, and thus, typically is not regulated by EPA.  Because 
microbial pesticides are living organisms that have the potential to reproduce and spread in the 
environment, however, even small-scale testing has the potential to present unreasonable adverse 
                                                                                                                                                                      
process used to create the product.  Id. 
321  EPA's primary authority for regulating agricultural biotechnology products be found in two statutes:  FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 
136-136y (2004), and FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2004).  Under FIFRA, EPA has the authority to address all 
environmental and human health issues associated with pesticide use.  Under FFDCA, EPA has the authority to set 
tolerances for pesticide residues in or on food.  EPA also regulates biologicals and biotechnology products that are not 
pesticides, food, or drugs under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2004). TSCA 
grants EPA the authority to screen new chemical substances and impose controls to prevent unreasonable risks, and, 
through rulemaking, to acquire information and impose restrictions to prevent unreasonable risks on existing chemical 
substances.  Although some agricultural biotechnology products may fall within the purview of TSCA, the majority of 
agricultural biotechnology products regulated by EPA are considered pesticides under EPAs broad definition of the term, 
and thus, are regulated under FIFRA and FFDCA. 
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effects on the environment.323  Thus, EPA has promulgated a rule that requires notification prior to 
any small scale testing of certain microbial pesticides, including microbial GMOs.324 
Another category of pesticidal GMOs regulated by EPA under FIFRA are pesticidal 
genetically modified plants, or plant incorporated protectants.325  In July 2001, EPA published its 
long-awaited rule for the regulation of plant-incorporated protectants under FIFRA.326  The plant-
incorporated protectant rule took approximately 10 years to develop.  Countless public hearings, 
scientific advisory council meetings, Congressional hearings and interagency negotiations were 
held.327  Despite all of the these efforts, however, the resultant rule is quite modest and does not 
really tackle the complex and novel risks of GMOs.  The thrust of the new rule is merely to define 
the scope of what types of pesticidal GMOs EPA believes warrant regulation.328  EPA has identified 
several categories that it has exempted from any FIFRA regulation because they are low risk.329  
One such category is GMOs that so closely resemble the types of plants that could be created 
                                                                                                                                                                      
322  The data requirement for microbial pesticides can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 158.740 (2005). 
323  See 59 Fed. Reg. 45,600 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 172). 
324  40 C.F.R. § 172. 
325  A plant-incorporated protectant is defined as a pesticidal substance that is intended to be produced in a living plant, or 
in the produce thereof, and the genetic material necessary for its production.  40 C.F.R. § 152.3. 
326  66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 152 and 174).  EPA does not yet have any rules governing GM 
animals.  For an historical discussion of the Plant-Incorporated Protectant Rule, see Angelo, supra note 224. 
327  66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (2001).  
328  Under EPA's definition of plant-incorporated protectants, all substances produced by plants and intended for a 
pesticidal purpose are within EPA's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the plant is genetically modified.  However, not all 
plant-incorporated protectants within EPAs jurisdiction warrant regulation under FIFRA.  EPA believes that many plant-
incorporated protectants do not warrant any regulation under FIFRA because they pose low probability of risk and will not 
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.  For example, in 1982, EPA promulgated a regulation under FIFRA 
§ 25(b) that exempted all biological control agents from the requirements of FIFRA, except for certain microorganisms.  40 
C.F.R. §152.20(3).  This exemption was promulgated because EPA found that macroorganisms used as biological control 
agents were adequately regulated by other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
329  EPAs first attempt to describe its plans to regulate plant-incorporated protectants was in early 1994.  On January 21, 
1994, EPA held a joint meeting of a sub-panel of the Agency's Scientific Advisory Panel  and the Biotechnology Science 
Advisory Committee to address certain scientific issues related to the regulation of pesticidal substances produced in plants. 
 For the meeting, EPA made available to the public a draft proposal of a comprehensive policy and four draft proposed 
rules (together referred to as the "draft proposal") that were developed under FIFRA and FFDCA.  On November 23, 1994, 
EPA published in the Federal Register somewhat modified versions of these draft documents (together referred to as the 
proposal).  59 Fed. Reg. 496 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 60,519 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 60,535 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 60,542 
(1994); and 59 Fed. Reg. 60,545 (1994).  The  proposal was intended to clarify the status of plant-incorporated protectants 
(referred to as plant-pesticides in the 1994 proposal and later renamed plant-incorporated protectants) under FIFRA and 
FFDCA and outline the scope of what types of plant-incorporated protectants EPA believed warranted regulation based on 
risk/benefit considerations.  Under the  proposal, many plant-incorporated protectants would not be subject to regulation 
because they pose a low potential for risk to humans and/or the environment.  Others would be subject to regulation, but 
would be regulated somewhat differently than conventional pesticides because of the unique nature of plant-incorporated 
protectants.  The  proposal outlined how EPA intended to assess plant-incorporated protectants at different stages of 
environmental testing and at the sale and distribution stage.  The final plant-incorporated protectant rule, promulgated in 
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naturally or through traditional plant breeding.  An example of this would be introducing a 
substance normally produced by one variety of corn in to another variety of corn versus introducing 
a substance normally produced only in bacteria into corn.  This type of plant-incorporated 
protectant would be exempt because it is not posing any new risks that would not have evolved 
naturally or through traditional  breeding.330  If a pesticidal GMO does not meet one of these 
exemptions, however, the regulatory process, is virtually identical to the regulatory process for all 
pesticides - namely, registration based on a cost/benefit analysis and labeling restrictions on use.331  
 EPA has not yet established specific data requirements for genetically modified plants that act as 
pesticides.332 
V. IS FIFRA ECO-PRAGMATIC? 
Although the basic regulatory framework of FIFRA dates back to 1972, with some of its 
provisions such as the misbranding prohibition dating back to the early consumer-protection 
statutes of the early 20th century, and despite the fact that a statute with the word rodenticide in it 
would hardly be expected to be cutting-edge, FIFRA is surprising eco-pragmatic.  In fact, 
somewhat ironically given the state of pesticide regulation today, the earliest applications of 
FIFRA have threads of eco-pragmatism running through them.  Even by todays standards, the 
1972 DDT cancellation decision represents a fairly sophisticated ecological analysis focused on: 
the tendency of DDT and its metabolites to persist in the soil and aquasphere, the tendency of 
DDT to be readily transported by leaching, erosion, run-off and volatilization, DDTs fat soluble 
characteristic which enables it to collect and concentrate in animal fat tissue, the fact that DDT can 
bioaccumulate as it moves up the food chain, and the fact that once accumulated DDT is toxic to 
animals and humans and inhibits the ability of fish and other wildlife species to regenerate.333  
EPA did not shy away from tackling the difficult issue of how to take into account the risks may 
occur in the future due to the persistent nature of the pesticide.  EPA also was not paralyzed by a 
lack of certainty in data.  For example, even though EPA recognized that the degree of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2001, adopted some, but not all of the exemptions proposed in 1994. 
330  40 C.F.R. § 174.25. 
331  EPA has not adopted any specific registration, data or labeling requirements for plant-incorporated protectants.  See 
generally, 66 Fed. Reg. 37772 (2001). 
332  Id. 
333  In the Matter of Stevens Industries, Inc, et al., I.F.& R. Docket Nos. 63, et al. (Consolidated DDT hearings, June 2, 
1972). 
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transportability of DDT was unknown, EPA utilized data showing that DDT was found in remote 
areas of the world and in ocean species, such as whales, as providing enough evidence from which 
a logical reference could be drawn that DDT is readily transported in the environment.334  
Moreover, EPA concluded that persistence and biomagnification in themselves were a cause of 
concern, given the unknown and possibly forever undeterminable long-range effects of DDT in 
man and the environment.335  Thus, even in 1972, EPA recognized the uncertainty surrounding 
ecological effects data, while at the same time employing a precautionary approach to prevent 
uncertain, possibly devastating effects that may occur in the long term. 
When the group petitioners who opposed cancellation argued that DDT is only one toxic 
substance in a polluted environment and that therefore whatever its laboratory effects, it cannot be 
shown as the causative agent of injury to wildlife, EPA responded that this argument does not 
redeem DDT, but only underscores the magnitude of effect that will be necessary for cleaning up 
the environment.336  Persuaded by evidence showing metabolites of DDT cause eggshell thinning 
in certain bird species despite some contradictory evidence, EPA found it sufficient that there was 
laboratory data and observation data, and in addition, a scientific hypothesis, which might explain 
the phenomenon.337  EPA further found that there were no label restrictions that could completely 
prevent effects on nontarget organisms, persistence and transport in the environment, or 
biomagnification.  Accordingly, cancellation was the only available risk-reduction measure. 
EPAs analysis of the benefits of DDT in formulating its decision to cancel was also fairly 
sophisticated and in some ways did a better job of considering benefits than many more recent 
EPA decisions regarding cancellation or suspension of pesticides.  The benefits analysis focused 
on the availability of alternatives including non-chemical pest management programs and the fact 
that the crops protected by DDT were not in short supply.  EPA found that DDT was not necessary 
to ensure an adequate supply of cotton at a reasonable cost, given that only 35 percent of the 
cotton-producing acreage at the time was treated by DDT.338  In contrast to many recent EPA 
decisions, where non-chemical pest control alternatives and emphasis on availability of crops are 
conspicuously absent, or at least play a very minimal role, in the decision-making process, EPAs 
                                                 
334  Id. 
335  Id. 
336  Id. 
337  Id. 
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1972 DDT cancellation decision takes a broader look at the cost/benefit analysis than merely 
counting up dollars and cents on each side of the equation.  In fact, EPAs 1972 DDT cancellation 
decision has other indicia of an eco-pragmatic approach.  For example, in the final order, EPAs 
statement that the risk/benefit equation is a dynamic one can be viewed as a foreshadowing of 
the arguments for flexibility and adaptive management that are at the center of eco-pragmatic 
scholarship.   
Subsequent to the DDT cancellation, EPA brought a number of cancellation and 
suspension actions, through which the agencys interpretation of the statutory standard, 
unreasonable effects on man and the environment, was further developed.339  This series of 
FIFRA cancellation and suspension cases cemented the interpretation of FIFRA as containing a 
cost/benefit balancing standard, rather than the open-ended balancing standard that, at least 
arguably, it was intended to be.340  As Professor William Rodgers has described the legislative 
history of FIFRA, the unreasonable adverse effects language was intended to be an 
environmentally stringent standard for registration.341  The Senate Commerce Committee, which 
created the standard, described it as not tolerating any adverse effects, unless there are overriding 
benefits from the use of a pesticide.342 Accordingly, it appears that the standard contemplated by 
the Senate drafters of the 1972 FIFRA amendments intended that, although economic and social 
factors should be considered and balanced against environmental risks, the balancing would not be 
a simple accounting of dollars and cents on two sides of the equation, with the pesticide winning 
the right to registration as long as the scale was tipped, no matter how slightly in favor of the 
benefits provided by the pesticide.  Instead, the Senate drafters appeared to intend that, where 
environmental risks exist, the analysis would favor registration only where the risks were 
outweighed by overriding benefits.  An example of an overriding benefit might be where a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
338  Id. 
339  Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. Denied 
431 U.S. 925 (1977); In the Matter of Chapman Chemical Co., et al., FIFRA Dockets No. 246 et al. (EPA 1976);  In the 
Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., et al., FIFRA Docket Nos. 625, et al (1989). 
340  See, e.g., In the Matter of Chapman Chemical Company (canceling certain uses of mercury in pesticides based on a 
finding that the risks of continued use outweighed the benefits); and In the Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., et al., FIFRA 
Docket Nos. 625, et al (1989)(describing the registrants burden in challenging a proposed cancellation as requiring a 
showing that the benefits of continued use justify the risks). 
341  RODGERS, supra note 190 at 451. 
342  Id. (quoting Senate Comm. on Commerce, Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, S.Rep. No. 970, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972). 
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particular pesticide is important to fighting a significant public health problem such as West Nile 
Disease, and where other less risky control alternatives are not available or are too costly.343  Other 
overriding benefits might include situations where a particular pesticide is necessary to the 
maintenance of a segment of agriculture, where nonchemical or less risky alternatives are not 
available and to grow the crop without the pesticide would result in severe economic losses or 
dramatically increased food prices.  However, an overriding benefit would not be found in a 
situation where, if the pesticide were taken off the market, the evidence showed only that chemical 
companies would lose money or farmers would have to switch to other existing alternative pest 
control practices, which might involve some additional cost.  If FIFRA were amended to make 
clear that only overriding benefits could outweigh significant environmental risks, then potential 
registrants would face a more stringent standard and pesticides that posed significant risk would 
not routinely be registered.   
Certainly there is much that can be done to mold FIFRA into a more eco-pragmatic law.  
Nevertheless, eco-pragmatic themes such as adaptive management and an ecological integrity  
baseline run throughout the existing statute.  The concept of an ecological baseline can be found in 
a numbers of places in FIFRA.  Specifically, the standard for registration under FIFRA is designed 
to address a large array of ecological concerns, as well as human health concerns.  FIFRAs 
regulatory standard is aimed at preventing unreasonable  adverse effects on the environment. 344 
 The word environment is defined very broadly by FIFRA to included water, air, land, and all 
plants and man and other animals living therein, and the interrelationships which exist among 
these. 345  Thus, FIFRA not only broadly includes land, water, air and plant and animal resources, 
within the definition of environment, but also includes the interrelationships among these 
resources as encompassed within the definition.   
Moreover, FIFRA contemplates an ecological baseline in its premarket evaluation.  Under 
FIFRA, a registration is required prior to the sale, distribution or commercialization of any 
                                                 
343  The importance that pesticides can play in preventing significant public health problems is specifically addressed by 
FIFRA.  The definition of unreasonable adverse effects on the environment provides that The Administrator shall 
consider the risks and benefits of public health pesticides separate from the risks and benefits of other pesticides, In 
weighing and regulatory action concerning a public health pesticide under this subchapter, the Administrator shall weigh 
any risks of the pesticide against the health risks such as the diseases transmitted by the vector to be controlled by the 
pesticide.  7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2004). 
344  See, e.g., id. § 136(l), § 136(x), § 136(ee)(2).  
345  Id.§ 136(j). 
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pesticide product.  Moreover, except for in limited circumstances qualifying for an exemption, 
some level of regulatory review is required prior to the release of any pesticide into the 
environment even if only for experimentation purposes.  Unlike some other environmental 
regulatory programs, such as the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), 346 FIFRA imposes a 
somewhat precautionary approach in that pesticides, in that they are by definition intended to kill 
or disrupt living organisms, are presumed to pose unreasonable risks, and therefore, they cannot be 
sold or distributed without a premarket environmental review. 347 
Moreover, FIFRAs precautionary approach is manifest in its allocation of the burden of 
proof.  While not expressly stated in the language of FIFRA, pursuant to a series or administrative 
and judicial decisions, the burden of proof that a pesticide does not pose an unreasonable adverse 
effect of the environment remains at all time on the proponent of registration or continued 
registration.348  Thus, a proponent of registration is required to demonstrate it meets this burden 
prior to a pesticide being registered.  Further, if EPA proposes cancellation of a pesticide or use of 
the pesticide, the burden of proof rests on the proponent of continued registration during any 
cancellation or suspension hearing that may ensue. 
With regard to adaptive management, FIFRA also shows surprising signs of being eco-
pragmatic.  Many of FIFRAs provisions are specifically designed to seek new information, to 
adapt to new information or to tailor the level of regulation to the level of certainty of risks based 
on the sufficiency of available data.  For example, FIFRA establishes two different levels of 
registration  full registration and conditional registration.  EPA may conditionally register a 
pesticide under certain circumstances, despite the fact that sufficient data have not been generated 
to support full registration. As described above, such circumstances may be where a new use is 
proposed for a pesticide that is already registered for another use.  In such a situation, sufficient 
                                                 
346  15 U.S.C. §§ 2607-2629 (2004). 
347  In contrast, new non-pesticide chemicals entering the marketplace do not require a premarket environmental review 
under TSCA. Id. § 2604.  Instead, prior manufacturing these new non-pesticide chemical substances under TSCA, all that is 
required is a 90-day notification to EPA. Id. § 2604(a).  During the premarket notification period, EPA conducts a cursory 
review of the proposed new chemical, but unless a determination is made that for a particular chemical generation of new 
data rare required, EPA typically does not require environmental testing.  Id. § 2604.  If a non-pesticide substance is later 
found to pose unforeseen risks, EPA can, by regulation, require additional testing to be conducted or impose regulations to 
reduce the risk from such a substance under sections 4, Id. § 2603 and 6 , Id. § 2606, of TSCA, respectively. 
348  Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. Denied 
431 U.S. 925 (1977); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (DDT II), 439 F.2d 584 (1971); Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. 
EPA, 461 F.2d 293, 304 (7th Cir. 1972). 
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data exists to support the existing use, but additional data may be required to support full 
registration of the newly proposed use.  Under such circumstances, EPA may conditionally register 
the pesticide for the new use if EPA determines that the conditional registration would not 
significantly increase the risk of any unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.  
Accordingly, through the conditional registration process, a degree of flexibility is built into 
FIFRA, allowing products to be used in new ways prior to full data generation.349  
Other provisions of FIFRA that allow unique circumstances and changing information to 
be taken into consideration include the emergency exemption provisions, the state registration 
provisions and the experimental use permit provisions.  The emergency exemption provision of 
section 18 of FIFRA authorizes EPA to grant an emergency exemption to any state or federal 
agency if emergency conditions  i.e., urgent non-routine conditions for which no economically or 
environmentally feasible alternative practices that provide adequate control are available.  Thus,  
section 18 provides flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances, which could include the 
outbreak and spread of a new pest or the spread of a public health disease.  In such circumstances, 
EPA is authorized to act quickly to control the problem before the pest or disease vector is widely 
disseminated and to minimize the harm, without waiting for a full data set to be produced to 
support registration.   
The state registration provision in section 24(c) authorize states to issue registration to 
meet special local needs.  Accordingly, this provision allows states to take into consideration local 
circumstances that may warrant the use of pesticide products or uses that are not generally 
approved under FIFRA for nationwide use.  Thus, in a state where a particular pest causes more 
severe harm than in other states, the cost/benefit analysis for the use of the pesticide in that state 
may have a different result from the nationwide cost/benefit analysis for that use, and accordingly, 
a special local needs registration may be granted for that state only.  In this way, FIFRAs 
flexibility allows registrations to be tailored to the special agricultural, environmental, economic or 
other needs of a state. 
Finally, the experimental use permit provision continued in FIFRA section 5 is another 
example of the flexibility afforded by FIFRA in tailoring the amount of data necessary to the level 
                                                 
349  Of course, should the new data demonstrate that the new use does not meet the standards for full registration, full 
registration will not be granted.  
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of risk resulting from a particular use.  FIFRA section 5 authorizes EPA to issue permits for the 
field testing of pesticides necessary to generate data to support full registration.  Thus, as the risk 
from exposure to a pesticide increases (i.e., as it moves from lab testing, to small-scale field 
testing, to full-scale use), progressively greater data requirements attach to ensure that sufficient 
data are available to make an unreasonable adverse effects determination for each level of use.  
Similarly, the ability for EPA to classify a pesticide as either general or restricted use allows EPA 
to adapt the amount of regulation required to the risks associated with the particular pesticide.  By 
classifying a pesticide as restricted use, EPA ensures that users of the pesticide will have at least 
some level of training and supervision to reduce the risks associated with the use of that pesticide.  
With regard to taking advantage of new information as it develops  or requiring new 
information as new testing methodologies become available or new risk scenarios are understood 
FIFRA also contains some relatively eco-pragmatic approaches.  Because hundreds of pesticides 
on the market were registered prior to the current registration data requirements being in place, 
FIFRA section 4 contains a detailed reregistration process designed to ensure that older 
pesticides are reexamined in light of more stringent regulatory standards and more sophisticated 
testing methodologies that have come into existence since the times of the early registrations of 
many pesticides.  The current reregistration provisions include a multi-phased process with a 
number of deadlines, which must be met to avoid suspension or cancellation.  This reregistration 
approach has been an extremely time-consuming, burdensome and expensive process.  If future 
changes to the registration standard, data requirements or testing methodologies warrant another 
round of reregistration, it also could be extremely costly in terms of time and resources.  
Nevertheless, such a process may be the only way to comprehensively address significant changes. 
While reregistration applied to all pesticides registered prior to 1984, there are a number of 
FIFRA data requirements that apply to previously registered pesticides in a more targeted manner. 
 For example, FIFRA section 3(c)(2)(B) authorizes EPA to require holders of existing registrations 
to provide additional data support the continued registration of a pesticide whenever EPA finds 
that additional data are required to maintain in effect an existing registration of a pesticide. 350  
Finally, under section 6(a)(2) of FIFRA, if at time after the registration of a pesticide, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
350  7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B) (2004). 
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registrant obtains in any way factual  information regarding unreasonable adverse effects on the 
environment of the pesticide, the registrant is required to submit such information to EPA.  
Unreasonable adverse effects information submitted to EPA may lead to EPA requesting 
additional data under section 3(c)(2)(B), EPA initiating a cancellation or suspension action, EPA 
reclassifying a general use pesticide as a restricted use pesticide, or some other form of regulation 
to ensure that the pesticide will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.  Thus, 
FIFRA contemplates a process of ongoing evaluations of pesticide risks as new information 
becomes available.  With regard to pesticidal GMOs, EPA has taken the section 6(a)(2) approach a 
step farther to require ongoing reporting of adverse environmental effects data, not only for 
registered pesticides, but also for pesticides that qualify for a  plant-incorporated protectant 
exemption.351  In its plant-incorporated protectant rule, EPA requires that any person who 
produces, for sale or distribution, a plant-incorporated protectant exempt under the rule, who 
obtains any information regarding adverse effects on human health or the environment alleged to 
have been caused by the plant-incorporated protectant, must submit such information to EPA.352 
VI.  REINVENTING FIFRA THROUGH ECO-PRAGMATISM 
Notwithstanding all of these promising elements, FIFRA has not lived up to its eco-
pragmatic promise.  As described more fully below, a combination of statutory shortcomings, 
unfortunate interpretations, and problems with implementation and enforcement, have resulted in 
FIFRAs lack of success as an environmental protection statute.  Accordingly, there is 
considerable room for improvement.  By revising FIFRA to follow the eco-pragmatic approach 
and to more consciously incorporate ecological principles, the statute could be improved 
substantially. 
A.  Reinventing the Cost/Benefit Balancing 
For FIFRA to be reinvented in an eco-pragmatic mold, a number of changes are indicated.  
First, as described above, EPAs cost/benefit approach to registration and cancellation under 
FIFRA, must be replaced with and open-ended balancing approach, which appears to be Congress 
                                                 
351  40 C.F.R. § 174.1. 
352  40 C.F.R. § 174.71 (2005).  This rule goes on to explain that for the purposes of plant-incorporated protectants, 
[a]dvsere effects on human health or the environment means at a minimum information about incidents affecting humans 
or other nontarget organisms where both: (1) The producer is aware, or has been informed, that a person or nontarget 
organism allegedly suffered a toxic or adverse effect due to exposure to (e.g., ingestion of) a plant-incorporated protectant. 
(2) The producer has or could reasonably obtain information concerning where the incident occurred.  Id. § 174.71(b). 
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intent in drafting the unreasonable adverse effects on man and the environment standard.  Under 
such an approach, although economic and social costs would be factors to be considered in 
determining whether to allow a pesticide to be sold or distributed in the U.S., they would not be 
used to balance away significant human health or environmental risks. Such risks would only be 
permitted in cases where there are overriding benefits of the pesticide, taking into account a 
number of specified considerations in the open-ended balancing. 
The plain language of FIFRA, as it currently stands, does not mandate a strict cost/benefit 
balancing.  Instead, as Shapiro and Glicksman have suggested, on its face, FIFRA could be read to 
contain a open-ended balancing standard.  As described above, FIFRAs definition of  
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment means any unreasonable risk to man or the 
environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the 
use of any pesticide.  Congress only direction to EPA was to take into account economic and 
social as well as environmental considerations.  Nevertheless, EPA has interpreted and 
implemented  this standard as more of a strict cost/benefit balancing.353   However, at least with 
regard to the registration of pesticides, EPA does not really engage in a true cost/benefit analysis 
because it does not require applicants to demonstrate the benefits of the pesticide.  Moreover, as 
described above, EPA generally does not require efficacy data prior to registering a pesticide.  
EPA has, by rule, waived all requirements to submit efficacy data unless the pesticide product 
bears a claim to control pest microorganisms that pose a threat to human health or a claim to 
control vertebrates (such as rodents, birds, bats, canids, and skunks) that may directly or indirectly 
transmit diseases to humans.354  Accordingly, at the time of a registration decision, EPA does not 
know how efficacious a particular pesticide is.  Further, at the time of registration, EPA does not 
conduct an analysis to determine whether more efficacious alternatives, including non-chemical 
alternatives, exist.  Thus, at the time of registration, EPA does not know the extent of the benefits 
                                                 
353  Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA (heptachlor-chlordane), 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. Denied 
431 U.S. 925 (1977); In the Matter of Chapman Chemical Co., et al., FIFRA Dockets No. 246 et al. (EPA 1976);  In the 
Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., et al., FIFRA Docket Nos. 625, et al (1989). 
354  40 C.F.R. § 158.640 (2005).  The only pesticides for which EPA requires efficacy data are pesticides intended to 
control microbial organisms that affect human health and certain vectors of public health diseases. See id. (containing 
product performance data requirements for antimicrobial agents, products for treating water systems, and pesticides 
intended to kill or repel rodent, avian, and bat vectors). However, EPA has reserved the right to require, on a case-by-case 
basis, submission of efficacy data for other pesticides. Id. 
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of the pesticide.  Instead, benefits are assumed.355 When coupled with the limited cost data that 
EPA considers, it can be seen that EPAs cost/benefit analysis to support registration is not a true 
cost/benefit analysis and is flawed in many respects. 
Technology-based approaches, which have worked well in other areas of pollution control 
law,356 may not work so well where the goal is to release substances into the environment with the 
intent to kill living organisms.  Thus, a different approach may be necessary.  FIFRA differs from 
many other environmental laws in that the environmental risks that are sought to be reduced by 
other such laws are by-products of activities that are intended to produce some other product or 
service (e.g., air pollution from energy production), whereas, with FIFRA, the pesticide that poses 
the risk is the intended product.  Accordingly, under FIFRA, the imposition of technology to 
reduce risks would take a different form that with other technological controls that seek, for 
example, to reduce air pollution emissions.  The FIFRA analogue of the technology-based 
standard, therefore, is an alternative reduced risk method of pest control.  Such an alterative can be 
either a lower risk chemical pesticide, or other non-chemical methods of pest control, such as 
biological control or cultural control.357 
FIFRAs balancing standard should be revised to make clear that it is an open-ended 
balancing rather than a strict cost/benefit balancing.  In addition to the economic considerations 
that the statutory standard directs EPA to consider in conducting this balancing, the statute should 
be revised to explicitly direct EPA to take into consideration additional factors aimed at ensuring 
that ecological concerns are adequately valued in the balancing.  For example, considerations such 
as the degree of uncertainty regarding risks, the level of probability or risk, the degree of harm that 
could occur, the likelihood of a pesticide to spread or reproduce in the environment, either through 
biological means as in the case of GMOs or physical means,358 are all factors that should be given 
serious consideration in any open-ended cost/benefit balancing. 
                                                 
355  In determining whether to register a pesticide, EPA assumes that a manufacturer would not invest the resources 
necessary to support registration and commercialization of the pesticide unless the pesticide was efficacious and thus has 
benefits.  Of course, one need only look at the glut of weight loss products, anti-balding products, and wrinkle cream on the 
market, and the billions of dollars consumers spend each year on such products to conclude that marketability and efficacy 
are not necessarily one in the same.  
356  See generally Wagner, supra note 94. 
357  Biological controls include predator or parasites of pest insects.  Cultural controls  include as cultivation,  sanitation,  
crop rotation, and sowing and harvesting practices. See supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text. 
358  Physical means of environmental dissemination include the tendency of a pesticide to move great distances through 
 
 77 
Another recommended revision to EPAs cost/benefit approach to FIFRA registration is to 
require that the benefits provided by a pesticide actually be demonstrated.  As discussed above, 
FIFRA does not mandate, and EPA has opted not to require that efficacy data be provided when 
registering a pesticide359.  Nor does EPA require that applicants for pesticide registration provide 
data showing that there are not cost-effective alternative pest control methods available.  Likewise, 
EPA does not require applicants to provide information demonstrating that their proposed 
pesticide is relatively beneficial, either environmentally or economically over other existing 
pesticides or pest control methods that are available to address the target pest.  EPA merely 
assumes that a pesticide manufacturer would not incur the costs of developing and marketing a 
pesticide if it was not efficacious and did not have benefits and that any pesticides that are not 
beneficial will be eliminated through market forces. Consequently, a manufacturer could obtain a 
registration for a pesticide without ever having to show that the pesticide works for its intended 
purpose, let alone that the pesticide is necessary for combating particular pests or that existing 
chemical or non-chemical alternatives are not available.  Virtually no chemical pesticide is without 
at least some risk.  Thus, it is at least possible, if not likely, that pesticides are being registered that 
pose some risks, but have not been demonstrated to have any significant environmental, economic 
or societal benefit.   
It is not until EPA begins to consider whether to cancel the registration of a pesticide that 
EPA evaluates the benefits of the pesticide and whether there are viable alternatives available.  In 
determining whether EPA should proceed with cancellation, EPA necessarily makes a threshold 
determination that the risks posed by a pesticide are significant.  Once that determination is made, 
EPA conducts a full cost/benefit analysis.  It is only at this point that EPA takes a look at the 
economic benefits of the pesticide.  However, when conducting a benefits analysis, EPAs analysis 
of alternatives is typically limited to looking at other registered pesticides for the same use (which 
are assumed to be efficacious if they are registered).  EPAs consideration of non-chemical 
alternative  pest control techniques such as cultural control, biological control or organic farming 
                                                                                                                                                                      
soil, water or air, and the tendency of a pesticide to bioaccumulate. 
359 The lack of a requirement for efficacy data is in contrast to other licensing statues, such as the licensing provisions of the 
FFDCA governing the approval of new drugs, which explicitly requires a finding that a drug is effective as part of the 
premarket review process.  A new drug is considered to be effective if there is a general recognition among experts, 
founded on substantial evidence, that the drug in fact produces the results claimed for it under prescribed conditions.  21 
U.S.C. § 111 (2004). 
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practices has proven to be extremely limited and cursory.  Moreover, when evaluating whether 
existing chemical alternatives are available for the target pest, EPA does not conduct a 
comparative risk analysis, which leads to the situation where a less risky pesticide may be 
cancelled because other alternatives exist, but as more and more pesticides are cancelled, the 
benefits of the remaining pesticides grow.  Thus, the benefits of the last pesticide standing will 
be very high because no alternatives exists.  Accordingly, the last pesticide standing will have 
benefits that outweigh the risks, even if the risks are relatively high.  This problem could be solved 
by requiring a true benefits analysis for each registered pesticide, including a consideration of non-
chemical alternatives, and conducting relative risk analysis, that compares the risks of pesticides 
targeted toward a particular pest. 
It should be noted that although EPA does not routinely consider the relative risks of 
alternative pesticides when making registration or cancellation decisions, EPA has implemented 
certain policies to encourage the development and registration of lower risk pesticides.  In 1997, 
EPA issued Pesticide Registration (PR) Notice 97-3, which sets forth EPAs policy for the 
expedited review of conventional pesticides under the reduced risk initiative and of biological 
pesticides.360  The goal of the policy is to encourage the development, registration and use of 
lower-risk pesticides products which would result in reduced risks to human health and the 
environment, when compared to existing alternatives.  To accomplish this goal, EPA offers the 
incentive of an expedited registration review for qualifying products.  Qualifying pesticides 
include those that may reasonably be expected to accomplish one or more of the following: (I) 
Reduce the risks of pesticides to human health; (ii) Reduce the risks of pesticides to nontarget 
organisms; (iii) Reduce the potential for contamination of groundwater, surface water or other 
valued environmental resources; and (iv) Broaden the adoption of integrated pest management 
strategies. 361 
                                                 
360  This policy was developed partially in response to the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act mandates to develop 
procedures and guidelines for expedited pesticide review.  The policy supersedes EPAs prior reduced-risk criteria 
published in 57 Fed. Reg. 32140 (July 20, 1992) and 58 Fed. Reg. 5854 (Jan. 1993) and PR Notice 03-9 (July 21, 1993). 
361  These criteria are found in FIFRA § 3(c)(10), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(10).  EPA has further interpreted these criteria to 
develop a list of factors that will most significantly contribute to EPAs decision to grant reduced risk status.  These factors 
include, in descending order of importance: very low mammalian toxicity; toxicity generally lower than alternatives (10-
100X); displaces chemicals that pose potential human health concerns [e.g., organophosphates, probable carcinogens 
(B2s)]; reduces exposure to mixers, loaders, applicators and reentry workers; very low toxicity to birds; very low toxicity to 
honeybees, significantly less toxicity/risk to birds than alternatives; not harmful to beneficial insects, highly selective pest 
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Moreover, with regard to the costs side of the equation, EPAs analyses, although more 
complete than for benefits, does not fully address the suite of environmental risks posed by 
pesticides.362  Most of the indirect environmental and economic costs of pesticide use are not 
considered.363 Environmental and economic costs which are not typically addressed in any 
meaningful way in pesticide cost/benefit analyses includes: domestic animal poisonings and 
contaminated products, destruction of beneficial natural predators and parasites, honeybee and 
wild bee poisonings and reduced pollination, crop and product loss, ground and surface water 
contamination, fishery losses, adverse effects on wild birds and mammals, adverse effects on 
microorganisms and invertebrates, and adverse effects on ecosystem services.  In 1993, Cornell 
Professor David Pimmentel estimated that if the full environmental and social costs of pesticide 
use are taken into account, including indirect effects, the environmental and social costs of 
pesticide use would be significantly greater than $8 billion/year. 364  Pimentel estimated that of this 
$8 billion/year, users of pesticides in agriculture pay only approximately $3 billion, leaving the 
remaining $5 billion/year to be borne by society.  365  Moreover, Pimentel points out that many of 
the true costs of pesticide use are either not well understood or difficult to quantify.  Thus, the true 
cost of pesticide use many be even higher.  Unfortunately, very few of these costs are considered 
by EPA when conducting the cost/benefit analysis it relies on to register a pesticide.  Moreover, 
the way that EPA has interpreted FIFRA, even a very small risk may warrant cancellation of a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
impacts; very low toxicity to fish; less toxicity/risk to fish than alternatives; potential toxicity/risk to fish mitigatable/ 
similar toxicity to fish as alternatives, but significantly less exposure; low potential for groundwater contamination; lower 
use rates than alternatives, fewer applications; low pest resistance potential (i.e., new mode of action); highly compatible 
with IPM; efficacy.  PR 97-3 at 3-4. 
362 It is not clear why EPA has focused its attention on human health risks, and has given short shrift to ecological concerns. 
 While EPA certainly has the legal authority to regulate to address ecological concerns, its focus continues to be human 
health concerns.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of pesticide regulation.  Professor Holly Doremus has 
raised the issue of whether EPAs emphasis on human health concerns, as opposed to ecological concerns, stems from the 
institutional setting of EPAs pesticide program.  Holly Doremus, Personal Correspondence, July 27, 2005.  Although a full 
evaluation of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, the history of the EPA pesticide program may be a factor in 
creating such a bias.  Prior to the creation of the EPA, pesticides, to the extent they were regulated, were under the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  When EPA was formed, many of the USDA employees working on 
pesticide issues moved over to the EPA pesticide office.  Perhaps this created a culture focused on promoting agriculture 
even at the expense of ecological harm. Another explanation for this institutional bias may simply be that, from a political 
standpoint, it is easier to justify imposing costs on industry or farms to protect human health than  it is to protect ecological 
resources 
363  See generally, Pimentel , supra note 219. 
364  Id. at 72. 
365  Id. 
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pesticide, provided that the benefits are very low.366  Conversely, presumably, even a very high 
risk may not trigger cancellation if the economic benefits to be achieved are very high.  By this 
logic, if a pesticide poses a great economic benefit, high risks to vulnerable species or ecosystems 
will be tolerated.   
Another area in which EPAs current approach to regulating pesticides is lacking is with 
regard to threatened and endangered species. The Center for Biological Diversity recently released 
a report that found that EPA has approved registrations for pesticides that put more than 375 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) listed species at risk.367  In the past several years, EPA has come 
under considerable attack for its failure to adequately address risks to certain species listed under 
the ESA368 from pesticide uses. Since the 1989 Defenders of Wildlife case, in which EPA was 
found liable for a take under the ESA for allowing the continued registration of pesticides 
containing strychnine, which harmed certain listed species, it has been clear that EPA not only has 
an obligation to comply with the consultation requirements under the ESA when making decisions 
regarding pesticide registration, but the agency also has an obligation to ensure that the permitted 
use of a registered pesticide will not result in an unauthorized take of a listed species.  
Nevertheless, in the years since the Defenders of Wildlife decision, EPAs actions with 
regard to the protection of listed species from pesticides have been limited and have failed to carry 
out the mandates of the ESA.  EPAs policy regarding pesticides and endangered species has 
consisted of requiring certain pesticide products labels to direct users to County Bulletins, which 
identify on a map the range of listed species in that County.  In the past several years, EPA has 
come under increasing criticism for is failure to fulfill its obligations under the ESA.369  In 
                                                 
366 In the Matter of Protexall Products, Inc., et al., FIFRA Docket Nos. 625, et al (1989) (upholding cancellation of sodium 
arsenate ant baits which posed a small risk of minor illness to children because the benefits of the pesticide were minimal). 
367 Brian Litmans & Jeff Miller, Silent Spring Revisited:  Pesticide Use and Endangered Species (A Center for Biological 
Diversity Report, 2004), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/ (Last visited, 
August 4, 2005). 
368  15 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1599 (2004). 
369  While a detailed discussion of the issues related to the relationship between pesticide laws and the Endangered Species 
Act is beyond the scope of this article, those issues are the subject of a forthcoming article by the author.  For a further 
discussion of these an related issues, see Patti A. Goldman, Protecting Endangered Species From Pesticides: Making the 
ESA Work or Finding Loopholes, SJ023 ALI-ABA 31 (2003); Pierre Mineau, Birds and Pesticides: Are Pesticide 
Regulatory Decisions Consistent With the Protection Afforded Migratory Bird Species Under the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act?, 28 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 313 (2004).  See also, Marcilynn A. Burke, Klamath Farmers and 
Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why it (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POLY F. 441, 487-491 (2004) (discussing a number of regulatory attempts to weaken the consultation process including 
with regard to pesticide registration).   
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particular in September of 2004, environmentalists won a significant victory when the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision affirming a January 2004 U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Washington order which found that EPA had violated the ESA, because it had 
failed to take steps to ensure that the registration of 54 pesticide would not jeopardize the survival 
of listed salmon species.  The Courts ruling upheld the District Courts injunction, which imposed 
detailed buffer zones restricting the use of more than 30 pesticides along listed salmon supporting 
waters in California, Oregon, and Washington states.370 
EPAs response to the criticisms regarding its failure to fully comply with the ESA, as well 
as its recent court loses, has been to amend the joint regulations for consultation under section 7 of 
the ESA.371  On August 5, 2004, EPA published in the Federal Register Final Rules that in essence 
allow EPA to avoid consultation with the federal wildlife agencies regarding whether new 
pesticides could cause harm to species listed under the ESA.  Under the new rules, EPA will 
conduct its own reviews, which will simplify the process.372  The agencies purported rationale for 
the new rules is to provide a more efficient approach to make decisions on whether new pesticides 
will adversely affect a listed species.373  However, environmental groups fear that the new rules 
will  undercut the ESA and put listed species at greater risk.  Consequently, a number of 
environmental organizations have filed suit alleging that the new rules violate the ESA.374 
Concerns with rare or sensitive species or ecosystems can be addressed by an open-ended 
balancing approach, where the agency is directed to consider costs, but not  in a strict cost/benefit 
monetized balancing.  Under such an approach, although costs would be taken into consideration, 
the agency could be directed to afford greater weight in its balancing to other specified factors 
                                                 
370  See Wash. Toxics Coalition, et al. v. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Order issued January 22, 2004.  This Order 
was the third in a series of orders granting injunctive relief to the environmental plaintiffs in this matter.  See Wash. Toxics 
Coalition, et al. V. EPA, et al., Case No. C01-013132C, Orders issued July 16, 2003 and August 8, 2003. All of these 
Orders are available on EPAs website at http://www.epa.gov/espp/wtc/index.html (Last visited January 7, 2005). 
371  EPA adopted the new regulation as a joint regulation along with the two ESA consulting agencies,  the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  Joint Counterpart 
Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 47,732 (Aug. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 402).   
372  According to EPA officials, the consultation process was not working.  EPA frequently ignored the consultation 
requirements because it the complexity of considering thousands of chemicals potential effects on 1,200 ESA-listed 
species.  See  Http://www.eenes.net/Greenwire/searcharchive (last visited December 1, 2004).   
373  See id.  FWS and NMFS have completely only approximately 12 consultations on pesticides in the past 10 years.  Since 
2002, EPA has sent the wildlife agencies approximately 30 pesticide consultations, but very few have been completed.  Id. 
374  On September 23, 2004, a coalition of eight environmental groups filed suit challenging the Joint Counterpart 
Endangered Species Act Regulation.  Id. 
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such Environmental Justice concerns, risks to threatened or endangered species, risks to rare 
species, or  risks to vulnerable ecosystems.  It should be noted, however, that under this proposal, 
the analysis would not end with the open-ended balancing.  A second step, described more fully 
below, would require the consideration of local factors, such as the presence of threatened or 
endangered species, which could be effected by the use of the pesticide in that location.375 
FIFRAs cost/benefit approach also raises concerns with regard to the pesticidal GMOs.376 
 EPAs cost/benefit approach raises particular concerns with regard to pesticidal GMOs that are 
exported, or that naturally spread, to other parts of the world.  For example, one risk concern with 
plant-incorporated protectants is whether a favorable ecological niche exits for the modified plant 
in its new environment that will enable the plant to thrive, and perhaps become a pest or disrupt 
the balance of ecosystems.  EPA may evaluate a particular pesticidal GMO under FIFRA and may 
                                                 
375 Although the possibility of harm to threatened or endangered species should be considered and afforded weight in the 
open-ended balancing analysis, it would be noted that under the ESA, jeopardy to listed species can not be balanced 
away by cost considerations.  Accordingly, in the second-step localized decision-making process, specific risk to listed 
species from the application of the particular pesticide in that particular locale must be evaluated under the ESA.  Pesticide 
applications that do not comply with the ESA would be prohibited. 
376  The world-wide concern over the safety of biotechnology products is evidenced by the significant role that 
biotechnology played in the negotiations of the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.  The agreement that 
was eventually reached contained a number of provisions that were relevant to biotechnology.  Two provisions in 
particular, Article 8 (In-situ Conservation) and Article 19 (Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits) were 
directed at addressing international concerns with biotechnology products.  Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000). 
Article 8 of the Convention requires that Contracting Parties establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the 
risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting from of biotechnology that could affect the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.  Neither FIFRAs export provisions nor EPAs plant-incorporated 
protectant rule are address the broader concern of risk to biological diversity internationally.  It is conceivable that a 
pesticide, particularly a plant-incorporated protectant, that does not pose an unreasonable risk in the U.S. could pose an 
unreasonable risk in another country.  As discussed above, many of the risk issues associated with plant-incorporated 
protectants relate to their ability to outcrops to wild relatives.  This is a very different situation than that of conventional 
pesticides.  For conventional chemical pesticides, the risks posed by the substance will tend to be the similar regardless of 
the country or part of the world.  For example, if a pesticide is highly toxic to humans or other mammals in the United 
States, it will also be highly toxic to humans or mammals in other countries.  The risks associated with plant-incorporated 
protectants, on the other hand, may vary more with location depending on a number of factors such as the presence of wild 
relatives.  It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for EPA to evaluate all risks of a plant-incorporated protectant 
in every country in the world.  Moreover, to conduct the unreasonable adverse effects analysis required by FIFRA, EPA 
also must look at the societal benefits associated with the pesticide.  It would seem infeasible for EPA to conduct such an 
analysis for every importing country.  EPA is not in a position to evaluate, and place value on, the economic and societal 
benefits that an importing country derives from a particular pesticide or chemical substance. 
Another impediment to EPA addressing risks of plant-incorporated protectants in countries other than the United States is 
that FIFRA provides EPA with very limited authority to regulate exported pesticides.  The export of pesticides is regulated 
under section 17 of FIFRA.  See 7 U.S.C. § 136o (2004).  The primary emphasis of this section is on the provision of 
information by EPA to foreign governments.  Id.  Section 17 mandates two systems of notification: a notice to the 
government of an importing country of the export of unregistered pesticides, id. § 136o(a)(2), and a notice to all countries 
of cancellation or suspension actions taken by EPA, id. § 17o(b).  Beyond these notification provisions, FIFRA does not 
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find that it will not pose an unreasonable environmental risk in the U.S. because a suitable niche 
does not exist for the modified plant in the U.S. that would allow the creation of a pest.  To 
determine whether the pesticidal GMO poses an unreasonable risk in another country, however, 
the exporting company (or EPA) would be required to identify the types of ecosystems that exist in 
that country and the likelihood that the modified plant would thrive or spread in that environment. 
 To do this, the exporting company (or EPA) would have to address a wide array of issues to 
determine whether the pesticide produced by the plant gives it a selective advantage in the new 
environment.  Such a determination would depend on a number of considerations such as whether 
the modified plant has wild relatives in the new environment, how the modified plant is affected 
by factors such as climate, what selective pressures (e.g., viruses or other pathogens that normally 
keep the plant population in check) exist in the new environment, and how the modified plant 
interacts with the types of species present in the various ecosystems of the importing country.  It 
appears to be unreasonable to require such a site-specific risk assessment for every country that 
imports U.S. pesticides.  Nevertheless, international concerns could be averted if the United States 
were to participate in international efforts to provide advanced informed consent prior to exporting 
GMOs to other countries.  Such a process is contemplated by the Rio Convention on Biodiversity, 
as well as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, to neither of which the United States is a party.377 
B.  An Ecological Integrity Baseline 
As described above, one of the cornerstones of eco-pragmatism is an environmental 
baseline.  By incorporating ecological principles into eco-pragmatism, the notion of ecological 
integrity as the environmental baseline emerges.  With such a baseline, any action taken under 
FIFRA can be measured against the reference point of the baseline.  As with any baseline, 
however, such comparisons cannot be made without good data and ongoing monitoring.  To ensure 
that pesticide usage does not undermine ecological integrity, a number of revisions to the FIFRA 
program are necessary.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
provide EPA with the authority to regulate exports. 
377  Article 19(3) of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity provides:   The Parties shall consider the need for and 
modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the 
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organisms resulting form biotechnology that may have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.  The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety 
implements this directive by including a provision which requires advanced informed agreement by the Importing Party 
prior to the first international transboundary movement of living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the 
environment.  Article 7(1) of the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety.  
 
 84 
Perhaps most importantly in this regard, EPAs data requirements must be revised to 
require data better designed to evaluate risks to wildlife species, and in particular ESA listed 
species, as well as ecosystem services such as pollination, decomposition, nitrogen fixation, and 
other ecological services provided by organisms that may be affected by pesticides.  Currently, 
EPAs data requirements for pesticide registration only address a limited number of these 
concerns.378  EPAs data requirements for testing for ecological effects are limited and many such 
data requirements have not yet been developed.  In addition to substantial data requirements 
related to product chemistry,379 much of EPAs requirements regarding data necessary to support 
the registration of a pesticide are focused on human health effects.  For example, EPA has 
extensive data requirements related to residue chemistry to estimate human exposure to pesticides, 
acute human hazard, subchronic human hazard, chronic human hazard, mutagenicity, metabolism 
studies, reentry hazard, spray drift evaluation, as well as oncogenicity, teratogenicity, 
neurotoxicity, and reproductive effects in humans.380 
EPAs environmental fate data are designed to assess the presence of widely distributed 
and persistent pesticides in the environment which may result in loss of usable land, surface water, 
ground water, and wildlife resources, and assess the potential environmental exposure of other 
nontarget organisms, such as fish and wildlife, to pesticides. 381  Environmental fate studies 
include studies to determine the rate of pesticide degradation,382 metabolism studies to determine 
the nature and availability of pesticides to rotational crops and to aid in the evaluation of the 
persistence of a pesticide, 383 mobility studies pertaining to leaching, adsorption/desorption and 
                                                 
378  The minimum data requirements for registration, experimental use permits, and reregistration are set forth in 40 C.F.R. 
§ 158 (2005).  More detailed standards for conducting tests, guidance on evaluation and reporting of data and additional 
guidance is provided in a series of advisory documents that EPA makes available to applicants and the public.  See id. § 
158.20(c).  In its data requirement rules, EPA identifies some data as required and other data as conditionally required.  
Conditionally required data are required only if the products proposed pattern of use, results of other tests, or other factors 
meet the criteria specified in the rules.  See id. §§ 158.25(a) and 158.101.  EPAs rules also allow certain data requirements 
to be waived if that are not applicable to the particular pesticide or use.  See id. § 158.25(b) (setting forth policy on 
flexibility and waiver); 40 CFR 158.35 (describing the flexibility in data requirements) and § 158.45 (regarding waiver of 
data requirements).  In addition, EPAs rules set forth varying data requirements for minor use of a pesticide (i.e., used on a 
minor crop) and biochemical and microbial pesticides.  See id. §§ 158.60 and 158.65, respectively. 
379  See id. §§ 158.150, 158.153, 158.155, 158.160, 158.162, 158.165, 158.167, 158.170, 158.175, 158.180, and 158.190. 
380  See id. paragraphs 158.202(a), (c), (e), (f), and (g) and id. §§ 158.240, 158.390, 158.440 and 158.340.  See also, id. § 
158.34 (providing that certain human health effects data d=submitted to EPA must be flagged as indicating potential 
adverse effects). 
381  Id. § 158.202(d)(1). 
382  Id. § 158.202(d)(2). 
383  Id. § 158.202(d)(3). 
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volatility of pesticides, 384 dissipation studies 385 and accumulation studies.386  Perhaps because 
environmental fate data are used to evaluate human exposure to pesticides, as well as wildlife 
exposure, these data requirements appear to be fairly comprehensive.  However, EPAs data 
requirements regarding effects on wildlife and nontarget organisms are considerably less 
comprehensive. 
With regard to ecological effects, EPA has, by rule, developed limited data requirements 
designed to evaluate  wildlife and aquatic organisms, environmental fate, and nontarget insects. 
EPAs data requirements for effects on wildlife and aquatic organisms, include avian toxicity 
studies387 and freshwater fish and invertebrate acute toxicity studies388 for most pesticides intended 
for outdoor use.  Wild mammal toxicity, avian reproduction, simulated and actual field testing of 
mammals and birds, acute toxicity to estuarine and marine organisms, fish early life stage, aquatic 
invertebrate life cycle, fish life cycle and aquatic organisms accumulation and simulated or actual 
field testing of aquatic organisms are only conditionally required389 for most outdoor uses.  As can 
be seen by EPAs primary focus on acute toxicity testing, EPA does not generally require data 
related to potential adverse effects of pesticides on wildlife behavior, neurology, reproduction, 
birth defects, or other non-acute effects.  Moreover, EPAs data requirements do not contain any 
studies aimed at evaluating effects on other species, such as amphibians or reptiles or other species 
not specifically identified in the rules. Accordingly, EPAs wildlife data requirements should be 
revisited to determine what additional data requirements should be included to more fully address 
the wide range of potential effects on fish and wildlife that may result from exposure to pesticides. 
Likewise, EPAs data requirements for nontarget insects are limited.  EPA does 
conditionally require acute toxicity testing for honey bees and other pollinators, if the proposed 
use will result in honey bee or other pollinator exposure, however, EPA does not have any data 
                                                 
384  Id. § 158.202(d)(4). 
385  Id. § 158.202(d)(5). 
386  Id. § 158.202(d)(6).  See also id. § 158.290. 
387  Avian oral LD50 and dietary LC50s are required using the preferred test animal species, the mallard and the bobwhite. 
Id. § 158.490. 
388  Freshwater fish LC50 studies are required, with the preferred test species being the rainbow and bluegill fish and acute 
LC50 studies are required on freshwater invertebrates, with the preferred test species being Daphnia.  Id. § 158.490. 
389  Id. § 158.490.  Conditionally required studies are required only on a case-by-case basis depending on the results of 
lower tier studies, such as acute and subacute testing, intended use pattern and environmental fate characteristic or if certain 
specified criteria are met.  
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requirements related to honeybee subacute feeding studies,390 nontarget aquatic insects, or 
nontarget predatory or parasitic insects.391  Moreover, EPA does not have any data requirements 
whatsoever related to soil microorganisms, which provide critical ecological services, such as 
decomposition and nitrogen fixation, or any data requirements designed to evaluate the effects of 
pesticides on any other ecological services. 
Although EPAs data requirements do include some studies designed to evaluate risks to 
fish, wildlife, aquatic organisms and nontarget insects, EPAs primary purpose in requiring such 
studies is not to determine whether to register a pesticide product, but instead is to provide data 
which determines the need for (and appropriate wording for) precautionary label statements to 
minimize the potential adverse effects to nontarget organisms. 392  However, label requirements 
do not always provide sufficient protection against the environmental harms resulting from 
pesticides use.   
Despite all of the testing and labeling that EPA imposes, large numbers of birds, insects, 
amphibians, and aquatic species, including threatened and endangered species, continue to be 
harmed by EPA-registered pesticides.393  While many label requirements that EPA imposes are 
aimed at protecting human users of pesticides,394 as well as other humans such as children 395 from 
accidental poisonings, EPA does require certain environmental hazard information to appear on 
pesticide labels.  For example, if a pesticide intended for outdoor use contains an active ingredient 
with a specified level of acute mammalian or avian toxicity, the label must bear a precautionary 
statement, such as This pesticide is toxic to wildlife. 396  If either accident history or field studies 
                                                 
390  In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies this type of requirement as reserved pending development of test 
methodology. 40 C.F.R. § 158.590 (2005). 
391  In its data requirements rule, EPA identifies these types of requirements as reserved pending further evaluation to 
determine what and when data should be required, and to develop appropriate test methods.  Id. § 158.590. 
392  Id. § 158.202(h)(1). 
393  See Brian Litmans & Jeff Miller, Silent Spring Revisited:  Pesticide Use and Endangered Species (A Center for 
Biological Diversity Report, 2004), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/Programs/science/pesticides/ 
(Last visited, August 4, 2005). 
 
394  See id. §§ 156.10 (general labeling requirements); 156.60 (human hazard and precautionary statements); 156.62 (human 
hazard toxicity categories); 156.64 (signal words for human hazard toxicity categories); 156.68 (first aid statement); 156.70 
(precautionary statements for human hazards); 156.78 (precautionary statements of physical or chemical hazards); and §§ 
156.200 -156.212 (worker protection statements). 
395  See id.§ 156.66 (child hazard warning). 
396  The specified level of acute toxicity for mammals warranting such a statement is an oral LD50 of 100mg/kg or less.  
The specified level of acute toxicity for fish warranting such a statement is an LC50 of 1ppm or less.  The specified level of 
acute toxicity for birds warranting such as statements an oral LD50 of 100 mg/kg or less or a subacute dietary LC50 of 500 
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demonstrate that the use of the pesticide may result in fatality to birds, fish or mammals, the 
pesticide label must bear the precautionary statement, such as  This pesticide is extremely toxic to 
wildlife (fish).  397 Similarly, if a product intended for certain uses contains an active ingredient 
that is toxic to pollinating insects, the label must bear an appropriate label caution.398  Finally, if a 
product is intended for outdoor use other than aquatic applications, the label must bear the 
precautionary statement Keep out of lakes, ponds or streams.  Do not contaminate water by 
cleaning of equipment or disposal of wastes. 399 
Although EPA does require these precautionary statements on labels, it is unclear what 
effect they have in practice.  For example, if a farmer intends to apply a particular pesticide to 
combat a particular pest of her crops and the pesticide label indicates it is toxic to wildlife, how 
will this information influence the farmers' behavior?  It is unlikely that the farmer will choose not 
to apply the pesticide, because virtually all of the major chemical pesticides use in agriculture 
today are acutely toxic to at least some nontarget organisms.  It is difficult to imagine that a 
statement on a label indicating that a product is toxic to wildlife will have any significant influence 
on user behavior.  Without more specific directions about when, where or how it is appropriate to 
apply the pesticide to minimize risks to wildlife, the farmer is left with an essentially useless 
warning.  The lack of more useful directions to minimize risk is likely due to the fact that because 
most chemical pesticides are acutely toxic to at least some wildlife, it is impossible to release them 
into the environment in large amounts, without creating the possibility for harm to wildlife.  
C.  Addressing Uncertainty and Change 
As described above, eco-pragmatism argues in favor of feasibility approaches rather than 
cost/benefit approaches.  While this article proposes a modified cost/benefit analysis (open-ended 
balancing) for the registration of a pesticide under FIFRA, it also proposes that a feasibility 
analysis be conducted for significant pesticide use.  Currently, there is no federal system in 
place, and only very limited state or local systems in place, that regulate the uses of pesticides 
registered under FIFRA other than the label instructions on each registered pesticide.  These label 
instructions generally are the same nationwide.  Thus, there is not currently a widespread system 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ppm or less.  Id. § 156.85(b) paragraphs (1), (2) and (3), respectively. 
397  Id. § 156.85(b)(4). 
398  Id. § 156.85(b)(5). 
399  Id. § 156.85(b)(6). 
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for considering local factors to determine what pest control method should be used in what 
location under what circumstances.   
As described above, for an environmental regulatory system to be eco-pragmatic, it must 
be flexible and able to adapt to new information and changed circumstances.  Transferring some 
decision-making authority to a local level is one way to accomplish this goal.  The  consideration 
of local factors in making the determination of whether or how to use a specific pesticide in a 
specific location is of particular import.  The benefit of local control over pesticide use is that 
decision can be made based on local factors.  Such factors could include presence of threatened, 
endangered or otherwise rare species, presence of sensitive species, soil conditions, climatic 
conditions, proximity to environmentally sensitive lands, types of crops grown, types of farming 
practices used, severity of pest infestations, or other relevant site-specific factors.400 
There are a variety of potential mechanisms available for achieving local decision-making 
regarding actual pesticide use.  One such mechanism is to encourage local government regulation 
of pesticide use.  Another mechanism is to provide better training to certified applicators in IPM 
and non-chemical controls, and better information regarding endangered species, ecological 
processes, the role of predators and parasites, and other local environmental conditions.  Similarly, 
better training could be provided to local agricultural extension agents.  A variation on this theme 
would be to empower local officials  whether they be local government officials or extension 
agent officials to make case-by-case, or season-by season decisions on the actual use of pesticides.  
For example, a local official could be required to evaluate the local conditions, including 
the particular pest concerns, the climatic conditions and a wide variety of local environmental 
factors, before prescribing that a particular pesticide be used.  This idea is similar to that of a 
medical doctor prescribing that a patient take a particular medication.  Prior to issuing such a 
prescription, the doctor would consider a number of factors such as the patients overall health, 
other medical conditions, other medications the patient is taking, any allergies or  sensitivities the 
patient may have to certain types of medications, the patients age, the patients health and lifestyle 
objectives ad the patients willingness to accept certain risks to achieve such goals.  Moreover, the 
doctor could adjust the type or amount of medication over time to fine-tune the treatment in 
                                                 
400 Because ecological impacts are necessarily contextual and local, whereas, human health impacts are not, EPAs failure 
to adequately address local ecological effects of pesticides may be further evidence of an institutional bias away from 
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accordance with changing circumstances or new information.  A prescription-type approach to 
pesticide application could similarly be adjusted over time to take into consideration changed local 
conditions, or new information about local environmental factors.  Of course, the physician-
prescribe pharmaceutical system is not without its shortcomings.  High pressure sales tactics by 
representatives of the pharmaceutical industry, glossy advertisements on television and in 
magazines promising a wonderful life can be achieved merely by popping a pill, the publics 
desire for an easy fix in the form of a pill, and industry-sponsored research all may contribute to 
the trend over physicians over prescribing medications.  It is likely that even with a pesticide 
prescription system in place, pesticide manufacturers will be able to convince decision-makers to 
prescribe their pesticides.  Nevertheless, such a system, if properly instituted, could result in at 
least some level of informed decision-making prior to the release of large amounts of pesticides 
into the environment.   
The likely criticisms of such a system would be that to institute such a system could entail 
high costs and possibly the creation of a new bureaucracy.  However, the possibility exists of 
relying on existing infrastructure to facilitate such a system without the need for a completely new 
institution or significant additional personnel.  The existing agricultural extension services could 
potentially be used to administer such a system.  Alternatively, existing state requirements for 
certified applicator training and certification could be expanded to better educate applicators on 
local environmental factors that should be taken into account and on non-chemical alternative pest 
control mechanisms that in many cases may be preferable to chemical approaches. additional  and 
expense.  Such and approach might also be able to rely on existing extension infrastructure and 
resources. 
Although FIFRA provides a regulatory system that applies to any pesticide sold or 
distributed in the United States, FIFRA does not generally preempt state or local government 
regulation of pesticide use.  In 1991, the right of a local government to regulate pesticide use was 
clearly established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. 
Mortier.401  In that case a Wisconsin local government had adopted an ordinance, which required a 
permit from the local government prior to certain types of pesticide use.  Prior to the Mortier 
                                                                                                                                                                      
ecological protection.  See infra note 362 & accompanying text. 
401  501 U.S. 597 (1991). 
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decision, only a small number of states had in place laws that preempted local governments from 
regulating pesticide use.  After Mortier, all but 11 states have laws preempting local regulation of 
pesticides.402 
Justice White, writing for the majority in the  in the Mortier decision, recognized the 
benefit of  local decision-making for the actual use of pesticides when he wrote: FIFRA nowhere 
seeks to establish an affirmative permit scheme for the actual use of pesticides.  It certainly does 
not equate registration and labeling requirements with a general approval to apply pesticides 
throughout the Nation without regard to regional and local factors like climate, population, 
geography, and water supply. 403  And yet, this is in practice  what FIFRA does.  Once a pesticide 
receives a FIFRA registration, unless a particular state actively seeks to further regulate such a 
pesticide, it can be used anywhere in the United States with the only limitation being that it must 
be used in accordance with the FIFRA label instructions.  As is described more fully below, most 
states do not have detailed environmental permitting requirements for pesticide use.404  Although 
EPA attempts to impose risk reducing measures on users through detailed labeling requirements, a 
set of instructions on a container that have been drafted to apply to the entire United States is a 
poor substitute for a site-specific, circumstance-specific decision on what pesticide to use where, 
when and how. 
The issue of localized decision-making regarding pesticide use has arisen in another 
context in recent years.  Beginning with the case of Headwaters, Inc., v. Talent Irrigation 
District405 in 2002, the courts, as well as EPA have been grappling with the issue of whether and 
under what circumstances a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systems (NPDES) permit is 
required under the Clean Water Act for the application of pesticides into waters of the United 
States.406  Historically, EPA had not required NPDES permits for such pesticide applications.  
                                                 
402  Haight, supra note 202, at 39.  The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed FIFRA preemption again in Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences, LLC., 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt claims for defective design, defective 
manufacture, negligent testing, breach of express warranty, and violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and 
remanding the issue of whether FIFRA preempts fraud and failure-to-warn claims).). 
403  501 U.S. 597 (1991). 
404  See infra notes 412-414 & accompanying text. 
405  243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that the application of an aquatic pesticide to irrigation canals in compliance with 
the registration and labeling requirements under FIFRA, did not eliminate the need for an NPDES permit). 
406  For a detailed discussion of the judicial decisions and EPAs position on the issue of requiring NPDES permits for 
aquatic pesticide application, see Kelly C. Connelly (case note), Pesticides and Permits: Clean Water Act v. Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 35 (2003) and Paul Herran, (case note), 
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Thus, although EPA, at least arguably, had s the legal authority to require permits for applications 
of pesticides to waters, which would take into consideration localized environmental factors, EPA 
has chosen not to do so.  Even after the Headwaters decision, EPA has steadfastly refused to 
require NPDES permits for the application of pesticides directly to waters of the U.S. for the 
purpose of controlling pests in or over such waters.407 
In addition, as described above, nationwide decision-making regarding pesticides can lead 
to disproportionate risks being place on vulnerable populations of people, as well as on vulnerable 
species or ecosystems.  While an overall cost/benefit analysis for a particular pesticide may weigh 
in favor of use of the pesticide, geographic or ecological hot spots may occur where the risks 
outweigh the benefits on those localized geographic areas or for those particular species.  Without 
some way to bring localized concerns into the decision-making process, risks will continue to fall 
disproportionately on the most vulnerable human and ecological resources.  Although over one 
half of all registered agricultural pesticides are restricted use pesticides,408 which must be applied 
only under the supervision of a certified applicator, the certified applicator requirement does not 
provide the level of oversight, consideration of local ecological factors and consideration of lower 
risk alternatives that would be needed to adequately address ecological risks.  First, certified 
applicators do not necessarily directly oversee the application of pesticides, but instead typically 
serve as arm chair supervisors.409  Second, certified applicators are not required to receive any 
particular training in local ecological systems and their vulnerability to particular pesticides.410  
Finally, although FIFRA section 11 requires EPA and states to make available to certified 
applicators at their request instructional materials concerning Integrated Pest Management (IPM), 
the statute expressly states certified applicators are not required to receive instruction on IPM and 
are not required to be shown to be competent with respect  to such techniques.411  Thus, certified 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Headwaters, Inc. V. Talent Irrigation District: Application of Aquatic Pesticides to Irrigation Canals, a Discharge, Which 
Requires a Clean Water Act Permit?, 25 HAW. L. REV. 629 (2003). 
407  See 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (August 13, 2003). 
408  RODGERS, supra note 190, at 458. 
409  See infra note 414 & accompanying text.  
410  For a description of certified applicator training programs, see RODGERS, supra note 190, at 462-63. 
411  7 U.S.C. § 136i(c) (2004), regarding instruction in integrated pest management, provides:  
Standards prescribed by the Administrator for the certification of applicators of pesticides under subsection (a) of this 
section, and state plans submitted to the Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, shall include provisions for 
making instructional materials concerning integrated pest management techniques available to individuals at their request in 
accordance with the provisions of section 136u(c) of this title, but such plans may not require that any individual receive 
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applicators are not required to know about less risky pest control techniques, let alone to consider 
them in making decisions regarding which options to choose to control a particular pest.  In fact, a 
certified applicators job is not to decide what approach to take to control a pest, but is merely to 
ensure that once a particular pesticide is chosen, it is applied properly in accordance with label 
instructions. 
Unfortunately, despite compelling reasons for considering local conditions in determining 
what pesticides to use in what locations and under what conditions, and the fact that FIFRA allows 
state and local governments to regulate pesticide use, state regulation of pesticides tends to be 
minimal.  Most states do not have regulatory systems in place that are much more environmentally 
protective than FIFRAs basic nationwide protections.  Most states do not have any significant 
regulations addressing the use of pesticides under localized conditions.  For example, most states 
do not require site-specific permits to be obtained before a pesticide can be applied, even for large 
scale agricultural pesticide application into the environment.412  Likewise, most states do not 
require anyone with specialized knowledge of the presence of threatened or endangered species or 
rare or sensitive ecosystems to make any evaluation prior to the release of pesticides into the 
environment.  What state pesticide regulatory programs generally do is treat farmers as private 
applicators, who are required to obtain a state certification that demonstrates that they have 
attained a level of practical knowledge of pesticide use and hazards, before such farmer is allowed 
to apply pesticides.  Some states have more stringent requirements for chemigation, fertigation and 
aerial application,413 but generally, once a farmer has obtained the required training and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
instruction concerning such techniques or to be shown to be competent with respect to the use of such techniques.  The 
Administrator and States implementing such plans shall provide that all interested individuals are notified on the 
availability of such instructional materials. 
412  Some states do have limited permitting requirements for pesticide use, however these requirements generally apply only 
to aerial application of pesticides and generally a permit is not issued for each application.  For example, in Hawaii, a 
permit is required prior to aerial application of pesticides.  See HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 4-66-64 (2004).  However, the 
permit can be issued for repeated uses or for a specified length of time.  Id. at § 4-66-64 (a)(4).  Consequently, changing 
local environmental conditions are not likely to be adequately addressed for each application.  In Massachusetts, a permit is 
required for the aerial application of pesticides, however, the permit is for a one-year duration and is not specific to the date 
or time of application.  See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 13.05(3)(b) (2004).  Nevertheless, a site inspection is required 
prior to permit issuance, which presumably means that local condition are assessed prior to issuing the permit.  Id.  In 
addition, in Massachusetts, a special permit is required for application of restricted use pesticides to an area greater than 
twenty-five acres.  See id. § 13.03(18).  Similarly, in Vermont, one-year duration permits are required for aerial application 
of pesticides.  See VT. CODE R. 20 031 012 § IV (5) (2003). 
413  See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5E-9.019(2)(a) (2005) (aerial applicators require a separate certification); HAW. 
ADMIN. RULES § 4-66-64(6) (2004) (mandating a notice requirement prior to any aerial application); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 
02.03.03.310, 02.03.03.320 (2004) (placing specific restrictions on aerial application geared primarily toward minimizing 
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certification, he is free to apply pesticides at will provided it is done in accordance with FIFRA or 
state label directions and restrictions. Whats more, generally the certified private applicator can 
supervise the application of pesticides by non-certified persons.  In most states, direct 
supervision means that the certified private applicator is within a telephone call away from his 
supervisees.414  Some states do have specific pesticide regulations aimed at protecting groundwater 
or surface water bodies.  However, even these states do not generally require any form of site-
specific permitting evaluation prior to pesticide use.  By establishing a prescription-type system to 
large-scale pesticide use, not only will local environmental factors receive due consideration, but 
the system would have the flexibility necessary to adapt to changing circumstances and new 
information.415   
                                                                                                                                                                      
spray drift); 302 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 27:050 § 2(8) (2003) (requiring separate certification for aerial applicators); LA. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, Part XXII § 145 (A)(iii-vii) (2005) (detailing specific requirements regarding aerial application, 
including the requirement to adjust flight patterns to avoid sensitive areas and prohibitions on aerial application if wind 
velocity exceeds 10 mph or if it is raining or rain is imminent); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 13.05(3)(b,c) (2004) 
(requiring a permit for aerial application, as well as prohibiting aerial application within 400 feet of a water body and 
requirements that aerial spraying cease if spray drift occurs); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 285.637.10 (2005) (detailing specific 
requirements regarding aerial spray drift, including a requirement for applicators to have a written spray draft plan in place 
and restrictions to protect sensitive areas including all water bodies); NEB. ADMIN. CODE tit. 25, chp. 2 005.03 (2002) 
(mandating separate certification requirements for application of restricted-use pesticides via chemigation); N.C. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 2, r. 9L.1002, 9L.1003 (2004) (detailing spray drift control regulations and a prohibition on aerial application to 
restricted areas, including water bodies); VT. CODE R. 20 031 012 § IV (1)(b) (2003) (detailing rules regulating pesticide 
drift); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 16-202-2001 - 16-202-2021 (2004) (detailing rules regulating fertigation); WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE § 29.50(2) (2003) (listing restrictions to prevent significant spray drift).  
414  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 487.021(64) (2004) (under direct supervision means that the licensed applicator is 
available if and when needed); IDAHO CODE § 22-3401(34) (2004) (stating that a supervisory certified applicator must be 
available as needed, even though the certified applicator is not physically present at the time and place the pesticide is 
applied); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2642(5)(c)(iv) (2002) (direct supervision defined as being available by voice or 
electronic means and the ability to be physically present if needed); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-249.27 (2004) (under the direct 
supervision of means the certified applicator is responsible for supervisees actions); and WIS. STAT. § 94.67(10m) (2003-
2004) (allowing private applicators to direct the use of restricted-use pesticides, provided they are available if and when 
needed during the application); MD REGS. CODE tit. 15.05.01.01(b)(23)(b) (2005) (stating that the supervisory certified 
applicator must be available is needed); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 30-1.2(2005) (defining available if and when needed 
to mean that the direct supervisor is in constant voice contact and no more than 3 hours away via ground transportation); 
OR. ADMIN. R. 603-057-0001(10) (2004) (immediate supervision defined as no more than five minutes away).    
Nevertheless, a few states do have more stringent supervisory requirements for certified applicators.  See e.g., IND. ADMIN. 
CODE tit. 355, r. 4-2-3 (2004) (stating that, if an applicator has never worked with a pesticide before or is not a registered 
technician, the certified applicator must be both physically present and in direct voice contact during the application; for 
registered technicians, the certified applicator can be available through telephone or walkie-talkie); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 
333, § 10.07 (1996) (requiring that the supervision of non-certified applicators increase based upon the hazard of the given 
pesticide being used); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 325.7 (2004) (defining under the direct supervision to 
mean that the certified applicator must be physically present and within voice contact); and VT. CODE R. 20 031 012 § 
I(7)(17) (2003) (certified applicators must be physically present and actively supervise non-certified applicators). 
415 A possible alternative to a registration approach, would be imposing a reporting requirement on farm.  Such and 
approach would be similar to the Toxics Release Inventory under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
program. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2004).  J.B. Ruhl has suggested such an approach as a way to provide regulators and 
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As described above, one of the cornerstones of eco-pragmatism, as well as conservation 
biology, is adaptive management.  Because of the complexity and changing nature of ecological 
systems, as well as our ever-increasing understanding of those systems, it is necessary that any 
system designed to address ecological risks, be flexible and able to adapt to changed circumstances 
and new information.  Accordingly, a prescription approach, whereby a prescription for pesticide 
use is written based on a feasibility analysis for each large-scale application (or perhaps series of 
applications during a growing season), could serve as an adaptive management approach.  Each  
time a localized decision must be made to determine what pesticide to prescribe, current local 
conditions can be evaluated to determine the pest control that would maximize ecological 
protection to the extent feasible. 416 Moreover, as new pesticides and non-chemical pest control 
techniques are developed, they can be considered when determining what to prescribe.417 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Despite its early successes in protection of ecological resources at the beginning of the 
environmental movement in the United States, FIFRA has virtually lain dormant with regard to 
protection of ecological resources for the past 25 years.  Ironically, if any area of environmental 
law should be tailored specifically to address ecological concerns, it is with pesticide law, where 
substances that are intend to kill and disrupt species and natural systems are intentionally released 
                                                                                                                                                                      
local communities with information on pesticide releases.  See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and 
Environmental Law, 27 Ecology L.Q. 263, 337-338 (2000).  Although such an approach would not directly require the 
consideration of local ecological factors prior to use of a pesticide, by providing bringing pesticide releases under the 
scrutiny of regulators and communities, such an approach could result in long-term changes to pesticide usage. 
416  For example, if in year two, an American Bald Eagle, or other listed species, builds a nest near the field to be sprayed, it 
may not be appropriate to prescribe the same pesticide that was used on the field in year one, if that pesticide is toxic to 
avian species. Likewise, if a listed species is no longer present near the field, it may be appropriate to go back to the more 
toxic pesticide.  Similarly, if new information about the surrounding ecosystem is discovered, it could effect the decision of 
what pesticide to prescribe.   
417 Although a detailed analysis of discounting environmental benefits is beyond the scope of this article, as described in 
Part IV, above, many risks of pesticides are long-term risks.  For example, the tendency of certain pesticides to 
bioaccumulate as they work their way up the food chain, poses risks that may not be realized for many years after the initial 
release of the pesticide into the environment.  Similarly, the harms from certain pesticides that pose reproductive effects, 
such as the endocrine disruptors, may not be to the animals exposed, but may instead be to the offspring, or even 
subsequent generations of the animals exposed.  Moreover, many of the potential harms to ecological systems and 
ecological services that pesticides pose, including disruptions of predator/prey relationships, harm to pollinators, harm to 
microorganisms that perform decomposition and nutrient cycling services, may not be evident in the short-term, but may 
have significant long-term impacts.  Accordingly, any pesticide regulation that reduces these long-term harms, may not 
demonstrate have immediate benefits.  Consequently, as Farber suggests, it is important to ensure that the long-term 
benefits of pesticide risk reduction measures are adequately valued through the use of low discount rates.  The idea of 
intergenerational equity further supports this notion.  To ensure that future generations inherit functioning ecosystems, 
including functioning agricultural systems, it is incumbent upon this generation to ensure that the long-term benefits of 
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in to the environment in large quantities.  Moreover, pesticide law has failed to keep pace with 
recent advances in ecological study and the field of conservation biology.  The eco-pragmatic 
framework proposed by Professor Daniel Farber, and elaborated upon by others may serve as 
useful approach to reinventing pesticide law to better address ecological concerns.  To accomplish 
this, several steps are required.  First, the prevailing interpretation of FIFRAs unreasonable 
adverse effects standard as mandating a strict cost/benefit balancing should be reevaluated and 
readjusted to be more of an open-ended balancing standard, as contemplated by the drafters of the 
standard.  Related to this idea, EPAs approach to evaluating whether a particular pesticide poses 
an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment should be modified so that registrants are 
required to demonstrate the true benefits of a pesticide, by demonstrating efficacy and by 
evaluating the benefits of the pesticide in relation to the benefits provided by other pest control 
methods that are available, including lower risk chemical pesticides as well as non-chemical pest 
control methods.  Moreover, a mechanism, such as the prescription approach, should be developed 
to allow for localized decision-making on which pesticide is best for a given situation taking into 
account local environmental factors to determine the maximum level of environmental protection 
that is feasible for any given situation. Second, to account for the uncertainties and long-term 
effects of pesticides on the environment, a low discount rate should be used in conducting the 
open-ended balancing analysis.  Third, to ensure that pesticides released into the environment do 
not undermine a baseline of ecological integrity, the data requirements under FIFRA should be 
strengthened to require information about the potential effects on a wider variety of wildlife 
species, as well as ecological services such as pollination, decomposition, and nitrogen fixation.  
Finally, an adaptive management approach should be developed to allow for  flexibility and 
adjustments to the choice of pest control method appropriate for a given situation.  An adaptive 
management mechanism could be based on a medical prescription model, which would allow for 
fine-tuning and adjustment as circumstances change over time or as new information becomes 
available.  The eco-pragmatic approach may provide the necessary framework for modifying U.S. 
pesticide law just enough so that we do the best we can to protect critical ecological resources. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
pesticide-risk reduction measures are properly valued though appropriate low discounting. 
